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ABSTRACT

In writing/trauma, I address the association of trauma with knowledge, language, and writing.
My discussion first works to establish the relationship between trauma and knowledge. I argue
that trauma does not fit into the traditional Enlightenment model of scientific knowledge or the
ontological model of what Michele Foucault calls the ‘truth-event.’ Rather, I contend that
trauma is unique embodied knowledge, different from that of praxis and normal memory. In
general, embodied knowledge is a matter of prenoetic and intentional operations. The body
schema and body image maintain a power of plasticity and adjust to new motilities in order to reestablish an equilibrium when disrupted or threatened. In line with this, embodiment involves a
sense of temporality, agency, and subjectivity. But in the case of extreme disruption, such as
trauma, these fundamental aspects of embodiment are compromised to the point that there is a
corruption of the “embodied feeling of being alive.” Physical pain, to some extent, produces this
phenomenon. However, the distinctive function of the repetition compulsion within trauma
distinguishes it as an exceptional embodied experience unlike physical pain or analogous
phenomena. In the case of trauma, an equilibrium is not maintained, similar to the ontology of
the accident. Instead, at best, we can say that what takes place is a destructive plasticity, in
which the individual is transformed to the point of being a whole new ontological subject.
This phenomenon of destructive plasticity is significant in establishing the relationship of
language to trauma-knowledge as trauma is the precise point at which language is ruptured. That
is to say, purported within psychanalytic discourse, traumatic experience is observed in a break
v

within the symbolic order. As opposed to physical pain, then, trauma is more akin to the abject,
sharing the same resistance to narrative language. Traumatic experience is expressed through
semiotic compulsions in the body as a revolt of being. In light of this, I argue that trauma, rather
than being treated as a pathology, is a specific embodied knowledge which can be captured in
semiotic, poetic language. Moreover, fragmentary writing, the interface of fragmented
knowledge and language, captures the disruptive force of traumatic experience. In conclusion, I
assert that writing-trauma is valuable, not because it allows for a ‘working through’ of the
traumatic experience, but because it is an expression of a distinctly human experience.
My work canvases nineteenth century to contemporary literature on trauma such as
Bessel van der Kolk in the neurobiological discipline, literary critics including Cathy Caruth,
Dori Laub, Dominick LaCapra, et al, and the psychoanalytic theorists Sigmund Freud and
Jacques Lacan. I draw from such literature to analyze the ambiguous impossible-possibility of
witnessing and giving testimony of traumatic experience in history and writing, as well as the
concern with trauma and language specific to the repetition compulsion and the unconscious.
Yet, my primary focus is on the contribution of philosophy to the ongoing discourse of trauma. I
look to philosophical thinkers such as Michele Foucault and Friedrich Nietzsche to depict the
types of epistemological models traditionally addressed within the history of philosophy. My
analysis of phenomenology and embodiment is mainly informed by the works of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and Shaun Gallagher. Additionally, Catharine Malabou’s work on destructive
plasticity provides an understanding of the ontology of the accident, one of the most critical
pieces to my work. Additionally, the works of Elaine Scarry and Julia Kristeva help to disclose
the intimate relationship between language and trauma. I also incorporate the work of Gloria
Anzalúa along with Julia Kristeva to describe the multi-dimensionality of poetic language and
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how this is what allows for an articulation of embodied trauma-knowledge. Finally, Maurice
Blanchot’s depiction of the disaster and fragmentary writing best captures writing-trauma as it is,
like trauma, a process of fragmenting language and meaning.
My purpose is to make clear the value of poetic language and fragmentary writing in
regard to knowing and writing trauma. The significance to philosophy is that my discussion
bridges the phenomenological and epistemological perspectives with that of the literary in order
to engage in philosophical discussion on the implications and value of traumatic experience for
understanding the human condition. It is my observation that the more we experience trauma,
the more valuable artistic expression becomes, and the more we are pressed within the
philosophical tradition to account for an experience so many individuals suffer.
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INTRODUCTION

I looked down and saw darkness,
nothing but the dark, though I knew there was an expanse of endless, beautiful, snow enveloped
peaks
Darkness
no horizon where the land meets the sky,
no breaks,
no piercing lights,
or life
I watched the darkness it seemed for hours
Then a few lights flickering in the distance came into sight
more and more lights
I could suddenly see the edges of the peaks,
mammoth dark silhouettes, marked out by the glow behind
A sense of awe came over me
I looked down and saw the chilling, yet calming, white of the snow
slopes softly flowing
against the black of the exposed, jagged rocks
piercing through the soft surface
forming the images I had imagined below
in the darkness—
the mountains
Circling over the white, I noticed what was different from other images from this position:
lights scattered around,
no formations, no grids, no particular order,
until reaching the city center
This was a calm, familiar darkness
which brought contentment and anticipation of good experiences yet to come
This was unlike the deep, intense, overwhelming darkness that existed
in edges of life
In the dark past,
I had experienced life from a distance,
through a mediated, funneled vision,
from the depth of the thick darkness,
as though it was a substance that enclosed in on my body,
as dense and black as tar
The heaviness weighed me down and allowed me to only see a blurry world that
1

I could not reach
or touch
It is as though I saw the space between me and the world
as walls of a cone-shaped funnel,
narrow at the source of my vision
and slowly opening up
I felt as though I was experiencing life through a telescope, out of focus,
isolating me from the living, vibrant encounter with the world, others, and its pleasures
At the opening of the funnel, I could see visions of bodies, objects, furnished spaces,
all dim,
as though there was a thick transparent glaze
over the one-dimensional images
The walls of the funnel resembled smeared paint
bright reds, yellow, green, blue
blurred,
blending together like abstract artwork.
From this I sensed the feeling of movement,
free-falling,
nothing touching my back,
nothing resisting the weight of my body
As I felt myself falling deep into the darkness,
my body felt an uneasy tingling sensation
as though on the edge of a shiver
I could feel the free-fall
My heart beat quickened,
the low thundering sent ripples of warmth and tingling throughout my body,
a rush of panic and fear pulsed through my muscles,
tense,
warding off the icy-cold, prickly sensation
just below the skin
I felt light,
plunging fast into the darkness;
my arms, legs, and head fluttered as though they were made
of tissue paper
I felt heavy, as though the weight of my body,
my pain, pulled me so forcefully,
so quickly into the all-engulfing,
heavy,
tar-like
darkness
There was no tar-like substance engulfing me
Below there was nothing to catch me,
nothing at all but darkness
as black as obsidian
a content-less
2

abyss
In this dark time, I could sense that I was not experiencing the full energy of life,
I had numbly moved through life
unaware of the abyss
It was always in the background pulling at me,
shadowing me,
beckoning to me
At this time, I did not know the meaning of the abyss,
how it was a way to understand
the vast openness of life,
how it was overflowing
with life
and meaning
Neither darkness was permanent.
……
At the time I wrote these words, I did not know the significance, both in practice and meaning.
A few years into the thick, swampy mess of trauma, I somehow developed a form of paralysis—I
could not write. But then, suddenly, I wrote these words. I wrote in no particular form or style; I
just wrote the images and sensations of my immediate experience.
Perhaps what lead me to paralysis in writing is that I was caught between an imperative
to know and a deep resistance to knowing. That is, trauma is so horrifying, so destructive, that
any knowledge is unbearable. There is always fear of flashbacks, nightmares, intruding images
and sensations, as they are unpredictable, and yet, inevitable. Initiating an inquiry invites one of
the most traumatic aspects of trauma: repetition. To address this experience means that I must
awaken the trauma within me, haul myself back to the scene in order to understand and articulate
such a weighty aspect of human experience. And thus, to engage this question of the relationship
of knowledge and trauma means that I must undergo the phenomenological experience of
knowing trauma.
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What we know of trauma is distinct from knowing trauma. Currently, the leading
theoretical model of trauma is Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which the American
Psychiatric Association included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) III in 1980.1 Since then there have been a number of modifications in subsequent
versions of the DSM IV (1994), and now, trauma has received its own section in the DSM V
entitled “Trauma- and Stress-Related Disorders” (2013). The DSM is held to be ‘a-theoretical,’
according to Patrick in Trauma: Culture, Meaning and Philosophy. That is to say, it is treated as
an established scientific, investigative document. In each version of the DSM, PTSD is
presented as “a ‘straightforward’ medical condition, which can be defined in terms of aetiology,
diagnosis, psychopathology, treatment and prognosis” (TCM 47). Bracken points out that the
symptoms are held as universal, not open to interpretation on the basis of any particular cultural
modalities. Within the diagnosis of PTSD, trauma is taken as an “always-already-there object,”
and is described according to four2 distinct diagnostic clusters: re-experiencing; avoidance;
negative cognitions and mood; and arousal. The section on trauma presents criteria detailing
what constitutes a traumatic event and how to identify the trigger(s) of PTSD.
The theoretical model underlining the precepts of PTSD, and similar ‘disorders,’ is
grounded in the Enlightenment, cognitive model of knowledge. This bedrock is preserved in the
various approaches to trauma theory ranging from behaviorist, cognitive, psychodynamic
cognitive, appraisal/information, and processing (internal schematas).3 Common to the various
approaches, theories of trauma view conflicts and disturbances to occur within the individual’s
mind and are based on the way in which our ability to process information is disrupted. The
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It is not my intention to elucidate an exhaustive account of the limits of the specific theories, but at this point, I
intend to indicate why theory’s formulaic structure is viewed as limiting.
2
This is a recent change in the DSM V; before there were only three diagnostic clusters.
3
For more see Bracken, TCM.
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traumatic event is seen as the central aetiological factor responsible for the disruption of mental
schematas; shattering of assumptions about self and reality; and failure in cognitive and
emotional processing. Other thematic elements include the inability to incorporate and
assimilate the traumatic event into processing; the experience of being overwhelmed or
overexcited from external stimuli; and the compulsion tendency. All of these approaches rest on
the Enlightenment model of subjectivity and temporality, in which the individual is an atomic,
independent agent with a coherent historical narrative.
The various approaches address the issue of meaning not as a metaphysical or
philosophical problem but as something amenable to empirical investigation (TCM 57). The
cognitive feature of trauma theory functions as a search for meaning and order in which human
reality consists of psychological laws, and accordingly, it is universal, not determined by social
or historical context. Within this framework, trauma, as an object of study, is believed to be
accessible through examination and explication, both causal and symptomatic. Each theory
looks to how a cause functions in order to produce the particular effects. Even within behaviorist
and psychodynamic theory, the process is to observe and collect ‘empirical’ evidence, whether
biographical or behavioral, along the basis of a temporal-causal framework. This background
makes it so that the study of trauma lends itself to the scientific model of knowledge and
investigation, in that the goal is to find a process that can be understood, predicted, and
addressed through technical interventions.
A contending approach to understanding trauma is that of literary theory. The assertion
within literary theory is that trauma is ineffable because of the way in which trauma happens too
soon, too fast, to be known. Any cognitive knowledge of trauma is delayed and it lies at the very
intersection between knowing and not knowing. Literary theory focuses around issues of how
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trauma challenges narrative and historiography as it compromises memory. Beyond ruptures in
memory, the traumatic event is not integrated into consciousness in a way that it can become
understood, known, and spoken of. That is because it is not understood through the
straightforward acquisition of facts gained through observation of behavior or biographical
documentation. The problem of interpretation remains as the trauma is barred from conscious
understanding. It is at the precise point where conscious understanding and normal, cognitive
memory fail. The result is that the individual has difficulty in incorporating their experiences
into meaningful narratives, and yet, the trauma continues to resonate within their body through
the repetition compulsion. Any knowing trauma, thus, shows up as unpredictable and
unintelligible, as well as unbearable in horror and intensity.
Literary theory, therefore, is mainly concerned with the question of memory, witnessing,
and testimony. With trauma, there is a unique phenomenon of an “elision of memory and the
precision of recall” (TEM 153). Leading literary critic, Cathy Caruth, explains that “The trauma
is the confrontation with an event that, in its unexpectedness or horror, cannot be placed within
the schemes of prior knowledge—that cannot, as George Bataille says, become a matter of
“intelligence”—and thus continually returns, in its exactness, at a later time” (TEM 153). For
this reason, the traumatic event cannot become “narrative memory.” Further, Dori Laub in
Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, explains, “Massive
trauma precludes its registration; the observing and recording mechanisms of the human mind
are temporarily knocked out, malfunction. … While historical evidence to the event which
constituted the trauma may be abundant and documents in vast supply, the trauma—as a known
event and not simply as overwhelming shock—has not been truly witnessed yet, not been taken
cognizance of” (57). Here Laub suggests that trauma is ‘known,’ but just not cognized; that is, it
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is not recorded within cognition. However, in tacking on “yet,” he implies trauma is some form
of knowledge which at some point can, in fact, be cognized.
The way in which it can come to be recognized and known, by Laub’s account, is through
testimony and a telling of the experience to a listener, “who is… the blank screen on which the
event comes to be inscribed for the first time” (TWLPH 57). Similarly, Jennifer Griffiths, in
Traumatic Possession: The Body and Memory in African American Women’s Writing and
Performance, notes that the testimony depends on the relationship between the survivor and
witness. She remarks that “memory emerges and reunites a body and a voice severed in trauma.
These fractured pieces of the survivor’s self come together in the reflection of the listener, and
memory comes into meaning through this bodily transaction, rather than simply by creating a
narrative in language” (2). The interface of bodies, one speaking, the other listening, is what
creates meaning, but this meaning, as implied, goes beyond narration through ordinary language.
That is to say, the repetition compulsion in traumatic experience bars narrative closure, and thus,
giving an account of and witnessing history is problematic as it is difficult to get at exactly what
took place.
In regard to the possibility of bearing witness, Giorgio Agamben, in Remnants of
Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, explains that “not even the survivor can bear witness
completely, can speak his own lacuna.” Therefore, he details:

This means that testimony is the disjunction between two impossibilities of
bearing witness; it means that language, in order to bear witness, must give way to
a non-language in order to show the impossibility of being witness. The language
of testimony is a language that no longer signifies and that, is not signifying,
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advances into what is without language, to the point of taking on a different
insignificance – that of the complete witness, that of he who by definition cannot
bear witness. To bear witness, it is therefore not enough to bring language to its
own non-sense, to the pure undecidability of letters. … [I]t is thus necessary that
the impossibility of being witness, the “lacuna” that constitutes human language,
collapses, giving way to a different impossibility of being witness – that which
does not have language. (RA 39)

Given this unique disjunction of testimony and bearing witness, Caruth, Laub, Agamben, and
Griffiths, (see also Claud Lanzmann, Shoshana Felman, and Eric Sundquist), focus on how
literature bears witness to trauma in a way that theory cannot. Agamben explains that “the poetic
word is the one that is always situated in the position of a remnant and that can, therefore, bear
witness. Poets – witnesses – found language as what remains, as what actually survives the
possibility, or impossibility, of speaking” (RA 161). The underlying implication in the literary
turn, Dominick LaCapra asserts, is that literature somehow “gets at” trauma in a way that is
unavailable in propositional, scientific, theoretical language. Trauma is in excess of theory, but
within literature, it “cries” out. LaCapra notes that he does not know precisely why this is the
case.
In his work Writing History, Writing Trauma, LaCapra makes a distinction between
writing about trauma and writing trauma. Writing about trauma is to establish a historiography
by reconstructing the past, written as “objectively as possible.” Writing trauma, on the other
hand, is a ‘metaphor.’ LaCapra details the distinction:
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Writing about trauma is an aspect of historiography related to the project of
reconstructing the past as objectively as possible without necessarily going to the
self-defeating extreme of single-minded objectification that involves the denial of
one’s implication in the problem one treats. Writing trauma is a metaphor in that
writing indicates some distance from trauma (even when the experience of writing
is itself intimately bound up with trauma), and there is no such thing as writing
trauma itself if only because trauma, while at times related to particular events,
cannot be localized in terms of discrete, dated experience. Trauma indicates a
shattering break or cesura in experience which has belated effects. Writing
trauma would be one of those telling after-effects in what I termed traumatic and
post-traumatic writing… It involves processes of acting out, working over, and to
some extent working through in analyzing and “giving voice” to the past—
processes of coming to terms with traumatic “experiences,” limit events, and their
symptomatic effects that achieve articulation in different combinations and
hybridized forms. (WHWT 186)

The claim that there is no writing trauma is based on how writing indicates some distance from
the event. But with trauma, even though it can be related to particular events, the repetition
compulsion problematizes temporality such that the past can be experienced as past (LaCapra,
WHWT 186). Beyond the phenomenon of repetition, such experience lies at the intersection
between knowing and not knowing. Cathy Caruth in Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative,
and History explains that “…literature, like psychoanalysis, is interested in the complex relation
between knowing and not knowing. And it is, indeed at the specific point at which knowing and
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not knowing intersect that the language of literature and the psychoanalytic theory of traumatic
experience precisely meet” (TNH 3). She further explains that “trauma seems to be much more
than a pathology, or the simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound
that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise
available. This truth, in its delayed appearance and its belated address, cannot be linked only to
what is known, but also to what remains unknown in our very actions and our language” (TNH
4).
Caruth’s literary approach to the issue of trauma is part of what LaCapra identifies as the
recent “epistemological turn” from psychoanalytic (and historiographical) theory to discourse on
the literary. The general claim is that literature goes beyond theory, exceeding limitations
inherent in theoretical discourse. LaCapra explains:

…[C]ertain forms of literature or art, as well as the type of discourse or theory
which emulates its object, may provide a more expansive space (in psychoanalytic
terms, a relatively safe haven) for exploring modalities of responding to trauma,
including the role of affect and the tendency to repeat traumatic events. At times
art departs from ordinary reality to produce surrealistic situations or radically
playful openings that seem to be sublimely irrelevant to ordinary reality but may
uncannily provide indirect commentary or insight into that reality. (WHWT 185186)

The poetic has a visuality and sensation which stick to us. This is perhaps why literary theory
has become one of the main contributing discourses on trauma, entering the wider literature
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previously dominated by psychoanalysis and neurobiology. A central question I explore, then, is
how do literature and art “get at” trauma in a way that theory and historiography cannot?
Such a claim suggests an ability to access ‘additional’ knowledge, which in turn, implies
that the cognitive framework veils, limits, or bars access to such knowledge. Thus, what hinges
on the shift to literary discourse, away from theoretical discourse, comes down to a matter of
what ‘truth’ each one establishes and how that truth operates in the process of writing about
trauma and writing trauma. With that in mind, some key questions emerge: If trauma is
unassimilable, ineffable, unintelligible, can we call it ‘knowledge?’ If trauma cannot be captured
in ordinary propositional or scientific language, then how can it be expressed, if at all? What is
the relationship of this ‘knowledge’ and language? And most significantly, how does literature
“get at” trauma in a way that theoretical discourse does not.
Neuroscience can provide maps of brain activity of what parts of the pain are engaged
during a traumatic episode. Psychoanalysis and psychology provide theory, etiology,
symptomatology, and attempt at understanding trauma. And literary theory can help to highlight
the difficulties of knowing, speaking, and witnessing trauma, which are eclipsed by the scientific
model of knowledge. Thus, I turn to philosophy to provide an epistemological and
phenomenological study of trauma. It is not my intention to necessarily position my inquiry
within the wider literature of psychanalysis, neurobiology, and literary theory, staking a
particular claim in reference to those posed so far. Rather, I want to go behind the scenes, so to
speak, in terms of the phenomenological processes of traumatic experience and writing trauma.
Frequently, trauma discourse is focused around the event—its intelligibility, meaning,
and expression. Thus, I take the unit of the event in regard to knowledge as a way to investigate
what knowledge, if any, can be said of trauma. In the first chapter, along the lines of Foucaultian
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genealogical method of inquiry, I construct a genealogy of trauma, to some extent, to show how
scientific knowledge is the predominant epistemological model in line with the development of
psychoanalysis and psychiatric institutions. Through such analysis, language manifests as the
meeting point of knowing and not knowing in regard to trauma. To help understand the
scientific model of knowledge, I turn to Michele Foucault’s description of scientific knowledge
and how he pits it against what he calls the ‘truth-event.’ Scientific knowledge presupposes a
universal, ever-present truth to be uncovered, discovered, and grasped; On the other hand, the
truth-event is one in which a truth occurs as an event. It is not true at all times, nor waiting for
us to discover it; it appears within a specific place and time, and further, it is a truth of
“privileged agents and bearers.” This distinction is drawn out through a survey of the work of
Charcot, Freud, and, more recently, Lacan on the core concepts of psychoanalysis, that of the
unconscious, repression, and repetition in trauma.
According to Freudian psychology, the unconscious activity amalgamates diverse
materials of different origins, making it so that the expression of the repressed desire is
unrecognizable. In the condensation process, a single word can take over the representation of a
whole train of thought. Lacan labels trauma as the tuché, a Greek word meaning chance or
fortune. He describes trauma as an encounter with the ‘real,’ that is, the raw, immediate
materiality of existence; yet, it is a missing encounter it that it is inaccessible through the
symbolic order. Trauma shares elements of the unconscious, which too is a gap in the symbolic
order. At best, expressing trauma is done so through metaphor and metonym. Further, literary
theorist Cathy Caruth notes another layer which further complicates the question of knowledge,
that of temporality. Thus, despite the focus around a singular ‘event’ which has taken place, and
continues to resound in the repetition compulsion, neither the Enlightenment model of scientific
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knowledge or that of the truth event work as models for the type of knowledge we are speaking
about in regard to trauma.
In the next chapter, I then offer the term ‘trauma-knowledge’ to capture how trauma is a
unique form of embodied knowledge, where knowing and not knowing meet. The body is aware
of the world in a way that we can, at times, access the privileged knowledge of the body, while at
other times, are barred from it. With this in mind, I provide an investigation of embodied
knowledge, detailing the interaction of body schema and body image in such experience as
vision, touch, and praxis through the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Shaun Gallagher.
Trauma stands out as an extraordinary embodied experience, as it compromises the embodied
feeling of being alive by corrupting agency, temporality, and identity. Elaine Scarry’s
phenomenology of pain helps to point out how trauma-knowledge shares some features of the
embodied knowledge of physical pain. With pain and other forms of embodied knowledge, the
body maintains a plasticity, the ability to arrive at an equilibrium despite disruption. But with
trauma, this notion of plasticity fails to capture the ontological metamorphosis which annihilates
the capacity for equilibrium.
Yet, as addressed in the third chapter, there is some element of ‘plasticity’ in that the
individual who undergoes trauma survives. Catharine Malabou’s account of destructive
plasticity illustrates such a metamorphosis in which, out of the accident, a new being emerges,
what she calls “flight identity.” Taking the Freudian model of the drives into consideration along
with the repetitive compulsion of trauma, the concept of “flight identity” portrays how
subjectivity is compromised to the point of an “abandoning of subjectivity.” Further, it is the
accidental element, the traumatic memory fragment in the flashback, nightmare, or chance
encounter, which distinguishes it from all other accounts of embodied knowledge.
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To illustrate this point, I look to the metaphor of the body as a work of art, a painting, in
particular. Painter Francis Bacon claims to seek out the accident in painting because it makes the
images “fresher, not interfered with,” “more organic,” “raw,” and “immediate.” If one is
familiar with his paintings, it seems strange to say that the images he creates are more organic
and not tampered with—his work is a collection of haunting distortions of the human body,
animal forms, objects, and obscure landscapes. It takes some time to know what you are looking
at. But, his method of distortion is, what he believes, traps life “at its most living point.” The
annihilation of form both unveils the screens by which we engage with the world, and exposes
the raw, immediate, materiality of our existence.
This is because the accident in painting damages to the point that it returns the materiality
of life back—the thick, immediate flesh of the world. Likewise, trauma distorts, disfigures, and
destroys the being far beyond recognition. Consequently, the individual returns to the world
more violently, and the world returns to the individual more violently— at its most living point.
What happens, then, is that the accident is absorbed into the body, as the paint is absorbed into
the painting, though the phenomenological experience is one of the impossibility of flight, not
absorption.
In the fourth chapter, I address how this is echoed in Elain Scarry’s description of the
physical pain and how it is not only resistant to language, but also destroys language. In order to
address the confrontation of language and trauma, I turn to the work of Julia Kristeva,
particularly on the notion of the abject. The abject is the revolt of being. She contends that the
abject reaches its peak at the moment when we are called on to respond through language. But
with the abject feeling of being alive at the most living moment all language shows up as trivial,
supplementary, and contrived as the world of the abject is that of ambiguity and disorientation.
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Gloria Anzaldúa describes such an experience as living on the borderlands. Her description of
what she calls the Coatlique state, named after the serpent goddess, points to one unique feature
of embodied trauma-knowledge: “the capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of
deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface.”
Chapter five investigates how, in spite of the disorienting, ambiguous Coatlique state,
there is still a drive for truth and certainty, which continues to afflict the individual. Nietzsche
pits the will to truth against the will to illusion/deception. Both factor into what counts as truth,
in that it is the will to illusion, the creative drive, by which metaphor is formed, but it is the will
to truth which preserves such concepts and metaphors. The will to truth is what drives our desire
for scientific knowledge, and this is what the individual who undergoes trauma is able to put into
question and recognize the uncertainty and free-spirited aspect of metaphor formation and
language. Also, trauma-knowledge is not the type of ‘truth’ we mean in the will to truth. We do
not will such truth or drive toward it; rather, it is rather an out-spilling of embodied knowledge.
With that, trauma requires a language of its own: one of imagery, semiotic rhythm, discordance,
life, flesh—poetic language—one that can capture life at its most living moment.
I conclude with the way in which poetic language has the ability to reactivate what the
individual wants to forget, but cannot. It is possible to “get at” trauma in that poetic language
itself is an interruption of language: the form and function are similar to the traumatic
experience. Writing-trauma, voicing the unique embodied trauma-knowledge, not only requires
a language of its own but a style of its own. Maurice Blanchot in The Writing of the Disaster,
explains how writing the disaster is the disaster itself and that it requires, what he calls,
fragmentary writing. Fragmentary writing, like trauma, does not involve aspects of agency and
subjectivity, though. Instead, we are passive to it. What Blanchot means by passivity is not non-
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action; rather, it is something like enduring struggle without resistance. He formulates his own
neologism to capture this idea: le subsissement, understood as a sudden going-under the disaster.
In one sense, we are passive in that we cannot resist the disaster, but beyond that, it always
returns. This means that, in regard to writing, the disaster returns whether we write or not; there
is an incessant interruption of the disaster. Fragmentary writing is what best captures this
incessant interruption and the eternal imperative of the disaster.
The sudden going under of fragmentary writing-trauma is to will the past and a matter of
self-overcoming. In the case of surviving trauma, and moreover writing-trauma, the notion of
self-overcoming goes beyond overcoming self-limiting constructs. Self-overcoming is
continuous. It is self-overcoming in the sense that undergoing writing-trauma, the individual has
to be willing to annihilate the self, to return to the scene of the trauma, the immediate, abject
feeling of being alive, where subjectivity, identity, agency, and temporality are demolished. It is
also self-overcoming in the sense that it is the body of the ‘self,’ in the repetitive compulsion,
forces a return to the deepest, darkest, most abject.
Thus, the overall project is to situate the human experience of trauma within
philosophical discourse, specifically within the phenomenological tradition, and to address
concerns of embodied knowledge, agency, intelligibility, and language. I assert that literary
theory does contribute to an understanding of trauma as it addresses the problem of knowing and
bearing witness to trauma. However, I hope to illustrate what is taking place ontologically such
that this seeming impossibility emerges to begin with, and conclude that trauma is, in fact,
known and can be voiced, but through a mediated process.
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CHAPTER ONE:
BETWEEN KNOWING AND NOT KNOWING

1. Scientific Knowledge and the ‘Truth-Event’

During the 1974-1975 lectures on the development of psychiatric power, Foucault pauses to
insert a ‘history of truth.’ He proceeds by comparing two kinds of knowledge: scientific
knowledge and what he calls the “truth-event.” Scientific knowledge presupposes a universal,
ever-present truth to be uncovered, discovered, and grasped. In that case, truth needs only to be
demonstrated through scientific practices and ordered procedures. Through such practices and
techniques, truth is never too distant or inaccessible; nothing is seen as small, trivial, ephemeral,
or occasional (PP 236). If there is something perceived as difficult to reach, it only speaks to our
own limitations, lack of technologies, and circumstantial constraints.
On the other hand, the truth-event is one in which a truth occurs as an event. It is not true
at all times, nor waiting for us to discover it; it appears within a specific place and time, and
further, it is a truth of “privileged agents and bearers” (PP 237). What he means by this is that
only those who are witness to the event and are present as the event occurs ‘know’ the ‘truth.’
The access to knowledge is not one of method, technology, and discovery; rather, it is one of a
‘shock or clash’—the privileged, exclusive agents are ‘struck’ by it. Foucault uses a metaphor to
express this idea: the truth-event is not universally present within the “truth-sky,” but rather
shows up “like that of a thunderbolt or lightning” (PP 237). With this in mind, demonstrating
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such a truth does not depend on “the order of what is, but to the order of what happens” (PP
237). We can think of scientific knowledge as ‘knowledge of’ in that it is established through an
order of procedures and ongoing discourse. In the case of the truth event, it can lack such
processes by which it is established. This is because it is a highly specific, unrepeatable event.
Foucault frames this scheme through the language of geography and chronology. He
suggests that the truth-event has its own geography—the precise location of where the event
takes place—and its own chronology—the moment it occurs. This makes the truth-event
indeterminate and unpredictable, in opposition to scientific knowledge. Thus, to verify, or rather
witness, the truth-event, it must be produced and observed by performed ritual, actions, and
‘required words.’ It occurs only through prophets, seers, innocents, the blind, the mad, the wise,
etc., who are seized by this truth and possess the secret of the time and place of the truth-event,
and undergo tests of qualifications. What this means is that to access knowledge in this case, it
does not require a method, but rather a strategy. That is, the relationship is not one of
knowledge, but that of power, domination, and victory (PP 237).
What is significant about this distinction is that it helps to clarify Foucault’s hypothesis
that truth is produced by multiple, micro-power relations and constraints. What separates
scientific truth from a truth-event is not based upon the content, so to speak, or an oversimplified distinction between objective and subjective truth, but what disciplinary system
authorizes it as truth. According to Foucault, knowledge is constituted within a disciplinary
power system in which power is both claimed and exercised in dominion over the ‘truth.’
Language/speech, things, and individuals are subjected to procedures of normalization,
supervision, observation, and writing. With scientific knowledge, “the image of objectivity”
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serves as the sovereign by its power to classify, assimilate, supervise, and order (HM 17). The
sovereign-eye of objectivity liberates truth from what may be obscure, masked, or remote.
Yet, Foucault points out, all disciplinary power has its margins (PP 53). There are
necessary residues, the “unclassifiable,” irreducible, inassimilable, and indeterminate in any
regime of knowledge. The select privileged individuals, those who possess the secret geography
and chronology of the truth-event, seize power over this domain. They exercise power to verify
the truth-event as reality, while they are “seized by” the truth (PP 55). What this means is that
they are subject to the event—though they play a role in verifying it as truth, the truth, once
established, verifies their role. In this case, strategic performance and ritual liberate the truthevent from ‘unreality.’
Discourse plays a fundamental role in the distinction between scientific truth and the
truth-event. The truth-event does not require discourse, whereas scientific knowledge cannot be
known without a discourse. Underlying scientific knowledge is the presupposition of stable
‘things’ as coherent objects of study via strategies of observation. Scientific knowledge consists
of discursive domains of synchrony, series, causation, and continuity. These are rules of
formation of a group of statements, in a technical sense, ‘discursive relations.’ Scientific
knowledge has a structure, but one that is constructed through the linear model of speech.
According to Foucault, “a succession of events may, in the same order in which it is presented
become an object of discourse, be recorded, described, explained, elaborated into concepts, and
provide the opportunity for theoretical choice” (AK 167). Synchrony and continuity operate as
discursive relations, in which the coherency of ‘objects’ coincides with the coherency of
discourse. For instance, the principle of change—fundamental to observation within scientific
practices and ‘discovery’ of objects—is rooted in the functional domains of chronology,
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succession, and series. With the concept of change, we end up fixing two points or limits—that
of disappearance and emergence.
Foucault suggests, then, that scientific knowledge cannot be separated from its discourse.
Discourse is practice and, insofar, it is not a mere intersection of things and words in which there
is interplay of ‘things’ that are manifest through a chain of words on a single surface. As
Foucault puts it, discourse is not a “confrontation between reality and language” (AK 48). The
problem here is to specify and isolate the discursive relations in which an object of discourse
emerges. There are multiple relations: a level of relations within practices, but also a secondary
level of relations, that is, a system of discursive relations. Discursive relations establish
something like the ‘rules of the game’ of discourse. We can speak of, analyze, and order a
knowable ‘object’ because of such discursive relations. The rules of discursive practice do not
define the “dumb existence of a reality;” rather, the rules in the formation of statements constrain
how we speak, see, know, and examine things in a specific, transitory, local space (AK 49).
Thus, discourse and the emergence of its objects “exist under the positive conditions of a
complex group of relations” that operates like a disciplinary grid of intelligibility—something is
made intelligible through discourse (AK 45).
This suggests that the way we come to think, know, and speak of an object through
scientific knowledge involves a link of linear language. The linearity of language is constituted
through formal thinking along the lines of homogeneity, unity, coherency, series, continuity,
discontinuity, and emergence. Through this type of thinking, we imagine linear succession of
events that speak to a knowledge of sorts. From this, we impose some sort of ‘ground’ or unitary
thread in which we can see and speak of that progression. However, when we look for a
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common ground, or succession that exists on its own, we (invisibly) separate such things from
the discourse/practice by which they are constituted.
Coincidently, the objectivity of intelligible ‘objects,’ produced through procedures and
practices, conceal that they are effects of highly specific, historical practice of discursive and
social relations within localized space. The discursive relations are not “deployed when the
object is being analyzed…but what enables it to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to
situate itself in relation to them” (AK 45). That is, ‘objects’ of knowledge are produced through
disciplinary systems of power, such as the university or clinic. What this means is that what
seeing and speaking are doing is invisible to us. The eye of objectivity emerges from linear,
homogeneous language in which we visualize succession, series, or continuities. In performing
the necessary procedures of normalization, supervision, observation, and writing according to the
rules of the game of scientific discourse, we mask that very performance. This is significant to
note in the sense that this is all done within a disciplinary power system in which the sovereigns
are also subjected to and supervised via the same rules of the game (PP 55).
Emphasizing the interplay of vision, language, and space assists in understanding how
objects in scientific discourse emerge from a network of relations at various discursive and
procedural levels, the rules of speaking and seeing within a local space. With that, an intelligible
object cannot be divorced from its discourse and remains under the sway of its sovereign. This is
counter to the assumption of scientific knowledge, in which the object is supposed to speak for
and of itself. It follows from this that scientific knowledge does not require a master, a witness,
or an agent. However, what is noted above indicates that scientific knowledge cannot be effable
or known outside of a specific discourse. Additionally, the discourse must be according to
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particular rules of the game, namely, linear language, employing synchrony, succession, and
causality.
In terms of the truth-event, the coinciding language is ambiguous, perhaps absent, which
makes the ‘truth’ unspecified. This is especially ambiguous in the sense that what appears as a
truth-event, what stands outside the domain of objectivity, classification, and universal
accessibility, appears when there is a rupture, a discontinuity. In the truth-event, we cannot
isolate a statement of ‘what-is’ as any such knowledge is centered on what is speaking in the
process of speaking. This poses critical questions regarding the knowledge of the truth-event:
How do we know the truth of the truth-event if it is not given in the symbolic order, but
somehow resides in the privileged subject, or perhaps, in a performance of events? How can the
truth-event gain coherency absent of linear language and the domains of synchrony, succession,
and causality? By what rules can we establish the ‘truth?’
Foucault offers that establishing the ‘truth’ is a matter of disciplinary power relations, for
instance, psychiatric power relations, which I explain in more detail later. The ‘truth’ manifests
in some locality, geography and chronology. Further, it is verified through ordered procedures.
In this regard, one thing that is crucial to the truth-event is that it requires a witness, even if that
witness is the sole bearer of knowledge.

2. The Geometry of the Truth-Event

“The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the
locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a column in
perpetual disintegration.”—Foucault (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History 83)
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Disciplinary power, as Foucault puts it, is a “game of bodies” in which “the individual is a
subjected body held in a system of supervision and subjected to procedures of normalization”
(PP 57). The body is vital to any conception of the truth-event. This is demonstrated through
particular disciplinary systems such as medicine, psychiatry, and mental health. In the case of
medicine, the body is the site and occasion for the emergence of ‘disease’ as a functional object
in discourse and practice; but moreover, it is the space of this occurrence in which it can be
observed, isolated, and identified. This requires that it be witnessed, specifically, within the
clinic where the patient is subjected to observations and procedures for verifying the ‘truth’ of
the disease. This procedure for identifying disease takes place under the supervision of
specialists in the attempt to master over it. In this way, illness or disease is a truth-event, in that
it has a chronology and a geography.
In providing a genealogy of medical perception in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault
introduces another layer of the truth-event: geometry. The notion of geometry goes beyond
geography and chronology. The disease takes place within the individual—the geography—and
at a particular time—the chronology—but, the visible, material body is the way in which one
spatializes disease. Foucault writes:

For us, the human body defines, by natural right, the space of origin and of
distribution of disease: a space whose lines, volumes, surfaces, and routes are laid
down, in accordance with a now familiar geometry, by the anatomical atlas. (BC
3)
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According to Foucault, the development of this anatomical atlas is a rather recent historical
development for understanding disease and illness, at the time when pathological anatomy was
privileged during the period of nineteenth century medicine. As suggested above, we cannot
easily establish clear breaks, continuities, or discontinuities within the history of medical
perception, but at this time, something particular develops—what Foucault calls the medical
gaze. This shift in medical perception is not a matter of the same game, somewhat improved,
which would suggest an inherent rationality of progression, but a completely different game (BC
137). The medical gaze both claims and exercises the power, its right, to establish the truth in
terms of specified practice of medicine: the identification, classification, diagnosis, and etiology
of disease (BC 4).
The clinic, “the space in which bodies and eyes meet,” is the site where the medical gaze
is produced and generates medical knowledge corresponding to the “medicine of spaces”—both
the concrete space and ‘rational space’ of perception. The technique of opening corpses, such as
autopsies, provided a coherent anatomical view of the body in which disease was then thought to
be located in the space of the individual (concrete) body. The organization of disease was first
identified through the primacy of symptom. The symptom is the sign of disease which indicates
an essential identity, an “original truth” of the disease that “would speak a clear, ordered
language.” When the symptom corresponds to a geometrical part of the body, it is mastered by
language; disease is only visible in what could be said of it (BC 94-95). Once in this domain, the
illness or disease is known as a coherent ‘object’ of discovery, observation, and cure. The
medical gaze, then, is the ‘eye of objectivity,’ where both the discourse and objects of medicine
emerge within the specific space of the clinic.
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Simultaneously, ‘madness’ comes to be understood as an illness at the beginning of the
19th century as psychiatry is quickly concerned with constituting itself as a scientific discourse,
one that is “clinical, classificatory, and nosological” (PP 133). With illness, there are techniques
of discovery, identity, and cure—concrete technologies on concrete bodies. This model, then, is
transposed on the bodies in the asylum. Just as the clinic is the site of knowledge and cure of
illness and disease, the asylum is the site of the ‘truth’ and reality of madness, where bodies are
supervised, observed, and ordered. At this time, psychiatric discourse takes the shape of normal
clinical discourse as its model. As a field of study and practice, it is concerned with describing
madness with symptomatology, development, diagnosis, and prognostic elements. Similar to the
game of the medical gaze whereby the doctor seeks the site of the disease, the game becomes to
hunt down the cause, origin, or ‘truth’ of the madness. However, there is a problem with the
etiology of madness: it is not as easy as cutting open a corpse—madness itself does not have a
geometry. Without a geometry, there is no way of distributing the illness or spatializing the
disease. That is, in the case of madness, there are no visible lesions on the body, no physical
manifestation, and thus, the way to identify and know madness is through witnessing an event or
disrupted speech of the madman. The doctor serves as the sovereign-witness through the
disciplinary power relation of doctor-patient, the one who can verify the madness.
Foucault notes that the emergence of the truth of madness is only a product of the effects
of spatial arrangements (PP 101). Spatially, madness exists within the power relation: the doctor
produces madness as madness through the imposition of the division and exclusion of madness
and reason. In this way, the madness of the madman is actualized via the body of the doctor.
That is to say, madness is not located within the patient, but through the medium of power
relations in which the doctor is the witness and interpreter of speech and event. In order to verify
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madness, the question of truth is revealed through performed rituals in which the doctor imposes
his will on the patient to access the truth of madness. Foucault makes note of how the
psychiatrist’s body and the asylum form a single body as the site of the truth-event of madness.
In other words, madness is measured and identified within the disciplinary power system in
which the doctor (psychiatrist)—inside the ‘body of the asylum’—is the occasion for the truthevent of madness. The truth and reality of madness appear within the space of the asylum at the
time of the performed ritual, and thus, through the doctor. The gaze of the psychiatrist is
analogous to the medical gaze in that it both obtains and exercises the power to establish the
truth of madness within the particular space of the asylum under the gaze of psychiatrist—the
‘eye of objectivity.’ Thus, madness emerges from the assimilation of the body of the madman
and the doctor, within the body of the asylum.
Within scientific discourse, if mental illness is to be taken seriously, then it must have
some object of identification. As the body lacks the appearance of something like lesions,
neurology appears in order to distinguish those who are ill at the level of the body from those
whom one cannot assign an etiology at the level of organic illness. To verify madness, the
method was to bring about something like the medical crisis. The notion of the crisis in
medicine is the point at which the disease develops to its full intensity. At this point, the doctor
must intervene in order to battle the disease, resolve it, and triumph over it. It is the role of the
doctor, then, to distinguish when it will occur in order to resolve it. Foucault suggests that the
crisis, then, is “the disease becoming truth,” in that, the disease makes its appearance and confers
the doctor’s power (PP 243). For madness to reach the state of a medical crisis—bringing it into
being as an event to witness—techniques of questioning, magnetism, hypnosis, and drugs are
developed. Hypnosis, as a technique of truth, becomes a tool of the psychiatrist to get a hold on
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the body of the patient by opening a way to account for the functioning and mechanisms of
madness. Bringing the patient into a hypnotic state allows the doctor to perform an investigation
of the causes and origins of madness, all the while, galvanizing the truth-event of madness. The
doctor can then stimulate behavior through such a technique and ‘bring’ the madness into being
(PP 287). If the doctor can ‘locate’ and discover the origin of madness, the details of how
madness functions are finally available to the psychiatrist (PP 287). Similarly, hashish was used
to enable the doctor to discover the kind of single “core” from which all symptoms of madness
can spread. In this case, the introduction of hashish serves to mimic madness. This affords the
doctor the opportunity to grasp and fix an epicenter in a point of the body (PP 279). These
techniques coincide with the emergence of pathological-anatomy and neurology—a map of the
body.
Conversely, when there is the lack of a pathological anatomy, the technique of
questioning develops to locate the origin of madness. When the doctor cannot find any organic
substratum of the illness in the patient, the search shifts to pathological events within the ‘body’
of the patient’s family (PP 271). The techniques of interpretive-confession and narration serve to
provide a biography which becomes a pathological history. Instead of cutting open a corpse, a
material body, the psychiatrist can ‘look inside’ the patient’s body through its pathological
history. Acquiring the patient’s pathological history, the psychiatrist can establish reasons (later
seen as symptoms) which would justify intervention (PP 273). The body, then, is extended to the
patient’s historical body. This becomes a way of distributing illness—the onset of the illness can
be fixed to an event, that event then being the cause or core of the madness. With this, there is a
conceptual shift from curing the illness to curing the individual.
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Since the body cannot speak through signs and lesions, this search for a pathological
framework is what leads Jean-Martin Charcot, nineteenth century French neurologist and
professor of anatomical pathology, to look for an assignable cause. And this, according to
Foucault, is how Charcot develops the concept of trauma (PP 317). Charcot describes trauma as:

a violent event, a blow, a fall, a fear, a spectacle, etcetera…which provokes a sort
of discrete, localized hypnotic state, but which sometimes lasts for a long time, so
that, following the trauma, a certain idea enters the individual’s head, inscribes
itself in his cortex, and acts like a sort of permanent injunction. (PP 317)

The concept of trauma, then, serves as a way of distributing illness in terms of not just the onset
of the illness, but its pathology as well. The traumatic event is the origin of the illness; yet, it is
also the progression by which that original event develops into a full-blown illness.
Foucault provides an example of trauma to clarify this point:

A child is knocked down by a vehicle; he faints. In the moment before fainting he has
the feeling that the wheels of the vehicle run over his body. He comes to and, after a
time, realizes that he is paralyzed; and if he is paralyzed it is because he thinks the wheels
ran over his body. Now this belief is inscribed and continues to function within a set of
micro-hypnotic states, within a localized hypnotic state concerning this belief. What
provokes paralysis of the legs is, as it were, this idea that has become a hypnotic
injunction. We see here how the notion of trauma, which will be so important in the
future, is established… Since if he is paralyzed, it is because he believes that the wheels
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of the van ran over him… So, a trauma is something that provokes a localized and
permanent hypnotic state on just this point. (PP 317)

In this example, the initial event of being knocked down progresses into a belief which, in a
sense, hypnotizes the child and the child is continuously at the will of this belief, under its spell.
The child lives as if in a permanent hypnotic state, or rather, “a set of micro-hypnotic states.”
What is interesting to note about Charcot’s description of trauma as a permanent hypnotic
state is that hypnotism becomes not only the technique by which to discover the cause of the
illness, but also as a way to reactivate it in order to witness, identify, and verify it as illness.
When a psychiatrist puts a patient ‘under’ hypnosis, it is for the purpose of identifying the
original trauma or event. This is a practice of abreaction in which the patient is guided by the
doctor’s words to access the traumatic event by re-living it. Hypnotism, then, is a traumatic
experience. Foucault explains that hypnotism is:

a form of a brief, transitory shock which will be suspended solely by the doctor’s
will, but which will envelop the individual’s general behavior, so that within this
state of hypnosis, which is a sort of generalized and provisional trauma, the
doctor’s will, his words, will be able to implant ideas and images in the subject
which thus have the same role, same function, and the same effect of injunction.
(PP 317)

Simply put, “Trauma is what provokes hypnosis, and hypnosis is a sort of general reactivation of
the trauma through the doctor’s will” (PP 317).
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Similar to the medical crisis, hypnosis brings the trauma, in this case operating like an
illness, to the level at which the doctor justifies intervention as the illness can be confirmed. The
intent of discovering such truth is to then figure out the appropriate measures for managing the
madness or delirium, and moreover, the techniques of cure and domination. Trauma becomes
medicalized—the game is to find the origin of madness, and what is found, through discursive
and physical techniques, is an event. Rituals and practices, such as hypnosis, produce a dualism:
Trauma emerges as an organizing principle, in accordance with the medical model of symptoms
and disease, and traumatic experience is something like a truth-event, both of which are
produced and exercised as the body is subjected to the doctor’s gaze, will, procedures, and tools
of verification and cure.
The procedure develops into an observation of both the symptoms (the pathological
behavior) and the condition in which the deviation occurs (the pathological history). Thus,
according to Foucault, a double search arose: “a) for the nervous diathesis which causes
susceptibility to trauma; search for heredity. And then b) for the trauma itself” (PP 318 fn). The
trauma is the invisible lesion, yet visible through the patient’s pathological, disorganized,
dysfunctional behavior and speech—what is abnormal. This opens the domain of vision to
include all of the patient’s general behavior. And thus, in terms of looking at a patient’s
pathological history, there is a shift to abnormality to account for the susceptibility to trauma.

3. Trauma’s Metageometry

As psychiatry shifts from the monomania of madness to the ‘norm’ as a functional
regularity—a principle of appropriate and adjusted functioning—Trauma gains explanatory
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power to provide an etiology of pathological, morbid, disorganized, and dysfunctional behavior.
In his 1974-1975 lectures on The Abnormal, Foucault traces the way in which psychiatry
assumes responsibility for the description, analysis, and qualification of abnormal, deviant,
automatized conduct. He explains this shift and adoption of the abnormal as a confirmation of
madness:

First of all, [psychiatry] had to codify madness as illness; pathologize its disorders, errors,
and illusions, and undertake analyses—symptomatology’s, nosography’s, prognoses,
observations, clinical files, et cetera—to bring this public hygiene, or social safety it was
responsible for, as close as possible to function in the name of medical knowledge.
However, you can see that a second, simultaneous codification was also required.
Madness had to be codified at the same time as danger, that is to say, psychiatry had to
make madness appear as the bearer of a number of dangers, as the bearer of risks, and as
a result of this psychiatry, as the knowledge of mental illness, could function as public
hygiene. Roughly on the one hand, psychiatry made an entire part of public hygiene
function as medicine and, on the other, it made the knowledge, prevention and possible
cure of mental illness function as an absolutely necessary form of social precaution
against a number of fundamental dangers linked to the very existence of madness. (AB
118-119)

To justify intervention in order to ‘protect’ society, psychiatry (mental medicine) needs to detect
a danger to society, even if is not visible. Thus, it serves as an authority, employing the tools of
medical knowledge (AB 120).
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Out of this medical knowledge, new objects emerge, or rather a whole domain of new
concepts, specifically, impulses, drives, tendencies, inclinations, and automatisms. Such new
objects of discourse are integrated into psychiatric discourse, establishing the appearance,
construction, and regulated use of such concepts. Yet, these objects are not exclusive to the
mentally ill and mad, but rather account for all behavior and conduct; that is, all behavior can be
reduced to impulses, drives, and automatisms. A new discursive formation of the abnormal
(dysfunctional, disorganized behavior) emerges out of the framework of everyday behavior.
Nineteenth century psychiatry now has an object, an organizing principle that will “organize the
whole problematic of the abnormal at the level of the most elementary and everyday conduct”
(AB 132). Consequently, within the domain of impulses, drives, and tendencies, the concept of
instinct emerges as a way to explain behavior and becomes the privileged object of psychiatry.
Psychiatry no longer needs just madness to establish its sovereignty and this opens the
entire domain of psychiatry to include all possible conduct for all possible intervention and
symptomalogical evaluation. Psychiatry spreads its net over any deviation of the norm, whether
voluntary or involuntary. At this point, conduct now becomes pathological. Foucault notes that
when psychiatry takes on this problematic, psychiatry is concerned with the content of the
organic and functional disorder, and thus “can be connected directly at the level of their content
and, more simply, at the level of the discursive form of psychiatry, to all the organic or
functional disorders, and fundamentally to the neurological disorders that disturb voluntary
conduct” (AB 161). Organic and neurological disorders develop as discursive formations, in
which psychiatry now attaches itself to medical knowledge; there is now a language of disease
found within the domain of impulses, drives, and automatisms. With that, the discourse of
psychiatry shifts—new rules in a new game. The organic and neurological belong to the domain
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of medical knowledge, and thus, psychiatric discourse operates along the model of medical
knowledge. Foucault explains, “…psychiatry becomes firmly anchored in a medicine of the
body with the possibility of a somatization that is not merely formal at the level of discourse, but
a fundamental somatization of mental medicine” (AB 162). Psychiatry then functions as
scientific knowledge and as medical knowledge, providing the science of normal and abnormal
behavior.
Thus, the ‘normal’ becomes a functional regularity—the appropriate and adjusted
functioning of the individual’s body. It is through practices consisting of medical knowledge
that the individual’s body is subjected to procedures of normalization under the supervision of
the doctor, the psychiatrist, and the psychoanalyst. Such practices and surveillance are the
medico-epistemological production of an individual’s body as an organic cause of its behavior—
somatization. For this reason, if an organic account of the cause of the individual’s conduct
cannot be found in the individual’s body, a search for a new kind of body develops. At this time,
heredity in illness is the source for psychiatric pathology. Foucault notes that there is a ‘causal
permissiveness’ which makes it possible for heredity, or anything else, to be the cause of
abnormal behavior.
With practices consisting of medical and biographical knowledge, psychiatry is able to
connect neurology, in terms of mental illness, and general biology in terms of heredity. This
creates what Foucault calls a “metabody” with “metasomatization.” The metasomatization
includes any signs and symptoms that are outside the norms of how the body behaves and how
the individual functions. The metasomatization is located in the individual patient’s body as well
as the patient’s familial body. The symptoms of abnormal behavior are manifest as features in
an individual’s life. Such elements include an individual’s biography, in terms of significant
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events, as well as what the individual inherits from the family. The body of the family now
becomes fundamental as causal explanation of abnormal behavior in terms of neurological traits,
but also the conditions of the individual’s development. Thus, the causal metabody consists of
the individual’s biography and heredity—the individual’s family—and instincts and neurology—
the individual’s body.
In the case of abnormal behavior, if there is a danger toward society, it is found within
this metabody, which is what justifies intervention on the part of the doctor, the psychiatrist, and
the psychoanalyst. But then again, instincts, heredity, and biography do not manifest as visible
lesions on the body, and, thus, in order to account for abnormal behavior, one must look to
another etiology inside the body—the invisible site of the cause. Trauma becomes an
economical way to capture the host of abnormal conduct and the corruption of the functional
regularity. As discussed above, Trauma develops out of desire for the etiology of madness but
then is the cause of symptoms of abnormal behavior, dysfunction, and pathological conduct. The
traumatized individual shows up on the grid of intelligibility because of a lack of appropriate and
adjusted functioning. Trauma has a symptomatology of its own: flashbacks, neurosis,
maladjustment, depression, etc. With this, it adopts the language of disorder, symptoms, cause,
treatment, and cure while subjected to scientific discourse and procedures. For this reason,
trauma develops its own techniques of discovery and cure, namely, catharsis and abreaction. As
follows, it operates on a medical model of knowledge whereby it shows up and functions like an
illness.
In order to be an object of science it must exist before that science, yet, what Foucault
shows is that it is produced through disciplinary power systems with a corresponding discourse.
Trauma, as an explanatory power, a discursive formation, serves to account for the development
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of traumatic neurosis. Trauma, however, does not firmly fit into the category of a monomania,
an illness, nor a disorder, and yet it serves as an invisible etiology of madness, illness, and
abnormal behavior. It is a way in which we problematize ourselves along the lines of good/bad
becoming normal/abnormal (pathological). We are witness to its symptomology—the
dysfunctional and abnormal body—but it lacks a geometry. It is unclear where the invisible
etiology occurs. This serves as an impetus for the development of the concept of the
unconscious.

4. The Ungeometrical Unconscious

In “On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement,” Freud briefly tells the story of the
development of his own concepts of repression and the unconscious with trauma playing a vital
role. Early on Freud, along with Breuer, held the position that the development of neurosis in
adults was due to an early traumatic event. Specifically, psychoneurosis, as opposed to actual
neuroses, was distinguished by reference to an originating sexual trauma experienced early in life
(HPM 51). In line with his ‘seduction theory,’ therapeutic treatment—in which the hysterical
symptom permanently disappears—was achieved when the patient “succeeded in bringing
clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its
accompanying effect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail
and had put the effect into words” (HPM 51). At the time of the First World War, Freud
witnesses soldiers returning from battle exhibiting what appears to be a pathological condition.
The soldiers experienced repetitive intrusion, nightmares, and reliving of battlefield events. This
condition, “war neurosis,” is experienced like a neurotic pathology, but the symptoms do not
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reflect such a pathology; that is, it is neither illness nor disorder. Within normal neurosis,
manifestations are understood ultimately as the absolute inability of the mind to avoid an unpleasurable event. On the other hand, in the case of war neurosis there is a return of the event
against the will of the one it inhabits. This repetition is a disruption in homeostasis and moves
toward painful objects, or at least, brings them inside, as opposed to avoiding them (BPP 12).
This works as a rule against the development of neurosis. The patient is fixated to his trauma
and, yet, the subject is disinclined to re-experience the trauma.
In addition to this development, Freud’s recounting of Breuer’s “discoveries” in
psychoanalysis, namely that of repression and catharsis, is a result of observing the symptoms of
hysterical patients. These symptoms originate as scenes from the patients’ past lives that have
made a lasting impression but, apparently, have been forgotten (HPM 8). Freud calls these
scenes “traumas” and notes that the therapy founded on this, in terms of an attempt to provide
access to these scenes, that is to remember and reproduce these experiences, produced a
fragmented theory of repression with its inferred treatment—catharsis. These symptoms
represent “an abnormal employment of amounts of excitation which had not been disposed of”
(HPM 8). At this time, one of the latest developments of psychoanalysis was one in which the
exciting causes of illness are brought into the foreground of analysis. This, according to Freud,
is what Breuer and he used to do with the cathartic method. He explains:

We lead the patient’s attention directly to the traumatic scenes in which the
symptom had arisen, and we endeavored to discover the mental conflict in that
scene and to release the suppressed affect in it. In the course of this we
discovered the mental process, characteristic of the neuroses, which I later named
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‘regression’. The patient’s associations moved back from the scene which we
were trying to elucidate to earlier experiences, and compelled the analysis, which
was supposed to correct the present, to occupy itself with the past. This
regression led constantly further backwards; at first it seemed regularly to bring us
to puberty; later on, failures and points which still eluded explanation drew the
analytic work still further back into years of childhood which had hitherto been
inaccessible to any kind of exploration. This regressive direction became an
important characteristic of analysis. It appeared that psychoanalysis could explain
nothing belonging to the present without referring back to something past; indeed,
that every pathogenic experience implied a previous experience which, though not
itself pathogenic, had yet endowed the later one with its pathogenic quality.
(HPM 10)

To look back into the patient’s biography is to desire knowledge of the scene which
occasioned the “outbreak of the current illness” (HPM 10). This analysis of the earliest
childhood experience then provides an understanding and solution of the current conflict. The
theory of repression became the cornerstone on which this analysis rested. Yet, Freud remarks
how this was just a “theoretical formulation of phenomenon” observed within treating the patient
without the technique of hypnosis. That is, when psychoanalysis adopts the practice of hypnosis,
the traumatic scenes (the traumatic event) serve as a way of accounting for neurosis. The theory
of psychoanalysis is an attempt to trace back the symptoms of neurosis, observed with the
patient, to their sources in past life. Thus, such theoretic formulations are produced out of
innumerable observations, providing hypotheses of infantile sexuality, resistance, and
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transference. This, according to Freud, is influenced by Charcot’s view of the traumatic origin of
hysteria.
Statements of recounting past childhood sexual experiences of the hysterics gained
etiological significance, but were later put into question when they discovered that such infantile
sexual traumas were not true, but fantasies. Thus, the inherent constitution of the patient came
into question, in which disposition and experience were “linked up in an indissoluble etiology
unity” (HPM 18). Freud explains that “Disposition exaggerates impressions which would
otherwise have been completely commonplace and have had no effect, so that they become
traumas giving rise to stimulations and fixations; which experiences awaken factors in the
disposition which, without them, might have long remained dormant and perhaps never have
developed. The last word on the subject of traumatic etiology was spoken later by Abraham
[1907], when he pointed out that the sexual constitution which is peculiar to children is precisely
calculated to provoke sexual experiences of a particular kind—namely traumas” (HPM 18). In
order to verify a hysteric as hysteric, the trauma has to be identified and made coherent.
Hypnosis allows the doctor to isolate and identify the repressed memory of the traumatic
experience and thus becomes a practice by which the doctor could confirm that the patient
experienced a trauma and not just fantasy. The theoretical consideration of the fact that the
patient’s resistance coincides with an amnesia leads inevitably to the view of unconscious mental
activity, which is distinct to psychoanalysis in that it distinguishes it quite clearly from
philosophical speculations about the unconscious (HPM 16).
The phenomena of repression and repetition of the traumatic experience lead to the
development of the theory of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. Freud explains that, “The
essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which
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represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious” (HPM 166). When this
happens, we can state that the idea is in a state of being ‘unconscious.’ Freud conceptualizes the
term ‘unconscious’ to refer to “any psychic process whose existence we are forced to assume on
the evidence of its outward effects but of which we know nothing directly. We stand in the same
relation to this as to some psychic process in another person, except that here it is one of our
own” (cited in Bracken, TCM 119). Freud remarks on how the unconscious, in fact, has a wider
compass in which repression is only a part of the unconscious. We can point to an ‘unconscious’
by observing effects of repression, effects of the work of the unconscious. The question, then, is
how do we arrive at knowledge of the unconscious if it is the case that it is the precise
mechanism that holds repressed ideas and instincts that are not conscious? If it is only of
something conscious that we know of it, how can we even speak of it? Freud answers this by
noting we can speak of it only after this unconscious has gone through transformation or
translation into something conscious. For that reason, according to Freud, psychoanalysis shows
that translation of this kind is possible.
The topographical view on the unconscious seems to suggest that the process of
translation or transformation, in which there is a change in the state of the idea, involves the
same material and occurring in the same locality. This brings up the problem of not just pure
psychological ideas, but the relations of the mental apparatus to anatomy. Freud explains,
however, that physical topography of the unconscious has nothing to do with anatomy; that is, it
does not have a reference to anatomical localities, but two regions in the mental apparatus,
wherever they may be situated in the body (HPM 174-175). That is to say, an idea does not
‘move in the body’ to another locality, but the same idea is in two forms in different locations or
levels of the mental apparatus—namely the unconscious and conscious. Freud gives the example
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of a repressed idea that the doctor, having “discovered” it in the patient, can bring to the attention
of the patient. The patient, though, can be aware of this idea, but not conscious of the actual
memory of the experience as it was in its earliest form. Calling attention to the repressed idea
does not lift repression, as hearing something and experiencing it are quite different things.
The question then becomes how the unconscious and conscious communicate in which an
unconscious thought becomes a conscious one on the part of the patient. Within the fundamental
concept in psychoanalysis, that of transference, language is essential. Freud’s study of
schizophrenics illustrates this point. For the schizophrenic, Freud notes that their inaccessibility
to therapeutic efforts; their repudiation of the external world; hypercathexis of their own ego;
apathy; and incomprehensible, nonsensical language indicate absence of the object-cathexes, the
object that emotional energy is concentrated on. However, Freud adds, the cathexis of the wordpresentations of objects is retained. Freud offers some telling examples to make his point, but I
can offer one of my own. A patient of the mental health clinic I worked at, who, although too
young to be diagnosed, displayed ‘schizophrenic’ behavior. During a routine activity, the child,
unprompted, once stated, “A dark man lives inside of me and tells me to kill people.” When
asked who the “dark man” is, the child stated, “My blood is black.” Such an example
demonstrates how Freud claims that the words, here, are subjected to the same process as that
which makes the dream-images out of latent dream-thoughts: they undergo condensation, and by
means of displacement, transfer their cathexes to one another in their entirety. He explains that,
“The process may go so far that in a single word, if it is especially suitable on account of its
numerous connections, takes over the representation of a whole train of thought” (HPM 199).
Given the biography (the pathological history) of the child, one could identify the dark man as
his father. The child repeatedly witnessed his schizophrenic father abusing and raping his
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mother after breaking in the house, though he had been expelled. The grouping of words is
indicative of a condensed historical biography, alluding to the way in which the child processed
the repetitive events.
This example is helpful to understand Freud’s assertion of the significance of language:
“What we have permissibly called the conscious presentation of the object can now be split up
into the presentation of the word and the presentation of the thing” (HPM 201). The latter
consists in the direct memory-image of the thing, or at least in the remoter memory-traces
derived from these. The traumatic experience is condensed into metaphorical language. Here,
words coincide with other words which are the same, that is, ‘dark man’ coincides with ‘dark
man,’ but words and things do not coincide—the “dark man” who instructs the child to kill
people does not directly coincide with the traumatic event. It is not until this ‘organ-speech,’ as
Freud calls it, is given an object-cathexes that it can become coherent. Freud distinguishes the
difference between the conscious and unconscious presentation of words and things:

We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious and
an unconscious presentation…The two are not, as we supposed, different
registrations of the same content in different psychical localities, nor yet different
functional states of cathexis in the same locality; but the conscious presentation
comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word
belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing
alone. (HPM 201)
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When there is a conscious presentation of a thing, it is coupled with language. In a sense, the
child is conscious of his trauma as he can express the experience metaphorically. The child,
though, may not be aware of the way in which such speech is coupled with the experience. And,
there may remain repressed memories. Yet, if the ‘thing-presentation’ is repressed, the child, not
being conscious of it, cannot speak of it. Repression denies the rejected presentation in the
transference neuroses: “what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall
remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act
which is not hypercathected, remains therefore in the unconscious in a state of repression.” With
that said, “[T]hey attain their capacity to become conscious only through being lined with the
residues of perceptions of words” (HPM 202).
It is important to note this fundamental connection between repression and the absence of
language. According to Freud, the presentations of objects, in this case the traumatic experience,
are simulated not as the actual event, but through language. That is, as Freud explains,

It turns out that the cathexes of the word-presentation is not part of the act of
repression, but represents the first of the attempts at recovery or cure… These
endeavors are directed towards regaining the lost object, and it may well be that to
achieve this purpose they set off on a path that leads to the objects via the verbal
part of it, but then find themselves obliged to be content with words instead of
things. (HPM 203-204)

In the case of repression, the event is present, but any words directly coinciding with the event
are absent.
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The unconscious, then, can be understood as an absence. That is, the concept of the
unconscious points to something, or rather indicates a lack: a lack of language. By ‘locating’ the
forgotten memory or repressed thought of traumatic experience in the unconscious, which is
inaccessible through ordinary language, psychoanalysis provides a framework for the kind of
knowledge we are speaking of with trauma as a truth-event. The concept of the unconscious
indicates how knowledge of trauma is thought to be inaccessible, unintelligible, unspeakable,
unassimilated, while in its repressed form. The re-telling of the traumatic event, though, can
speak to its chronology and geography, and thus, it presents itself to the domain of scientific
knowledge in terms of causality, process, symptomatology, and even cure. We can only come to
comprehend the meaning of the child’s statement when we tether it to an object, event, memory,
or to the trauma. This coupling is deployed when the doctor places the patient under his will in
order to discover that object, or event, through biographical narrative or other cathartic
techniques of hypnosis, abreaction, and narco-therapy.4 This is not to say that there is no
knowledge of the trauma, but the type of privileged knowledge of trauma, experienced as “a dark
man living inside of me,” for example, is indeterminate and remote. The concept of trauma
stands as a missing link in a causal chain of events and processes. Yet, what is ‘there’ is not a
link. If anything, it is a break—a tear in the tissue of linear, scientific knowledge whereby it
emerges in order to preserve continuity and synchrony. Any type of explanation on our part is to
refer back to some scientific explanation of a neurosis, illness, disorder, dementia, etc.—it is to
position the individual in unreason and the abnormal.
Thus, within the early development of psychoanalysis, the concept of trauma is tied to the
unconscious through the theoretical formulations of repetition and repression. The notion of
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repression implies that once the traumatic experience is brought into consciousness through
language, it is known and then subjected to techniques of analysis and cure. Trauma is
discovered in the unconscious, absent of language.

5. In this Gap, Something Happens

Lacan, in his series of lectures on the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, proposes that
the unconscious is structured like a language—it “functions spontaneously, of itself, and in a
presubjective way” (XI 20). This can be better understood by explaining Lacan’s account of
linguistics and subjectivity. Lacan returns to Freud, for whom the unconscious is dependent on
the psychic dimension of language. The unconscious is a reference to a system of signifying
elements analogous to the signifying elements of language. Language is structured because it is
always grounded in a set of given elements, namely, signs. Additionally, it is structured in that it
presupposes laws that govern the signs. The sign is the linguistic unit, composed of the signified
(concept) and the signifier (acoustic image) which can be represented through an algorithm:

𝑆
𝑠

Lacan inverts the original algorithm provided by Ferdinand de Saussure with the intent to
establish the primacy of the signifier. It reads as follows: signifier over signified. The signifier
and signified are two distinct orders. The “over” corresponds to the bar separating the two levels
in which the barrier makes it so that signified resists signification (E 415). The emergence of the
signifier is inseparable from the creation of the linguistic sign due to the fact that the sign is a
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function of its context. It can only make sense retroactively since signification emerges at the
end of the signifying utterance.
The barring of signifier over signified can be illustrated through Lacan’s theory of the
“mirror stage” of infancy, which he introduces in 1936 and returns to in 1949. The mirror stage
is the moment in which the subject is disjointed from its body. An infant, looking at a mirror,
sees a reflection, that is, an image of a coherent, unified object. The image “immediately gives
rise in a child to a series of gestures in which he playfully experiences the relationship between
the movements made in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual
complex and the reality it duplicates—namely, the child’s own body, and the persons and even
things around him” (E 94). The mirror stage is to be understood as an identification (E 76). It is
at this stage in which a transformation takes place in the subject—when the subject assumes he is
the image and thus desires to establish a relationship between organism (body) and its reality (I
as image). Yet, this is precisely what the child lacks, in that it is determined by a split in the
body and the representation of the body. The reference to the body, the image of what should
be, is already a break. The experience is disjointed although the infant sees a unified ‘self,’
which is the Ideal Image. Lacan explains: “the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound
up with that which determines it – namely, a privileged object, which has emerged from some
primal separation, from some self-mutilation induced by the very approach of the real, whose
name in our algebra, is the object a” (XI 83). The object a is the mediation of the lack, in which
the lack is always as symbol; it is not as itself because it is the lack of the unified self. The
infant projects himself as unified within the representation, yet the object is removed from the
‘self’ as an alienated symbol of the lack.
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The image at the mirror stage is the first signifier, but is built out of the imaginary of
unification (it is this imaginary of unification which serves as a way by which we can even think
of/for a community). That is, within the mirror stage the self is seeing the (unified) self, but that
self is not a ‘self’ until the subject sees itself. The image in the mirror is the image of coherence
and becomes the process of identification of self and external image—the other—and thus
represents the infant's first encounter with subjectivity, an external sense of coherence—the
sense of “I” and “you.” There is a feeling of being ‘not that:’

At stake here is the being that appears in a split second in the emptiness of the verb “to
be” and, as I said, this being raises its question for the subject. What does that mean? It
does not raise it before the subject, since the subject cannot come to the place where
being raises it, but being raises it in the subject’s place—in other words, being raises the
question in that place with the subject. (E 432-433)

Here lies a misrecognition in which the subject encounters its own existential negativity.
The “total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a
mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form is
more constitutive than constituted, but in which, above all, it appears to him as the contour of his
stature that freezes it and in a symmetry that reverses it in opposition to the turbulent movements
with which the subject feels he animates it.” The gestalt symbolizes the I’s mental permanence,
at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination (E 76).
Language becomes a higher version of this Ideal Image. The Ideal Image is identity.
This identity is the subject’s role in language; the position in language (in terms of personality,
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aspects, etc.). Given the primacy of the signifier, the signifier governs the subject’s discourse,
and for this reason, governs the subject. Lacan explains, “For the signifier, by its very nature,
always anticipates meaning by deploying its dimension in some sense before it” (E 419). The
“unity of signification,” then, “turns out to never come down to a pure identification of reality,
but always refers to another signification. In other words, signification comes about only on the
basis of taking things as a whole” (E 345). Language promises to make something definable and
accessible through a symbolic order. This is a closed order which unfolds in a directional, what
Lacan calls, signifying chain. Discourse, as per Lacan, unfolds in accordance with two types of
operations: metaphoric and metonymic.
Metaphor, as we know, is a substitution through relations of similarity. In this way, it is a
signifying substitution, “situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in
nonmeaning” (E 423). Lacan further notes, “metaphor’s creative spark does not spring forth
from the juxtaposition of two images, that is, of two equally actualized signifiers. It flashes
between two signifiers, one of which has replaced the other by taking the other’s place in the
signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present by virtue of its (metonymic)
connection to the rest of the chain” (E 422). This substitution is an immediate association of the
signifier as signified, in which the signified obtains its coherence from the network of signifiers.
The metaphor then, operates along the synchronic axis of language.
Metonymy is the exchange of a name, in which two objects are linked by relation of
material to object or by container to contents. In order for the metonym to have meaning, the
first signifier must be retained in the immediate contiguity of the second signifier. With that, “an
effect of signification is produced that is creative or poetic, in other words, which is the advent of
the signification in question” (E 429). To make sense of the metonym, then, a mental operation
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is always required, in which the connection between the signifier (S) and the second signifier
(S¹) is re-established.
For Freud, these two operations are extended to the formation of the unconscious. The
metaphoric and metonymic mechanisms are assimilated to the functioning of the primary
processes, namely condensation and displacement (E 439). The process of condensation is a
metaphoric process, while the process of displacement in dreams is a metonymic mechanism.
According to Freudian psychology, the unconscious activity amalgamates diverse materials of
different origins, making it so that the expression of the repressed desire is unrecognizable. In
the condensation process, as discussed above, a single word can take over the representation of a
whole train of thought. The metaphor stands in for a successive stratification, taken as a
symptom. Lacan, then, asserts that the “symptom is a metaphor…just as desire is metonymy” (E
439). In the case of trauma, “Metaphor’s two-stage mechanism is the very mechanism by which
symptoms, in the analytic sense, are determined. Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual
trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain, a spark flies that fixes a
symptom—a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element—the
signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious subject, by which the symptom may be
dissolved” (E 431). Symptoms need a cause, and that cause is the truth, that is the truth of the
event, of neurotic suffering (E 739).
Perhaps my previous example can assist in understanding these two operations within
language. When the child states, “A dark man lives inside of me,” the ‘dark man’ is an allusion
to his father. The child displaces the memory of the traumatic experience and fear of the father
through an ambiguous, seemingly benign, ordinary object. Without knowledge of the traumatic
experience, the ‘dark man’ is too ambiguous of an expression. This is why the expression of the
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repressed memory is unrecognizable. A mental process is required to identify the ‘dark man’ as
the child’s father. Further, condensation occurs when the child claims that the ‘dark man’
(father) is “living inside.” The memory of the traumatic events, the threat of the father, and the
child’s continuous fear, for example, merge and are condensed into the single idea of “living
inside.” The expression is a metaphor, in that it has replaced the originating diverse material,
taking its place within the chain of signifiers. The signifier of the traumatic memory remains
present, though, via the connection (of metonyms) to the rest of the chain. This is likewise also
the case in the expression, “I have black blood.”
In the example of the child, the ‘black blood’ functions as a symptom of the psychosis in
that there is a question of its place in reality. Yet, the ‘black blood,’ does signify some reality
that provides some ‘truth.’ The symptom, then, is a return of the truth. The child’s ‘truth’ can be
interpreted only in the order of the signifier, which has meaning only in its relation to another
signifier. This is how the signifier enters the signified, “namely, in a form, which, since it is not
immaterial, raises the question of its place in reality” (E 417). This is what Lacan means when
he states that in the case of metaphor, meaning takes place in nonmeaning. Thus, as Lacan
asserts, “the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language” (E 436).
But it should be noted that, according to Lacan, there is no existing language which
covers the field of the signified. The unconscious, then, is the truth of the subject but is used to
speak about what language cannot say. Language covers over the unconscious—an absence—
and emerges to patch up this lack. The unconscious is structured by language at the point where
language fails. And yet, the term ‘unconscious’ “assures us that there is, beneath the term
unconscious, something definable, accessible, and objectifiable” (XI 21). For this reason, Lacan
notes that language is what guarantees the status of the unconscious. The problem is that there
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cannot be a pure identification with reality, and instead, what we have is a signifier-to-signifier
correlation, in which no signification can be sustained except by reference to another
signification.5 In this case, the ‘unconscious’ is a signifier in that it points to something.
Nevertheless, if we are to grasp the constitution of an object in language, namely the
unconscious in this case, we could only make note that the constitution is found at the level of a
concept, at the level of discursive formations.
In trying to formulate the unconscious, it is already circumscribed in seeking it. The
signifier-to-signifier correlations provide the standard for any search for signification (E 418).
We structure the concept of the unconscious by looking for what is unconscious. In this
particular case, though, when we search for the signification of the unconscious, the correlation
of signifier-to-signifier is disrupted. The signifier ‘unconscious’ signifies what cannot be
signified; it points to a break in the symbolic order of signifiers. Lacan, thus, interprets the
Freudian concept of unconscious as a gap—a rupture. The unconscious ‘appears’ to us as a
phenomenon as it emerges from a break in the synchronic order of language (XI 25). It is the
missing link, incessantly sliding under the signified, eluding our grasp.
In the domain of synchrony and cause, the law of the signifier is the locus in which this
gap is produced (XI 23). Lacan explains:
It is in the dimension of a synchrony that you must situate the unconscious—at
the level of a being, but in the sense that it can spread over everything, that is to
say, at the level of the subject of the enunciation, in so far as, according to the
sentences, according to the modes, it loses itself as much as it finds itself again,
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This is what Freud indicates when asserting that verbal identity, the relation of words-to-words, takes precedence
over the thing signified (object-presentation), where substitutions (word-presentation) for the signified.

50

and in the sense that, in an interjection, in an imperative, in an invocation, even in
a hesitation, it is always the unconscious that presents you with its enigma, and
speaks—in short, at the level at which everything that blossoms in the
unconscious spreads, like mycelium, as Freud says about the dream, around a
central point. It is always a question of the subject qua indeterminate. (XI 26)

The unconscious, though produced and discovered in the form of discontinuity, is indeterminate
in that it is an absence. That is to say, when there is an impediment, a failure, a split in speech, a
rupture of the symbolic order, the unconscious is produced and “discovered”—the rupture makes
the absence emerge.
It is this form of discontinuity, a break in discourse, which is the essential form in which
the unconscious first appears to us as a phenomenon, and yet, would not appear except for in the
domain of synchrony and causality (XI 25). Lacan focuses on the prefix of un to make the
distinction between non-concept and lack (XI 26, fn). Un, in unconscious, suggests a negation,
but not in the sense of a non-concept, or nothing unreal, rather as a concept of lack (XI 26). He
asserts that the concept of lack does not suggest that the unconscious is nothing unreal; rather it
is unrealized: “In this gap, something happens” (XI 22). Something is there, suspended between
the cause and that which it affects.
Lacan refers to this as the ‘Real’—what is present, but yet, what we cannot encounter.
The real is the immediate, raw materiality of our existence. Lacan says that the Real is
impossible, in the sense that language marks our separation from the real. It cannot be put into
language as its very entrance into language disrupts the immediate reality. Yet, the Real is what
continues to erupt making us aware of our materiality and that which threatens our reality. In
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psychoanalysis, the real presents itself in a form of the trauma—when the materiality of our
existence is made known and threatened (XI 55). He refers back to an Aristotelian word, tuché,
which he translates as “the encounter with the real” (XI 53). The Real in the encounter is
souffance, translated from the French as ‘in suspense,’ abeyance, awaiting attention, pending (XI
26, fn). The encounter happens “as if by chance.” In dreams, flashbacks, spontaneous
memories, for instance, we stumble upon and encounter the real by accident. Lacan notes that it
is only in something like a dream that this truly unique encounter occurs. Dreams are essentially
a tribute to the missed reality, in that reality can no longer produce itself except by repeating
itself endlessly, insisting on its existence. Repetition of the trauma likewise demands our
attention, but only unveils itself as a disruption in the drive for homeostasis—a repeated
disruption in the form of the remembering and reliving. Trauma can no longer produce itself
except by repeating itself endlessly. Due to the repetition of the traumatic event, the event is
never closed off—it has no ending, no beginning, as it is on an eternal loop. Thus, the function
of “the tuché,” similar to the unconscious, does not function in time, cannot be assimilated, and
is apprehended in its experience of rupture.
However, given the primary processes (such as the pleasure principle) it is unclear how
the dream (the bearer of the subject’s desire) can produce that which makes the trauma emerge
repeatedly. The image in the dream repeats the trauma, threatening the subject again. The
subject is then fixated to the trauma—it becomes absorbed in the subject’s very being. The
subject, though, does not desire the trauma and is not interested in undertaking the reliving of the
event. If the image in the dream is the expression of desire, then it is in at its most “cruel” form,
as Lacan puts it. Lacan then asks: what then is the function of the traumatic repetition? Why
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would an agent undertake such an operation? For the sake of mastery? To master the painful
event? To master the self? But who masters? (XI 51).6
Lacan examines the word wiederholen (repetition) to pursue these questions. Containing
the verb hauler, it is literally translated as “hauling of the subject who always drags its thing into
a certain path that he cannot get out of” (XI 51). Taking the image of a subject dragging its
‘thing’ into a certain path hints at agency in the sense that the subject is mastering over itself: it
drags. But, it is the thing which sets the path. In the case that this is a repetitious ‘act,’ in which
the subject cannot get out of this repetition, out of this path, agency is indeterminate. It is as
though the thing drags itself of itself. This can make sense if we take into consideration the way
in which the trauma is absorbed into the subject. Taking the elusive “encounter with the real”
that is trauma, what we find, then, is that the subject is elusive—the subject incessantly slides
under the trauma in the ‘act’ of repetition. The event is never closed off—it has no ending, no
beginning, as it is on an eternal loop, and thus, the tuché, similar to the unconscious, does not
function in time. To take something as closed indicates a locus; however the locus is missing.
The ‘Real’ in the encounter is souffance—in suspense, abeyance, awaiting attention, pending.
The place of the ‘Real’ stretches from the tuché to the phantasy, in which the phantasy is a
screen that conceals something quite primary, that is, the lack (XI 60). As detailed above, Lacan
asserts that the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language (E 436). Yet, as the
tuché is a breakdown of language, it cannot be assimilated. With this in mind, the question of its
truth and its place in reality remains open.
Employing psychoanalytic discourse, the analyst reigns over this domain, and with that, a
promise to make something definable, accessible, and objectifiable. However, if there is a break
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This is what leads Freud to later develop concepts of the death drive.
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in the symbolic order, the analyst seeks a reality beyond language to fill the absence, and thus,
looks to the patient’s dysfunctional behavior, pathological biography, dreams, and confessional
narrative. Equipped with the tools of hypnosis, confessional narrative, narco-therapy, et cetera,
the analyst intends to uncover the traumatic neurosis, seize it, and then return it to the subject as
a cure. Considering this, psychoanalysis rests on a law of misrecognition that governs the
subject not only as observed, but also observer. The analyst tells the patient that the cause of the
observed symptoms is inaccessible to him except through the discourse of the psychoanalyst,
whereas, the trauma is inaccessible to the analyst except through the speech of the subject. The
exchange of speech fails:

While it is to [the patient] that you must speak, it is literally about something
else—that is, about some-thing other than what is at stake when he speaks of
himself—which is the thing that speaks to you. Regardless of what he says, this
thing will remain forever inaccessible to him if, being speech addressed to you, it
cannot elicit its response in you, and if, having heard its message in this inverted
form, you cannot, in re-turning it to him, give him the twofold satisfaction of
having recognized it and of making him recognize its truth. (E 349)

Through this failure, this split, the unconscious emerges—it is there to speak on behalf of
the subject—what language cannot say. The psychoanalyst is only able to ‘access’ the
truth as a witness—a witness to a truth-event; but only able to make it ‘known’ through
language. From this we see that, “The logical term “other” makes it clear how much the
truth for all depends on the rigor of each: that truth—if reached only by some—can
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engender, if not confirm, error in the others; and, moreover, that if in this race to the truth
one is but alone, although not all may get to the truth, still no one can get there but by
means of the others” (E 173). Trauma is the other living within. Through witnessing, in
some regard, psychoanalytic discourse is able to “get at” some unconscious material—
pieces of truth—in a particular geography and chronology of the event. This is the
meeting point where the body of the analyst encounters the body of the patient.
However, the tuché, being the rip in the symbolic order, repeatedly returns the ‘subject’
to where language and body do not meet—language is absent, the unconscious is a lack;
but, the body is present.

6. The Horror of Survival

“What does it mean to transmit and to theorize around a crisis that is marked, not by a simple
knowledge, but by the ways it simultaneously defies and demands our witness?” –Cathy Caruth

Caruth, echoing Lacan, also suggests that trauma is a missing encounter, while also claiming that
trauma is in ‘having survived.’ The trauma is not so much an “effect of destruction,” whether it
be destruction of the ‘self’ or the loss of an assumptive world; rather, it is “an enigma of
survival” (TNH 58). That is to say, what is so traumatic is that one comes close to their own
death, and yet survives it. This is not to single out violent events as solely what is traumatic,
meaning that the individual physically encounters and yet survives their own death, but also, it
could be experienced as the death of the assumptive world, or death of the self. The individual
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repeatedly returns to their survival and with that, repeatedly comes back to their death. For this
reason, Caruth views trauma as a break in the mind’s experience of time:

It is not simply…the literal threatening of bodily life, but the fact that the threat is
recognized as such by the mind one moment too late. The shock of the mind’s
relation to the threat of death is thus not the direct experience of the threat, but
precisely the missing of this experience, the fact that, not being experienced in
time, it has not yet been fully known. (TNH 62)

Caruth refers to Freud’s discussion of traumatic neurosis as a reference point in her
argument, in which repetitive dreams are endeavoring to master the stimulus retrospectively.
What she gathers from Freud’s work is that trauma is much more than a pathology, an illness of
a wounded psyche. She argues that the power of trauma is not the direct experience of it, so to
say, but rather of the attempt to overcome the fact that it was not direct—the attempt to master
what was never fully grasped in the first place (TNH 62). This is because at the time of the
traumatic experience itself, similar to Lacan’s notion of the missing encounter, we do not
experience trauma as such, but come to know of this experience by separating from the real and
entering the symbolic order. That is to say, trauma is not fully perceived as it occurs, and
further, a history of trauma can only be grasped in its inaccessibility of its occurrence (TNH 8).
What this means is that we do not have access to its occurrence in the moment of that occurrence
taking place. The trauma is experienced “too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and so it
is not available to consciousness until it imposes itself again, repeatedly” (TNH 8).
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Caruth not only highlights the mechanism of repetition within the traumatic experience,
but also draws our attention to the correlate of that repetition—forgetting. It is only through the
dynamic force of forgetting and repetition that trauma is first experienced at all. For trauma to
interrupt, as it does, it must veil itself, recoil into the unconscious, into the gap of knowledge and
time, to be forgotten. This is what makes it traumatic—the trauma victim is shocked back into
this ‘reality,’ or rather shocked via the reality after having forgotten it, repeatedly, and yet, can
never assimilate it. Caruth’s specific use of the language of “inherent forgetting” and occurring
within repetition, suggests some type of topology of trauma—repetition (forgetting and
remembering). But, what might appear as some ‘structure’ of trauma, whereby we could predict
and understand it, becomes more an indication of how we cannot predict and fully grasp the
experience. That is, because trauma is not a closed-off occurrence—it stands outside of time and
consciousness—it does not have any such chronology, geography, or locality—trauma is not the
event.
According to Caruth, trauma is not located in the original, inaccessible event, but in the
way it is unassimilated, in, what we could call, its unevent. It is not experienced in linear time
and thus has not yet been fully known. Yet, she indicates there is some type of ‘truth’: “This
truth, in its delayed appearance and its belated address, cannot be linked only to what is known,
but also to what remains unknown in our very actions and our language” (TNH 4). The “voice”
of the trauma “cries out.” With this, we are made aware of the ‘other’ within trauma: “the
otherness of a human voice that cries out from the wound”—a voice witness to truth that one
cannot fully know. In this way, it defies and simultaneously demands our witness.
Psychoanalytic theory listens to what cannot fully be known, but must, at the same time, be
witness to it (TNH 9). Therein implies a responsibility, or at least, a demand on our part to
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answer this call. Yet, the very language that we would do so is the language that defies its
claims. For these reasons, Caruth looks to the literary text as a way to respond to the voice of
trauma. Caruth claims that the literary, whether text or theory, is not straightforwardly
referential. With trauma, the transmission of knowledge can never be asked in a straightforward
way, and so must be in a language that is literary—“a language that defies, even as it claims, our
understanding” (TNH 4-5). What propositional, scientific/psychoanalytic language resists is
what literary theory “gets at.” —“situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in
nonmeaning” (Lacan, E 423).
What we find is that these narratives point to how one cannot remember, express, or
know of trauma except through some self-representation. The remembering almost, substituting
for itself, approaches ever nearer to some sort of focus, or center, namely, the memory.
Repetition vacillates, swings around the missing encounter, in which the subject does not
encounter the traumatic experience. As it is apprehended in its repetitive rupture, trauma is
positioned in a non-temporal locus. This compels us to posit another locality, another space,
another scene, in which trauma, held in abeyance between forgetting and repeating, pending its
emergence and disappearance, steps out of the wound (XI 56).

7. The Missing Encounter

Born where madness and the abnormal meet—where bodies are surveyed, observed, governed,
and subjected to the sovereign’s gaze—psychoanalysis responds to a call, a call emanating from
the soldier’s nightmares, from the child’s speech. As witness to this voice, what unfolds is a
discourse that both bares and veils what this voice is saying; provides and denies a language;
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knows and does not know. Returning to Foucault’s history of knowledge, the traumatic
experience at first glance shares the qualities of the truth-event: it is the privilege of a select few;
it takes place in a highly specific, temporal space which can never be repeated. We can isolate a
single individual as experiencing the truth-event of trauma, although, we can also say that a
select few can experience the same event, though their traumatic experiences are radically
different. Yet, in regard to the other criteria of the truth-event, the above analysis suggests that
trauma does not quite fit into this model of knowledge in the sense that it cannot have a
chronology and geography. That is, although the event(s) happens in a specific time and location,
trauma is indeterminate as it does not have a recognizable beginning or end, and is on an eternal
loop—it is not closed-off. Language points to a missing memory, an inherent forgetting, an
irretrievable experience, an inaccessible occurrence, which laps through time. But, all in all, it
points to a gap between two indeterminate geographical points—the real and the subject.
Freud offers a dark space, an indeterminate geometrical domain—the unconscious—
wherein repetition unveils a missing memory, an inherent forgetting, an irretrievable experience,
an inaccessible occurrence—absent of language—only by chance: a chance that breaks the
symbolic order; emerges from the gap; happens too soon; yet, recognized is one moment too late.
The unexpected shock is precisely the missing encounter, not being experienced in time, and not
fully known until it intervenes again, repeatedly. This renders the question of how if trauma
cannot be known through chronologic, synchronic, geographic, geometric, symbolic order, then
how do we know it.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE EMBODIED FEELING OF BEING ALIVE

While reading Catharine Malabou’s Ontology of the Accident, I am struck with the words: “A
smashed up face is still a…” The image of a face—his smashed up face—flashes, shocking me,
like the unpredictable electric current of a lightning strike that cracks the sky. I squint, shudder,
my heart beat quickens, and I impulsively look away from the page. There was no warning, even
though I was reading about the accident, even though I had just read the words, “No one thinks
spontaneously about a plastic art of destruction” (OA 4). But, the moment my eyes touch the
words, unfolding letter-by-letter, stacking on each other to create (no, conjure) the image, I am
flooded with sensations and memories, all of which happen as if by chance. The tuché, the
encounter with the ‘real,’ appears by accident.
I can describe the scene that flashes ‘in my head.’ I can describe the overwhelming
sensations. And perhaps you can imagine what it looks like and how it may feel, similar to
images in film or art. Perhaps the words I use in my description ‘ring true’ for you. But what I
describe is not equivalent to my encounter—it vanishes as it enters into language; it disrupts the
immediate, raw materiality of being; it happens “too soon, too un-expectantly to be fully known
and so it is not available to consciousness until it imposes itself again, repeatedly” (TNH 8).
And yet, this does not at all erase the certainty of the experience—the image is as real as the
flesh that bore the destruction. How is the accident (trauma) unassimilable, but, somehow, still
‘there,’ unveiling itself, insisting on its existence, and making itself known?
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1. Those Who Know

“After trauma the world becomes sharply divided between those who know and those who
don’t”—Bessel van der Kolk, The Body Keeps Score.

We can grant that there is always some private knowledge: I have direct access to my own
experiences and memories which others do not, and these memories make up the content of what
I can say I know. But, what is implied in van der Kolk’s statement is that there is some type of
privileged knowledge, shared between those who experience trauma. This shared, private
knowledge creates a community, in which others outside this domain, those who have not
“shared the traumatic experience cannot be trusted, because they can’t understand it” (BKS 18).
To say that anyone who has not experienced trauma cannot understand it defies the very inquiry
into what is known and how we can even speak about trauma. If it is the case that some are
outside the experience, then how is trauma at all communicated? Notice here, van der Kolk says
“can’t,” employing language of potentiality, not impossibility. The issue at hand is not to silence
such discourse, but to address the potentiality of understanding the distinction between what is
known and what is not.
Notably the task of understanding trauma is what motivates psychology, and more
recently, the disciplines of neuroscience, developmental psychopathology, and interpersonal
neurobiology, with the belief that it is possible to understand (BKS 2). And this is not just for
those who conduct studies, practice therapeutic techniques, record testimony, but also the
trauma-individual who seeks refuge in explanation and cure. Since discourse of the diagnosis of
PTSD made its way into the DSM III, psychiatrists and physicians attempt to verify traumatic
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experience by way of scientific, medical apparatuses, emboldened with the power to diagnose,
treat, and cure. This profuse scientific discourse, circulating and dissimilating beyond the
scholarly and scientific text, is now easily accessed and available for common consumption. A
simple example that I have observed is the way in which some veterans are quick to use such
language as if to account for and verify their experiences. Their ‘symptoms’ now are just that:
‘symptoms’ of a disorder—“I have a hard time concentrating; I get enraged at the smallest
things; I feel numb; I don’t feel like myself...That’s just my PTSD.”
But, being able to propose “That’s my PTSD” or explain the highly, technical
neurological processes does not capture the phenomenological embodiment of trauma. This is
where the line is drawn between those who know and those who do not know. I may be told
what is happening in my body when I have a flashback: areas of the ‘rational’ brain shut down
and both the ‘emotional’ and ‘reptilian’ parts light up, and my body is flooded with cortisol and
stress hormones which have failed to return to equilibrium. But that is not how I know the
flashback. We do not know trauma by way of the independent neuro-physiological processes,
neurobiological, or psychoanalytic narratives.
One aspect of this is that traumatic memories differ qualitatively from normal memory.
Traumatalogist Van der Kolk discusses the difference between normal, stressful memory and
traumatic memory (2015).7 In the case of normal memory, given subsequent experience and the
passage of time, often it is the case that the memory and its meaning are altered. For example,
someone can remember a time of heartbreak and feelings of anguish, lament, and loss. But,
several years later, that memory may have a different meaning than before. Perhaps, the
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There is vast literature on traumatic memory, dating back to Jenet and Charcot, working its way through Freud,
psychoanalysis, neurology, etc. I am focusing on van der Kolk’s distinction as it is succinct and targets the specific
element related to my discussion here.
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individual sees the heartbreak as an event in life that contributed to their development. The pain
and anguish associated with the memory may not be entirely stripped, but it no longer carries the
intense emotional sensations felt before. Perhaps it may even evoke a sense of empowerment
and pride in overcoming the pain of the heartbreak. Or, perhaps, the individual is indifferent to
the experience as it does not show up as meaningful in their present condition. Van der Kolk
also points out that two different individuals can give different testimony of a singular, shared,
past event. Normal memory is malleable in how meaningful it is to someone, the emotional
response, how the individual incorporates it into their narrative and current sense of identity.
On the other hand, with traumatic memory, scenes are played over and over without any
modification. The traumatic memory is preserved and remains intact despite the continuation of
time. Moreover, it is not just an image or scene which is preserved. In his research, Van der
Kolk describes traumatic memories as “fragments of sensory components of the event: as visual
images; olfactory, auditory, or kinesthetic sensations; or intense waves of feelings […which are]
representations of elements of the original event” (Traumatic Stress 1996, 287). Notably so, this
indicates that there is a particular ‘materiality’ of traumatic memory. That is to say, trauma is
“primarily remembered not as a story, a narrative with a beginning, middle, and end, but isolated
sensory imprints…” (BKS 70). These sensory components of the original event(s) are what live
in the body. Van der Kolk thus proposes that trauma is “imprinted” in the body—“the body
keeps the score.”
This indicates that there is a continuous interaction of the body (sensory fragments) and
the external world (sensory stimulants). But, the knowledge of the trauma, preserved in memory,
goes beyond just cognitive memory—it dwells in the body and world. For instance, when I
smell hand sanitizer, it is not just a slightly unpleasant smell; it is the scene and ritual of entering
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and exiting the hospital rooms. I am hauled back into the hospital room, with all of the smells,
sounds, colors, objects, etc.: the beeping of the heart monitor; the blue of the nurses’ scrubs; the
sage green walls; the stifling, unrelenting, haunting, dominate, ugly, abject, utter sensation of
fear; and, his smashed up face. Hand sanitizer has a distinct meaning and sensation; the image,
odor, and sensation overlap in a palpable, distasteful memory.
This means that traumatic experience does not just ‘take place’ in the individual’s psyche
or body, but extends into the world, and that world is hauled back into the individual. There is a
cohabitating of objects and body, as evidenced by Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment.
This is not to suggest that odors and sounds only remind trauma-individuals of a past event. The
distinction, though, is in most cases, normal memory remains a memory, subject to change or
fading away; it is a part of the individual’s narrative; but, it does not continue to occur as an
event taking place in the present. And yet, traumatic memory does not have to require an
external stimulant. In the cases of flashbacks, the sensations of the trauma reawaken, as if on
their own—there is no warning, no anticipation, no visible or auditory stimulant. The past still
lives as sensory fragments of the event, in which there is no beginning, no present, and no end;
the trauma takes place in the present. During the flashback or traumatic memory, the individual
is wrested out of the present, while still present.
The introduction of the embodied experience of trauma here shows where neuroscience
and psychoanalysis are both lacking in describing what ‘takes place’ in traumatic experience.
According to Malabou, in the case of plasticity in psychoanalysis and in neurology, “the plastic
brain or plastic psyche is one that finds the right balance between the capacity for change and
the aptitude for remaining the same, between what is to come and memory, between the giving
and receiving of form” (OA 5). But in the case of the accident (trauma), there is an entirely
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different force, not one that brings the mind, body, and world back in balance, but one that
annihilates equilibrium. She notes that this “destructive and disorganizing explosive power is
present virtually in each of us, ready to manifest itself, to take body or self-actualize at any
moment” (OA 5). For this reason, we could say it is part of our ontology. And yet, Malabou
emphasizes, it has not been given a name, and certainly not the name of plasticity (OA 5).
Although van der Kolk provides a medical interpretation of trauma, he also
acknowledges this essential aspect of embodiment. He states that, “We now know that trauma
compromises the brain area that communicates the physical, embodied feeling of being alive”
(BKS 3, emphasis mine). I want to focus on the embodied feeling of being alive. What provides
us with an ‘embodied feeling of being alive?’ How does the accident, specifically trauma,
compromise this sensation?

2. Caught Up in the Tissue of Things

Embodiment can be thought of as overlapping worlds: the world of objects and others, the world
of the self, and the world of the body. Merleau-Ponty states that “to be a body is to be tied to a
certain world” (TPP 171). He specifies that, “The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and
having a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify
oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to them” (TPP 94). We dwell in a
definitive world of sensible things—palpable things—in which the body is one such ‘object.’
We are aware of our own bodies by way of the world, enacting our bodies within a specific
environment through intentional and non-intentional action. He explains,
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Whether it is a question of another’s body or my own, I have no means of
knowing the human body other than that of living it, which means taking up on
my own account the drama which is being played out in it, and losing myself in it.
I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at
the same time my body is as it were a ‘natural’ subject, a provisional sketch of my
total being. (TPP 231)

We primarily operate without bodily awareness to accomplish intentional activity, though. This
is because the body has a world of its own, always operating in the background. It is the very
material and space for such intentional and non-intentional activity. In this way, the body shapes
consciousness though we are not directly conscious of this. However, the body can become the
focus of attention and become an object of consciousness in which it appears as a ‘thing’ or
‘object’ during certain circumstances, such as exercise, exertion, illness, stressful situations,
pleasure, or pathologies, for example. Even so, the body does not remain a permanent object of
thought.
Thus, the body has a double reference, or rather a double ‘belongingness,’ to the order of
the ‘object’ and to the order of the ‘subject.’ On one side, it is a thing among things; on the other
side, it is what sees them and touches things. Merleau-Ponty explains that to know the body
does not require having to leave “itself.” This is because the body serves as “a tangible-standard
to all those whose resemblance it bears and whose evidence it gathers, by a magic that is the
vision, the touch themselves” (VI 136). Through perception (vision and touch) “our body
commands the visible for us,” and thus, the body is world-forming (VI 136). Merleau-Ponty
explains that, “Between the alleged colors and visibles, we would find anew the tissue that lines
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them, sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part is not a thing, but a possibility, a
latency, and a flesh of things” (VI 133). He explains that the flesh is not matter, not mind, not a
substance but an “element” of Being (VI 139). And we only know of the flesh of the world
through our own flesh: “The thickness of the body, far from rivaling that of the world, is on the
contrary the sole means I have to go unto the heart of the things, by making myself a world and
by making them flesh” (VI 135). Body and world are intertwining flesh. This is to say that “it
uses its own being as a means to participate in theirs, because each of the two beings is an
archetype for the other, because the body belongs to the order of the things as the world is
universal flesh” (VI 137). More aptly put, then, we can think of embodiment as overlapping
bodies: the world-body (the tangible, in which our bodies are also tangible), the lived-body
(phenomenal body which senses the palpable of both world and body), and the I-body (subjective
body conscious of the self, body, and world).
In line with this, Merleau-Ponty states that inhabiting a body is to be “caught up in the
tissue of things” (VI 135). We know of this tissue, this flesh, through touch and vision. When I
touch my hand, I am both touching and being touched. I would not know what it ‘feels like to be
touched,’ unless I have been touched. And, likewise, I would not know what ‘touching’ is,
unless I am the one touching. And finally, when touching, I feel the tissue and all its distinct
features. Therefore, the way in which the body has knowledge of what it is to be touched and to
touch, is to perform the activity of touching. This indicates three distinct experiences, which,
Merleau-Ponty explains, “subtend one another.” The three dimensions overlap but are distinct:

A touching of the sleek and of the rough, a touching of the things—a passive
sentiment of the body and of its space—and finally a veritable touching of the
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touch, when my right touches my left hand while it is palpating the things, where
the “touching subject” passes over to the rank of the touched, descends into the
things, such that the touch is formed in the midst of the world and as it were in the
things. (VI 134)

Yet, we do not experience touch in three distinct activities; rather, the phenomenon is holistically
performed by the body, all at once. This means that in the activity of touching, the body does not
interpret the layers of phenomena. Merleau-Ponty explains, “I do not translate the ‘data of
touch’ into the language of seeing or vice versa—I do not bring together one by one the parts of
my body; this translation and this unification are performed once and for all within me: they are
my body, itself” (TPP 173). The way in which these dimensions overlap but are also distinct is
ambiguous. They are not isolated in the body or the objects, but in the “midst of the world”—in
universal flesh. This points to how one experiences the boundary of the body and world. As this
action has to be performed afresh each time, the boundary vibrates, and is continuously being
constituted.
This is also the case with vision. Merleau-Ponty describes vision as a ‘palpation’ with
the look, and thus, it must also be inscribed in the order of being—“he who looks must not
himself be foreign to the world that he looks at.” He adds, “As soon as I see it, it is necessary
that the vision (as is so well indicated by the double meaning of the word) be doubled with a
complementary vision or with another vision: myself seen from without, such as another would
see me, installed in the midst of the visible, occupied in considering it from a certain spot” (VI
134). With this in mind, he notes, the body is in the “heart of the visible” and yet far from it, in
the sense that it has a thickness that can be seen and is that thickness which sees. In this case,
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distance between things themselves and the seer “is not an obstacle between them, it is their
means of communication” (VI 135). “It is thus,” he explains, “and not as the bearer of a
knowing subject, that our body commands the visible for us, but it does not explain it, does not
clarify it, it only concentrates the mystery of its scattered visibility” (VI 136).
In his work “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty claims that the painter makes visible how
the world touches us (CD 283). He asserts that art is a process of expressing the “true density”
of the world, which “is for us the definition of the real” (CD 279). This is in line with what
Cézanne thinks of art. Cézanne states that “Art is a personal apperception, which I embody in
sensations and which I ask the understanding to organize into a painting” (CD 222). He strives
to “paint from nature” (CD 275). That is, not to ‘paint nature,’ but instead, to make nature and
art the same. The intention of the impressionists is to depict objects as they appear to
instantaneous perception, without any scientific exactness or fixed contours (CD 275). Our
instantaneous perception consists in seeing the world in a colorful mass, an indivisible whole, in
which colors touch to suggest outlines of distinct objects (CD 279). Thus, along with the body
“the spatial structure vibrates as it is formed” (CD 279).
The technique of the impressionist does not entail hard, precise outlines to demarcate
distinct objects. Rather, as Merleau-Ponty explains, the distinct visible objects are captured
through placing opposite colors next to each other. Two blotches of paint, one red and one
green, create the perspective of a darker color, suggesting a boundary when they are placed next
to the other—touching the other. Here Cézanne suggests that outlines and colors are no longer
distinct: “to the extent that one paints, one outlines; the more the colors harmonize, the more the
outline becomes precise…When the color is at its richest, the form has reached plentitude” (CD
279). Vision does not cut through this flesh of the world in order to form objects; rather, objects
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materialize with the juxtaposition of various colors touching. There are no gaps between colors,
but, suggestions of angles, outlines, and curves are inscribed like lines of force. This implies that
there are no seen gaps between objects and the body. Instead, colored surfaces meet in which
bodies and forms emerge from one universal mass.
According to Merleau-Ponty, Cézanne wants to portray matter as it takes on form. He
notes that there is a distinction between spontaneous organization and human organization of
matter. This, though, is counter to asserting a distinction between the sense and understanding
(CD 227). That is to say, as Merleau-Ponty explains, “These distinctions between touch and
sight are unknown in primordial perception. It is only as a result of a science of the human body
that we finally learn to distinguish between our senses. The lived object is not rediscovered or
constructed on the basis of the contributions of the sense; rather, it presents itself to us from the
start the center from which these contributions radiate. We see the depth, the smoothness, the
softness, the hardness of objects; Cézanne even claimed that we see their odor” (CD 279). Our
bodies do not experience touch and sight as distinct senses, distinct both from each other and
from the world.
Cézanne’s intention was to forget what was learned through science, but then through a
science, of sorts, to recapture the being of the image as an emerging organism. “The landscape
thinks itself through me,” he declares, “I am its consciousness” (CD 281). Cézanne brings the
landscape into being, but as the landscape presents itself in being. Merleau-Ponty states that the
painter, then, recaptures and converts the world into visible objects. For Cézanne, he explains,
what motivates the painter is not geometry or laws, or any particular knowledge; instead, they
are motivated by the “absolute fullness” (what Cézanne calls motif) of the world. Accordingly,
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Merleau-Ponty adds, the painter embodies an “intuitive science” of the lived perspective that we
actually perceive, not a geometric or photographic one (CD 278).
For instance, Merleau-Ponty explains that Cézanne does not negate the physiognomy—
the physical, facial features which project some meaning—when painting people. Cézanne
grants that there is always a manner of interpretation of the visual on the part of the painter; but
the interpretation is not a distinction from the act of seeing. In regard to portraits, he explains
that, “One’s personality is seen and grasped in one’s glance, which is, however, no more than a
combination of colors” (CD 279). Cézanne tells us, “If I paint all the little blues and all the little
maroons, I capture and convey [the individual’s] glance.” This suggests that even others’
personalities, others’ minds are communicated through vibrating colors. They are available to us
“only as incarnate, as belonging to faces and gestures” (CD 280). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty
states that “Cézanne’s painting suspends these habits of thought and reveals the base of inhuman
nature upon which man has installed himself” (CD 280).
The same relationship between world and body is modeled in the relationship of the
painting and painter. Merleau-Ponty states that the only emotion possible for the painter, though,
is of strangeness, the same way in which the body is in the heart of things, but also at a distance.
The painter has to be a stranger to his/her work, in that they are removed from the painting,
standing outside, perceiving at a distance. Additionally, painting interferes with the spontaneous
movement of the world, in that it consists of “frozen distortions” (CD 278). It is up to the painter
to arrest and project objects that “would remain walled up in the separate life of each
consciousness: the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things” (CD 281). The artist
does not just create and express an idea, but must awaken the encounter with objects and world
in others.
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Yet, the painter can do no more than construct an image, and must wait for this image to
come to life for other individuals. Through painting, then, there is a continual rebirth of
existence which is close to instantaneous perception. Just as objects in the painting are of the
paint, our bodies are of the world. The way the brush touches the canvas, the way the colors
touch the canvas, the way the colors touch colors, is representing of the way the body touches
and sees the world. As the painter paints the painting, through vision and touch, our bodies paint
the world with its very flesh, all its fullness—belonging to it yet also a stranger to it.

3. Body as a Work of Art

To understand embodiment, Merleau-Ponty compares the body to a work of art:

In a picture or a piece of music the idea is incommunicable by means other than
the display of colors and sounds. Any analysis of Cézanne’s work, if I have not
seen his pictures, leaves me with a choice between several possible Cézannes, and
it is the sight of the pictures which provides me with the only existing Cézanne,
and therein the analyses find their full meaning. (TPP 174)

A novel, poem, picture, or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in which
the expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning,
accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their
temporal and spatial situation. The idea of the body is incommunicable by means
other than the display. It is this sense that our body is comparable to a work of
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art. It is the nexus of living meanings, not the law for a certain number of
covariant terms. (TPP 175)

Merleau-Ponty states that “The process of grasping a meaning is performed by the body” (TPP
177). The meaning of a painting cannot be communicated other than by way of the painting.
One could give a description, but there is no equivalent in which the visual content can be known
other than through a direct encounter with the painting. Any description of the painting, as
Merleau-Ponty suggests, leaves open many possible interpretations; but, there is only the
individual painting. The meaning of the painting is preserved in the paint on the canvas without such material, all meaning is lost. Likewise, the meaning of the poem makes use of
language, but requires a material aid as well: it is only preserved in the printed text, or in spoken
word, which requires a body. Again, there are many possible interpretations of the poem, but
there is only one way in which the words are organized to convey meaning. Here, we can see a
distinction between the painting and the image of the painting, a distinction between the object
and how it is interpreted.
We see this same distinction in regard to the body. We can have an image of our bodies
but this is different than the body itself. To make this clear, this distinction can be condensed
into two concepts of ‘body image’ and ‘body schema.’ Generally, body image is understood to
consist of a system of perceptions, attitudes, emotions, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body.
According to Merleau-Ponty, it is the way one is conscious of the world through the medium of
the body. He writes: “Consciousness projects itself into a physical world and has a body, as it
projects itself into a cultural world and has its habits…any form of lived experience tends
towards a certain generality whether that of our habits or that of our ‘bodily functions’” (TPP
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158). That is, our body image is often a reflection of, or embodies, normative cultural standards
and a conception of how our bodies function in that context, whether we may be conscious or
unaware of how cultural norms inform our body image. Also, our body image is constituted by
our intentional actions and our chance for success, which I explain in more detail later.
The body schema is a system of motor capacities which do not require direct cognitive
awareness or monitoring in order to function. The body schema also includes abilities and habits
that enable and constrain movement and intentional activity. Bodily space and external space
form a practical system—it is in action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being (TPP
117). The body schema is not a structural copy of the body, not the sensation of the body, not
global awareness, but the spatio-temporal field of our body. That is to say, it is a way of
expressing how the body is in-and-of-the-world (115; 163-164). In this way, the body is tacitly
understood in the figure-background structure—“every figure stands out against the double
horizon of external and bodily space” (TPP 163). Knowledge of the body is not a matter of
concentrating or directing attention to the lived-body; rather, embodied knowledge is
instantaneous; it is peculiar to itself, and, moreover, it is complete in itself (TPP 100). The body
does not need cognitive consciousness to know; it does not need language or representation to
know. The body “has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of any
‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying function’” (TPP 173).

4. Canvas: Embodied Identity

In How the Body Shapes the Mind, Shaun Gallagher outlines the roles body image and body
schema play in our sense of self. When we act, we are aware of the bodily action as an
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intentional action but not as a bodily action per se (BM 33). When we intend to move our body
in a particular way to accomplish some task, for instance, picking up a cup of water, we exhibit
control over our bodies, though there are prenoetic functions which underpin and affect our
intentional experience. Gallagher defines a prenoetic performance as “one that helps to structure
consciousness, but does not explicitly show itself in the contents of consciousness” (BM 32).
These functions are subsumed into the intentional activities as “motor control takes its bearings
from the intention of the agent, rather than from the level of muscle contractions or neuronal
signals” (BM 33). Thus, we have a sense of ownership and agency, though not explicit, in the
sense that ‘I am the one picking up the glass with my body.’ The sense of agency comes from
the decision and then execution of picking up the cup—by making commitments and carrying
out tasks.
In everyday experience, our knowledge of ownership is part of the structure of
experience. As Gallagher explains, it is non-observational self-awareness of our own body
enacting our actions. He states that, “the body image, as a reflexive intentional system, normally
represents the body as my own body, as a personal body that belongs to me. This sense of
ownership contributes to a sense of an overall personal self” (BM 28). Yet, the action is not
mediated by a judgment that we have ownership of our body. In other words, we do not think ‘I
own my body’ when accomplishing an intended task; instead, it is incorporated into our body
image, we could say, pronoetically. That is, as Merleau-Ponty says, it is not a matter of “I
think” but of “I can.”
In the case of the body, ownership materializes as the individual grasps control: if I
control the movement of my body, I own my body. Gallagher notes that our sense of agency is
built into the structure of thinking itself, that is, the very structure of consciousness. To clarify,
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he offers Edmund Husserl’s description of phases of the conscious act, namely, focusing on the
retentional and protentional functions. The function of retention is to retain previous
consciousness and the intentional content of that consciousness. The protentional function is to
anticipate what is about to happen in terms of experience. Protentional thought underlies a sense
of agency in thinking, whereas, retention provides a sense of ownership of thought (BM 193).
If we are able to retain the thoughts we previously just had, then we get a sense that they
are our thoughts. Being able to anticipate what comes next in terms of thinking gives us a sense
that we are the ones who are thinking it. Thus, according to Gallagher, “the retentionalprotentional structure of consciousness is constitutive of self-identity within the changing flow of
consciousness; it generates the basic sense of auto-affection or ipseity…this being the feeling of
identity, of being the perspectival origin of one’s own experience, which is a basic component of
the experienced differentiation of self from non-self” (BM 201). In other words, through this
structure, we have a sense that ‘I am the one experiencing…,’ which provides a sense of
ownership and agency since the thought coincides with my experience.
A sense of agency, however, is closely tied to body schematic processes that underlie
movement and capacities. Problems with body schema can amount to a loss of motor control or
other functional breakdowns, but they can also entail a sense of “depersonalization” (BM 36).
This can lead to a disturbance in the auto-affective dimension of ipseity, or in our sense of self,
which can have prevalent cognitive and emotional effects (BM 201). This is emphasized in
cases such as the schizophrenic, in which the retentional-protentional structure of consciousness
is disrupted. For the schizophrenic, thought insertion disrupts the retention-protentional structure
because the individual does not have a sense of control over how and when these thoughts occur.
Yet, the schizophrenic has a sense of ownership as the thoughts are happening within their minds
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and are, therefore, part of their bodies. In this case, the self can become fragmented as the
person has a sense of ownership, but not agency.
But, as Gallagher points out, sometimes something such as an illness, trauma, or other
type of “personal-level” event may trigger the original disruption of auto-affective protentional
functions, such as neurological underpinnings, and may be genetically or developmentally
predisposed to disruption. This original disruption may be further reinforced by subsequent
emotional reactions (BM 201). Schizophrenics who have an original rupture of retentionalprotentional structure of consciousness can exhibit occasions of hyper-reflective behavior,
fragmentation of meaning, transformations of intentionality, a lack of attunement with the world,
abnormal feelings of saliency, flattened affect, etc. (BM 201). Also, in other ‘mental illnesses,’
the individual experiences a disruption of their body schema that gets transposed onto the body
image. The self becomes more aware of their embodiment as it is an obstacle for everyday
‘regular’ functioning and performance.
Gallagher states that his main purpose here is to show how “the temporal, auto-affective
structure that shapes cognitive experience also shapes embodied action” (BM 204). Changes to
this structure play a role in the conscious registration of agency, ownership, and body image.
“More than this,” he adds, “motor action itself, in its prenoetic body-schematic performance, has
the same tacit and auto-affective structure that involves retention of previous postures, and the
anticipation of future action.” That is to say, there is a common temporal structure of embodied
movement, action, and cognition. This all suggests that ownership and agency, within a shared
temporal framework, are components of the embodied feeling of being alive.
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5. Paint: Embodied Other

As noted above, our body image is formed not only through our own beliefs and attitudes about
our bodies but also through external social reflections on the ideal body, both in terms of how it
functions and what it looks like. This implies that the ‘other’ is partially constitutive of our body
image, which leads us to consider our relation to the other, and more fundamentally, how we
come to see and recognize the existence of the other. This question markedly concerns the
developmental source for both the body image and the body schema in relation to our own
embodied self and our relation to others.
Gallagher discusses the infant’s capacity for imitation as it is an important capacity
directly related to questions about perception, social recognition, the ability to understand
another person, and the origins of a sense of self (BM 68). In imitation, the child adjusts facial
features to reproduce the image of the other person. The visual image of the other’s features is
translated into a ‘motor language’ (BM 79). In this sense, this means that the recognition of
other, at this initial level of mimicking, is at the level of motor capacities.
Gallagher suggests that the imitating subject depends on a complex background of
embodied processes such as a body-schematic system involving visual, proprioceptive and
vestibular information (BM 76). Proprioceptive awareness is a self-referential, but normally prereflective awareness of one’s own body and proprioceptive information is non-conscious,
physiological information that operates on a sub-personal level, which contributes to the bodyschematic control of posture and movement.
In relation to the imitating infant, he concludes that the proprioceptive information allows
the infant to move parts of her body so that her proprioceptive awareness matches up to what she
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sees. According to Gallagher, “This intermodal intra-corporeal communication […] is the basis
for an inter-corporeal communication and has profound implications for the child’s relations
with others” (BM 76). In other words, the way in which the proprioceptive information and
proprioceptive awareness interact within the body has an effect on how the child, as an embodied
subject, relates to others as embodied subjects. Gallagher concludes that, “This proprioceptive
awareness is a tacit, pre-reflective awareness that constitutes the very beginning of a primitive
body image. It is in the intermodal and intersubjective interaction between proprioception and
the vision of the other’s face that one’s body image originates” (BM 73). This indicates that the
body-schematic system plays a role in our relation to others as well as our own identities. That
is, at the level of the body, the “body schemas, working systematically with proprioceptive
awareness, constitute a proprioceptive self that is always already ‘coupled’ with the other” (BM
81).
Beyond infancy, the understanding of the other person, according to Gallagher, is a form
of embodied practice. We tend to have an understanding of another person and their intentions
because such intentions are expressed in their embodied actions, which, as he puts it, mirror our
own capabilities for action. Merleau-Ponty explains that an individual can interpret another’s
bodily action by the fact that the individual has a body as well. Another way to consider this is
to suggest that one’s desire and beliefs are expressed in their behavior. Understanding the other
person’s behaviors, beliefs, and intentions weighs in on our own body image. Our body image is
not solely a personal relation, but can be influenced by external beliefs, context, etc. and even
how we view the bodies of others.
We have a “perception-based” understanding of other individuals which is determined by
‘body-reading.’ Gallagher explains that, “In seeing the actions and expressive movements of the
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other person, one already sees their meaning; no inference to a hidden set of mental states
(beliefs, desires, etc.) is necessary” (BM 227). Merleau-Ponty provides an example of bodyreading: “Faced with an angry or threatening gesture, I have no need, in order to understand it, to
recall the feelings which I myself experienced when I used these gestures on my own account.
And what is more, I do not see anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact hidden behind the
gesture, I read anger in it. The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself” (TPP
214). No reasoning by analogy or other intellectual interpretation takes place, this is because,
“Communication between consciousnesses is not based on the common meaning of their
respective experiences, for it is equally the basis of that meaning” (TPP 216). Merleau-Ponty
explains that, “The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions discernible
in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and
mine his” (TPP 215). In this sense, the body-to-other is the same proximity of the seer and thing
seen, as noted above, “it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication”
(VI 135).

6. Palette: Embodied Context

Furthermore, Gallagher states that cultural norms are also embodied and they greatly affect our
body image and body schema. Cultural norms can be thought of as a matrix of body image and
body schema. Social practices and institutions, societal sentiments, modalities of truth, and
power relations establish an image of how the body is supposed to move, behave, and operate
and whether one’s body complies with this image. Likewise, bodily movement and behavior are
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interpreted along the lines of such ideals in which one comes to identify with the available
stigmas and traits; and thus, come to have an image of their body, shaped by innumerable
cultural mentalities.
Often we are not aware of this aspect of our body image, although, it is the means of our
sense of identity and role in the wider social context. But, this can get interrupted and our focus
can shift to an awareness of cultural norms, particularly in the case of some disruption. For
instance, individuals that stand outside or on the borders of accepted identities tend to be more
aware of their bodies in the context of such norms. If what they do with their bodies does not fit
within the domain of accepted subjects, individuals can internalize this into their body image.
This aspect of their body schema in this wider social environment, then, can change one’s beliefs
about themselves and their image. It could be that one will believe that there is something
‘wrong’ with their body, they have a deficiency, or holistically, something is wrong with their
very being. Those within the domain of normal bodies are primarily not confronted with having
to account for their body—how it behaves, what it looks like, etc. However, marginalized
identities are often marginalized by means of their bodies. That is to say, it is not one’s set of
beliefs, body image, or practices which positions them within the domain of intelligible, accepted
identities; rather, it is these sets of beliefs, body image, and practices performed by the body.
Simply put, we observe how bodies perform and either identify with them, accept them, or reject
them.
The body image via body schema is constituted through such performances within social
space. An example can be seen in the film Examined Life, in which Judith Butler and Sunaura
Taylor discuss such marginalized identities formed by societal expectations of ability and
gender. Their conversation is telling of the plasticity of body image and body schema and how it
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shapes our identities within a particular social space. Taylor was born with arthrogryosis and
uses a wheel chair to get around. Taylor is identified as “disabled” because of her limited motion
and inability to perform and accomplish everyday tasks without help from either others or
supplemental technology. Her body schema violates societal expectations of how bodies
perform and accomplish tasks, and in return, inform her identity. Taylor, on the other hand,
disrupts such normalizing expectations as she has a different set of beliefs and attitudes toward
her body. She explains that she does not see herself as dis-abled, but able-bodied, which is
becoming a more readily available discourse. But Taylor points out it is not just her distorted
body which underlies such discourse, but how external bodies and technologies factor into her
body schema. Taylor would not need to confront and adjust her set of beliefs and attitudes
toward her body to societal standards and employ the language of ‘able-bodied’ if her body did
not show up as different, alien, abnormal, or exceptional with the social context.
This shows how the social environment provides us with an accessible language to
constitute our body image. We may be able to describe bodily behavior, but when it comes to
identity we use a different discourse. In the scene, Butler and Taylor are “walking” in a
neighborhood in San Francisco. Taylor contends that she is walking despite the visual fact that
she is in a wheel chair and not physically walking in the traditional sense. In this way she
suggests that she is as able-bodied as anyone else is, challenging the language and belief of
disability. For example, Taylor states that she is just as capable as anyone else at purchasing a
cup of coffee and drinking it. We witness a scene where she uses her mouth to pick up the
coffee. Thus, she may have to use body parts not normally used to do perform that task, but the
intentional action is still carried out.
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Underlying the conversation is the issue of agency and ownership. Butler asks Taylor if
she “feels free to move in ways you want to use.” Taylor’s response reveals the significance of
her context influencing her feeling of freedom and her attitude toward her body. What provides
her with a sense of free movement has to do with the social acceptability and the ease of physical
access to buildings and public transportation. She states that “physical access leads to social
access, moving in social space…” Yet, Taylor also stresses how it is more difficult for her to
move because of “normalizing standards.” She uses body parts in ways (or for purposes) that are
not necessarily what they are intended for. Such normalizing standards affect her life in
everyday situations, from experiencing the social repression of disabled people, being socially
isolated, not being given the same opportunities, and the social construction of disability.
Societal practices of repression and isolation fundamentally operate in how Taylor views her
body. But she contends that “social repression” of disabled people and the “disabling effects of
society” are what is disabling, not her body. In other words, the fact that she is “disabled” is
because there is a social construction of disability which, weighs in on her body image. On the
other hand, individuals do not necessarily have beliefs and attitudes about their bodies as being
abled, unless they were to encounter someone we label as disabled, or undergo a physical change
that would position them within the domain of disability. This is an underlying, non-conscious
belief, perhaps, that only surfaces when our own body image is ruptured through the event.
Concerning gender, Butler and Taylor discuss societal norms which construct our
identities through discourse of masculine and feminine. Such constructions then bear on issues
of sexuality, in the case that there are particular norms for what a masculine body does verses a
feminine body, and how they are to interact. Butler explains that all bodies are “sexed” and
therefore are always positioned along the continuum of gender and sexuality. In the film, as
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Butler and Taylor are walking, Butler describes a case in which a young man was killed for ‘how
his body performed’ and ‘what he did with his body.’ His bodily performance of swishing his
hips while walking was perceived as the way a homosexual male may walk. The swish of hips is
seen as a feminine behavior and if a male is performing in a feminine way, then they are
immediately identified as homosexual, through the identities available, whether the individual
performs what society labels as homosexual acts or not. Bodily movements and acts constitute
domains of subjectivity. Once again the theme of walking is introduced: someone is identified
along a set of norms by how they walk.
This is not to suggest that only marginalized identities confront the ways cultural norms
are constitutive of one’s body image and body schema. All bodies are subject to the influence of
societal interpretations and expectations in regard to our bodies.

7. Easel: Body Image and Body Schema

While we can distinguish between body schema and body image thematically, they are
intimately intertwined, and serve as common specifications for physiological, neurological,
psychological, somatic processes. Merleau-Ponty explains that “what allows us to link to each
other the ‘physiological’ and the ‘psychic,’ is the fact that, when reintegrated into existence, they
are no longer distinguishable respectively as the order of the in-itself, and that of the for-itself,
and that they are both directed towards an intentional pole or towards a world” (TPP 101). When
thought separately, the physiological is in-itself, meaning that it functions without intentional
activity; it is a medium of activity. The for-itself, on the other hand, implies a forward moving,
intentional activity, done on behalf of the one doing the action. Thus, it is the subject of action.
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This is understood in how the physiological operates without any perceptual consciousness, and
we are not made aware of it either than metaphorically to describe aspects of the body we do not
see; conversely, we are made aware of seemingly ‘psychic’ processes by the outward effect
observed.
Gallagher points out that despite their intertwining, body schema is not reducible to body
image, and also, body image is not reducible to the ‘mentalistic’ side of consciousness (BM 245).
Likewise, the body schema is not reducible to a purely neurophysiological explanation of motor
control, since our pragmatic intentions guide the way the body moves (BM 245). In the same
way my gestures are not reducible to body-schematic processes that are purely instrumental, “but
are generated in the service of communicative or cognitive processes” (BM 246).
This means that the integration of the ‘psychic’ and ‘physiological’ is ambiguous. The
ambiguity lies in the fact that “Man taken as a concrete being,” Merleau-Ponty explains, “is not a
psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows
itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts” (TPP 101). He adds:

Psychological motives and bodily occasions may overlap because there is not a
single impulse in a living body which is entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic
intentions, not a single mental act which has found at least its germ or its general
outline in physiological tendencies. It is never a question of the incomprehensible
meeting of two causalities, nor of a collision between the order of causes and that
of ends. But by an imperceptible twist an organic process issues into human
behavior, an instinctive act changes directions and becomes a sentiment, or
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conversely a human act becomes torpid and is continued absent-mindedly in the
form of a reflex. (TPP 101-102)

We take instinct to be a psychic process we assume is present by its outward effects. Take fear,
for example: we can experience fear entirely as reflexive—a sudden movement on the boundary
of our peripheral vision startles us; we then can become afraid of what we believe the moving
object to be. The instinct develops into a disposition. Another example is riding a bicycle in the
other case of the human act becoming more so of a reflex. At first an individual is astutely
focused on the movements needed to balance and move the bicycle, but then over time the body
becomes habitualized in terms of the schematic movements required, and thus, the action can be
performed “absent-mindedly.”
This also can be seen in cases in which we confront and take notice of our bodies through
intentional actions or possible (non-intentional) disruptions in our lives. According to MerleauPonty, conscious life is “subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our
past, our future, or human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which
results in being situation in all these respects.” As he puts it, “consciousness put[s] up a host of
intentions which run from the body as the center of potential action either towards the body itself
or towards the object…” (TPP 157). Although body schema is not an operation of cognition, it
can support intentional activity underlying cognition; the body schema conforms to an intention.
In the case of intentional action, we may shift our image so as to respond to and affect our body
schema. Our intentional experience can shape the pre-reflective, sub-personal movements
controlled by a body schema. Merleau-Ponty says that, “It is this intentional arc which brings
about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility” (TPP 157). Conscious
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manipulation of the body can be used to monitor and affect posture and movements, for instance,
and in these cases we do have some awareness of aspects of our body schema. Merleau-Ponty
clarifies that, “In the case of the normal subject, the body is available not only in real situations
into which it is drawn. It can turn aside from the world, apply its activity to stimuli which affect
its sensory surfaces, lend itself to experimentation, and generally speaking take its place in the
real of the potential” (TPP 125). Thus, although we typically do not have to attend to
movements to accomplish intentional activity, the body can become the focus of attention and
become an object of consciousness, in which it appears as an ‘object’ during certain
circumstances, such as in the case of physical exertion, illness, stressful situations, danger,
pleasure, or pathologies.
A simple example may help here: for instance, when I am running, I focus on tilting my
hips, lowering my shoulders, and elongating my spine in order to create the most efficient stride.
At this point, I am focused and aware of aspects of my body schema. Through the intention to
create a more efficient pace (the potential), I draw my attention to my posture, focusing on
particular parts of my body in which the body schema adjusts to match my intention. As
Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the normal person reckons with the possible” (TPP 157). Over time,
these adjustments become more proficient, they “take its place in the real of the potential,” and I
do them without conscious reflection. Yet, when there is a disruption of my body’s performance,
such as fatigue, my motor functions ‘unconsciously’ shift to conserve as much energy as
possible. For instance, my shoulders collapse, I lean forward, and my pace slows. In either case
of proficient pace or during fatigue, there is also a non-conscious, underlying schematic-system
in operation that is maintaining balance, such as constricting my abdominals and other muscles
to maintain an upright posture that accompanies this intentional action. Even more so, there are
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the neuro-physiological processes taking place in order to send the right message to the parts of
the body involved in movement, for example. I am not holistically aware of these motor
functions in that I never have consciousness of the whole, or a ‘global awareness’ of the body, as
Merleau-Ponty states.
Therefore, body image is partial—it can enter into our consciousness with certain parts
emphasized or singled out, but the body functions more holistically. When our body is ‘in tune’
with the environment, it performs prenoetically. When the body performs prenoetically, there is
a particular way that it is organized, or a style of performance, in its relations with its
environment. The schematic-system can actively organize or give style to the body to integrate
in and respond to the environment, but this is performed without our conscious monitoring the
body. Gallagher explains that, “It is a dynamic, operative performance of the body, rather than a
consciousness, image, or conceptual model of it” (BM 32). This means that it does not depend
on a consciousness, active awareness, and cognitive representations to monitor the body’s
performance; rather, we could say, the body’s schematic-system is responsible for monitoring the
performance of the body.
Yet, we can become aware of how the body schema operates prenoetically if our
attention is directed toward such beliefs and attitudes. The way that we move and navigate the
world affects our body image as it incorporates it into the schemata, as we saw with the two
examples of disability and running. I understand myself to be capable of certain movements and
performances, which inform one aspect of my body image. I may also think of myself as healthy
based on societal and medical standards of health. This belief is derived from the functioning of
my body as well as my cultural environment, as explained above. That is to say, “every
movement has a background,” and additionally, “the movement and its background are
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‘moments of a unique totality’” (TPP 127). In movement, we exist as being-in-the-world, in that
the totality of being and responses fill the whole field of action. In the case of what MerleauPonty distinguishes as concrete movement, there is no awareness of stimulus or reaction (TPP
122). On the other hand, in abstract movement, the body can become an impersonal being
through manipulation. Thus, the body is manipulatable for me or in itself. Our body, then,
comprises, as it were, two distinct layers: habit-body (manipulating movements) and body at
motion (being manipulated) (TPP 95). When the body moves toward a world, it buries its
perceptual and practical intentions into objects; the world is manipulatable for it.
Likewise, the body imposes a view of the world on us. Merleau-Ponty explains that,
“Bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning” (TPP 104; 170). It is
for this reason that, “There is always some degree of depersonalization at the heart of
consciousness” (TPP 158). There is an element of intervention from the outside (TPP 158).
Though this is always in operation, intervening elements are highlighted in moments of danger,
illness, pain, trauma, or accident. There is a sense of ‘this is happening to’ my body, and in these
moments we become acutely aware of such intervention. At the same time, the body is not
available in potential situations; rather, only one real world is possible, the world being imposed
on the individual. In other words, the biological is sublimated into personal existence:
“Impersonal time continues its course, but personal time is arrested” (TPP 96). If the body
schematic performance fails, the body takes center stage in the perceptual field. In illness the
“intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and
motility” goes limp (TPP 157). With that, consciousness “may collapse into fragments” (TPP
158).
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The disruption also occurs at the stage of prenoetic functions. That is, our body image
changes without specific reflection on, or monitoring of, our comportment toward our body.
Merleau-Ponty explains that, “When it has incorporated [an object] into its ‘world,’ and to move
one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is
made upon it independently of any representation” (TPP 160-161). For instance, when my
capacity for running was disrupted by an injury requiring knee surgery, my body image changed
in terms of what I found myself to be capable of and the potential movements available to me.
This was of concern for me, but only became highlighted when I attempted an activity I no
longer was capable of. The change in my body schema not only influenced how I moved, but
also, what I required to move. In order to maintain mobility, I had to incorporate crutches into
my body schema: the crutches became an element of my capacity for movement—they became
my legs. My body had to learn and understand how to combine with the external aid, creating a
new spacio-temporal field. In this case, embodied knowledge is a matter of praxis.

8. Those Who Paint: Plasticity

Gallagher presents the case of Ian Waterman, who lost proprioceptive awareness, to further
illustrate how an illness can also disrupt a person’s body schema and body image.
Proprioceptive awareness is pre-reflexive, pragmatic awareness which gives the body ability to
sense stimuli arising within the body. The proprioceptive awareness is a non-conscious process
and part of the system that constitutes the body schema. It provides a perceived spatial structure
which informs our body image.
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With the loss of proprioception, Ian’s body was impaired, but also, his body image was
impaired. Similar to how a schizophrenic might feel, Ian experienced an alienating effect
because he had lost the sense of his body as his own and the sense that it was under his control
(BM 44). In order to gain control of his body schema, he had to develop an extremely highfunctioning body image to ‘substitute’ for his loss (BM 42-43). Ian addressed his problem on a
behavioral level, slowly rebuilding a partial and very minimal body schema through a body
image which depended on a high degree of mental concentration to ‘relearn’ motor programs
(BM 44). He could then control intentional movements through controlling his body image.
In everyday circumstances, we are able to accomplish intentional actions without such
need for focused control. In the case of reaching for a cup, our focus is on the object and when
we intend to move, movements tend to follow automatically in accordance with the intention.
But, this is not the case for Ian, as when he moves, he has to focus not only on the intended
object but also on his hand in order to grab it (BM 44). For Ian, consciousness of movement has
to be present for there to be movement.
If we have normal proprioception when engaged in actions, we do not ordinarily
consciously plan our movements nor consider that we have to take our movement into account
(BM 64). In this sense, Gallagher explains, “Conscious experience is normally out ahead of
movement, directed at the environment…[I]n normal behavior, movement underpins and
supports intentional activity, but does not itself require reflexive conscious attention” (BM 64).
Ian has to use visual attention to accomplish sensory-motor functions that would come
‘automatically’ to us. That is, he has to see his arm to move to pick up the cup and concentrate
on the specific movements to accomplish such a task. It is as if Ian has a ‘virtual body schema,’
but functions only within the scope of the body image and has to be consciously and continually
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maintained (BM 52). In order for Ian to complete an intentional movement, then, he has to have
access to visual awareness of his body, but moreover, he has to be able to cognitively think about
his body to create the framework of the body image that the virtual body schema relies on (BM
52). With this set of limitations, Ian has “reinvented movement” (BM 55).
Ian’s case suggests that both the body schema and body image play an important role in a
sense of embodied self, and also the plasticity of body schema and body image. As Ian felt
alienated from his body because he did not have a sense of control, he felt a loss of embodiment.
This supports the view that both control and body image are an important source for the sense of
ownership and selfhood.
What is at issue for Ian is both the motor and perceptual habit, which is what, according
to Merleau-Ponty, “enables us to understand the general synthesis of one’s own body,” as well as
bodily spatiality (TPP 175). In a case like learning to navigate the world by means of a stick in
blindness, this is an example of motor habit and equally perceptual habit. With use over time,
“Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of feelable things recedes and now
begins, not at the outer skin of the hand, but at the end of the stick” (TPP 175-6). This suggests
that perception is “…a reading off from the same sensory data, but constantly accelerated, and
operating with ever more attenuated signals.” But, Merleau-Ponty notes, “habit does not consist
in interpreting the pressures of the stick on the hand as indications of certain positions of the
stick, and these as signs of an external object, since it relieves us of the necessity of doing so”
(TPP 176). The stick is no longer a perceived object, but rather is an instrument with which to
perceive the world; “it is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis” (TPP 176). It
is not a matter of interpretation, which is a cognitive intention; rather, the process of grasping a
meaning performed by the body. He gives the example of a child learning to observe color: “In
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the gaze we have at our disposal a natural instrument analogous to the blind man’s stick. The
gaze gets more or less from things according to the way in which it questions them, ranges over
or dwells on them. To learn to see colors is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a new use of
one’s own body: it is to enrich and recast the body schema” (TPP 177).
The ability to continually enrich and recast the body schema is evidence of the plasticity
of embodiment. In all examples, the body image and body schema are malleable in the attempt
to recreate equilibrium. This may be temporal, like in the example of using crutches; extended
over time, as in the case of the blind man; or essential, as in Ian Waterman’s condition. In each
situation, the body has to learn and understand its own embodiment. Cognitive concentration is
certainly present but, in most cases, just temporarily; and moreover, it is not responsible for
acquired embodied knowledge. As Merleau-Ponty explains:

Whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our body is not an object for an
‘I think,’ it is a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves towards its
equilibrium. Sometimes a new cluster of meanings is formed; our former
movements are integrated into a fresh motor entity, the first visual data into a
fresh sensory entity, our natural powers suddenly come together in a richer
meaning, which hitherto has been merely foreshadowed in our perceptual or
practical field, and which has made itself felt in our experience by no more than a
certain lack, and which by its coming suddenly reshuffles the elements of our
equilibrium and fulfils our blind expectation. (TPP 177)
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9. Turpentine: Phantom Plasticity

Merleau-Ponty presents a few cases in which this process of reforming equilibrium is
complicated. In the case of phantom limb syndrome, the body never seems to ‘get over’ the loss
of the limb. While cognitively one can recognize that they have lost a limb, the body does not
reflect this ‘knowledge.’ The body fantasizes that the limb is still there, not as an image of the
limb, but as a “representation of an actual presence.” Likewise, the representation is of the same
limb—not mutilated—which the subject still ‘possesses’ as their limb. Merleau-Ponty explains,
“The phantom arm must be the same arm, lacerated by shell splinters, its visible substance
burned or rotted somewhere, which appears to haunt the present body without being absorbed
into it” (TPP 98-99).
The loss of the limb is not absorbed in the sense that the individual still ‘utilizes it.’ That
is, individuals with phantom leg syndrome, for instance, will continue to try and walk or use it to
get out of bed, seemingly not discouraged by the fall (TPP 93). With that, unlike the case of Ian
Waterhouse, (an attempt at) mobility does not require such an acute image and awareness of the
body—the body just acts. Additionally, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the awareness of the
amputated limb is not a judgment or deliberate decision. The consciousness of the phantom leg
is not a matter of ‘I think that…’ (TPP 94). Therefore, “If [the subject] treats it in practice as a
real limb, this is because, like a normal subject, he has no need, when he wants to set off
walking, of a clear and articulate perception of his body: it is enough for him to have it ‘at his
disposal’ as an undivided power, and to sense the phantom limb is vaguely involved in it” (TPP
93, emphasis mine). This is why Merleau-Ponty proposes that the consciousness of the phantom
limb is ambiguous. The subject has a preconscious awareness of the missing limb, in fantasizing
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a limb; yet, the subject, in the attempt to use the limb, appears unaware of the limb being
missing. Consequently, “To have a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of which
the arm alone is capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed before mutilation”
(TPP 94). Despite the destruction of the limb, the practical field is not destroyed.
Here we also see a distinction between ‘intellectual memory’ and, what Merleau-Ponty
alludes to, something like ‘emotional memory.’ He explains, “The memories called up before
the patient induce in him a phantom limb, not as an image in associationism summons up another
image, but because any memory reopens time lost to us and invites us to recapture the situation
evoked” (TPP 99). With memory, the subject attempts to recapture the moment of when the
limb was not missing. The subject projects a past image into the present, recasting memory. The
emotional memory is formed by the way the subject both acknowledges the missing limb by
fantasizing one to be there, and, nonetheless, does not want to accept that the limb is missing.
This dual insistence on what is real and what cannot be real defies the individual’s ‘intellectual
memory’—in its place, memory is either repressed or fantasized. Merleau-Ponty explains:

To feel emotion is to be involved in a situation which one is not managing to face
and from which, nevertheless, one does not want to escape. Rather than admit
failure or retrace one’s steps, the subject, caught in this existential dilemma,
breaks in pieces the objective world which stands in his way and seeks symbolical
satisfaction in magic acts. The ruin of the objective world, abandonment of true
action, flight into a self-contained realm are conditions favoring the illusion of
those who have lost a limb in that it too presupposes the erasure of reality. (TPP
99)
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This is why Merleau-Ponty suggests that memory, emotion, and the phantom limb are
equivalents in the context of being in the world (TPP 99).
Merleau-Ponty also alludes to a distinction between memory and traumatic memory,
though he does not name it as such. He explains that the fixation on the repressed memory (the
fixation on the phantom limb), “…does not merge into memory; it even excludes memory
insofar as the latter spreads out in front of us, like a picture, a former experience, whereas this
past which remains our true present does not leave us but remains constantly hidden behind our
gaze instead of being displayed before it” (TPP 95). The memory of losing the limb is not
assimilated into an individual’s body image, and strangely, also the body schema. Both the
subject and the body deny that the leg is missing. Further, the memory is not preserved as a
memory—it is happening in present time. According to Merleau-Ponty “Each present may claim
to solidify our life, and indeed that is what distinguishes it as the present. Insofar as it presents
itself as the totality of being and fills an instant of consciousness, we never extricate ourselves
completely from it, time never completely closes over it and it remains like a wound through
which our strength ebbs away. It can now be said that, a fortiori, the specific past, which our
body is, can be recaptured and taken up by an individual life only because that life has never
transcended it, but secretly nourishes it, devoting thereto part of its strength, because its present
is still that past” (TPP 98). But, in the case of phantom limb syndrome, we find the opposite: its
past is still present.
Thus, he reasons that the imaginary limb is “...like repressed experience, a former present
which cannot decide to recede into the past” (TPP 99). An individual can feel the missing limb
and has memory of the causal situation—that situation making itself known through the
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phenomenological experience. Similar to the concept of repression in trauma, the memory is
submerged, only to be hauled along. Although absent, the limb is present—it insists on its
presence. It is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty not only likens phantom limb syndrome to
repression, he asserts that “the phenomenon of the phantom limb is absorbed into repression”
(TPP 95, emphasis mine). Merleau-Ponty describes repression as the body entering a course of
action, but in that course, encountering a barrier which cannot be surmounted. In this sense, the
body remains “imprisoned”—held captive to pursuing an impossibility. Specifically in traumatic
experience as time passes, this impossible project does not get carried away; time does not “close
up on traumatic experience” and “the subject remains open to the same impossible future, if not
in his explicit thoughts, at any rate in his actual being” (TPP 95). With repression, one world or
present situation “acquires exceptional value” among others; “it displaces the others and deprives
them of their value as authentic presents” (TPP 96). The body insists that the world in which the
limb is still intact is the only authentic present.
This is also the case with traumatic memory:

The traumatic experience does not survive as a representation in the mode of
objective consciousness and as a ‘dated’ moment; it is of its essence to survive
only as a manner of being and with a certain degree of generality. I forgo my
constant power of providing myself with ‘worlds’ in the interest of one of them,
and for that very reason this privileged world loses its substance and eventually
becomes no more than a certain dread. All repression is, then, the transition from
first person existence to a sort of abstraction of that existence, which lives on a
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former experience, or rather on the memory of having had the memory, and so on,
until finally only the essential form remains. (TPP 96, emphasis mine)

The traumatic memories, much like the nerves of the body, are experienced as physical reactions
to the present (Kolk, BKS 204). The nerves in the body still register that there is a limb; it is still
very much a part of the organism, even if only virtually. Analogously, dread—dreading the next
interruption of the traumatic memory, dreading the inescapability, dreading that impossibility—
“prevents it from being abolished, and cause(s) it to still count in the organism” (TPP 99). Both
the phantom limb and the dreaded memory take on exceptional value and remain as such.
Thus, plasticity in regard to phantom limb syndrome and also, more broadly, in trauma, is
not adaptive or developmental—the body does not admit to disrepair; it does not adapt to
traumatic experience and memory; it does not develop a successful strategy of repair. Whereas,
in the case of Ian Waterhouse, he is able to adapt and develop a virtual body schema via his body
image to accomplish intentional actions. What we find with trauma, such abilities to recast body
schemas, construct virtual body schemas, reorganize the organism, or absorb the traumatic
memory into the individual’s narrative in order to regain equilibrium are not available as the
embodied feeling of being alive is compromised. This is because the features of trauma—
flashbacks, nightmares, interruptive memories, depression—are unpredictable; the trauma is “not
assimilated” in the body or narrative; linear time is collapsed.
The model of embodiment and plasticity covered in this chapter helps to establish what is
essential for the “embodied feeling of being alive”: a sense of ownership, agency, historical
narrative, linear temporality, and control over one’s body. But now we need to understand how
these essential aspects of embodiment are compromised in trauma. Catharine Malabou asserts
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that trauma does not work from repression, unlike cases of phantom limb syndrome. And
moreover, the essential form does not remain. A whole new being emerges, not the same patient
with a missing limb, but a whole new identity is formed. And thus, she offers another possible
plasticity in regard to trauma: destructive plasticity.

99

CHAPTER THREE:
MAKING OF THE ONTOLOGICAL REFUGEE

Catharine Malabou describes plasticity as, “…an equilibrium between the receiving and giving
of form. It is understood as a sort of natural sculpting that forms our identity, an identity
modeled by experience and that makes us subjects of history, a singular, recognizable,
identifiable history, with all its events, gaps, and future” (OA 3). Plasticity is the ability to
maintain a capacity for change and balance, with the aptitude of remaining the same. It is a
positive metamorphosis, one that is developmental, modulational, and reparative. It is a system
that undergoes metamorphosis in order to maintain equilibrium. Malabou explains that
“Plasticity also refers to the possibility of being transformed without being destroyed; it
characterizes the entire strategy of modification that seeks to avoid the threat of destruction” (OA
44-45). For instance, Merleau-Ponty notes that in the case of danger, illness, or trauma, new
emotions and perceptions develop and replace old ones. He adds that this process only affects
the “content of our experience and not its structure” (TPP 96). This means that what structures
our experience is not replaced—we still experience the world as embodied subjects with a sense
of ownership, agency, linear temporality, historical narrative, and control over one’s body. So
while the content of such experience influences how body schema and body image are shaped,
this capacity for equilibrium remains an essential component of our being, despite disruptions to
the schematic system.
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For instance, take my earlier example. When I underwent knee surgery, the material
content of my body went through several metamorphoses—scar tissue, loss of a meniscus,
frequent swelling and pain, etc. I also underwent a reorientation of what I could do, how to get
around, and how to live with pain. These changes are incorporated into not only my body
schema but also my body image. My daily experience is influenced by knowledge of my
limitations, being in pain, and anticipation of the development of other complications, such as
osteoarthritis. And yet, I have returned to being able to do almost as much as before.
Equilibrium is established not just in the physical recovery, but also the way in which the event,
surgery, pain, and future complications are all a part of my identifiable, historical narrative. At
no point was this capacity for equilibrium, my sense of time, autonomy and ownership of my
body, or identity compromised.
Take another example. In the case of drastic emotional changes, like in the case of grief,
an individual’s comportment to the world, others, and oneself undergo significant
metamorphosis, in the sense of the sublimation of biological into personal existence. Yet, as
Merleau-Ponty points out, these moments are no more than moments (TPP 97). He explains:

While I am overcome by some grief and wholly given over to my distress, my
eyes already stray in front of me, and are drawn, despite everything, to some
shining object, and thereupon resume their autonomous existence. Following
upon that minute into which we wanted to compress our whole life, time, or at
least, personal time, begins once more to flow, carry away, if not our resolution,
at least the heartfelt emotions which sustained it. Personal existence is
intermittent and when this tide turns and recedes, decision can henceforth endow
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my life with only an artificially induced significance. The fusion of soul and
body in the act, the sublimation of biological into personal existence, and of the
natural into the cultural world is made both possible and precarious by the
temporal structure of our experience. Every present grasps, by stages, through its
horizon of immediate past and near future, the totality of possible time; thus does
it overcome the dispersal of instants, and manage to endow our past itself with its
definitive meaning, re-integrating into personal existence even that past of all
pasts which the stereotyped patterns of our organic behavior seem to suggest as
being at the origin of our volitional being. (TPP 97-98)

The body schema still is operating as it does, and while the grief may overwhelm the
individual, it is still the same recognizable identity experiencing that grief. In fact, the
very experience of grief hinges on a recognizable identity having a shared history with
the lost loved one. That is to say, for one to experience grief, they carry the past
memories into the present—their memories. Furthermore, what takes place in grief is the
forecasting of the future without the loved one. Thus in the case of metamorphoses of
emotions and perceptions, the temporal and relational structure of being remain intact.
Additionally, while there may be disruptive events to the body-image-schematic system,
there is also a creative plasticity. Malabou notes that there is always a cycle of destruction and
creation in regard to plasticity, and even though a being may drastically change, there is a
unifying, cyclical metamorphosis that links the various changes. An individual can go through
several metamorphoses, several new combinations of body schema and body image, or how
Merleau-Ponty would put it, several worlds. But in any of these interpretations, the true nature
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of being is not “carried off” and the identity returns to its prior form, not in terms of content, but
in terms of identification with a prior self (OA 11).
Malabou, though, proposes that if the identity were to change substantively then there
would be no return to prior forms (OA 9). Rather, the circle of metamorphosis would be broken
and the capacity for equilibrium would be annihilated (OA 5). This is what Malabou labels as
destructive plasticity—one that she claims has not been given any name, especially the name of
‘plasticity.’ This is because, by definition, plasticity at its core is the capacity for a balance
between change and remaining the same. The being can experience changes to body schema and
body image, yet it still remains the same ontological being. On the other hand with destructive
plasticity, the result is the subject is transformed to the point that it is unrecognizable, not
“because of a change in appearance,” but, “on account of a change in nature…” (OA 9).
A metamorphosis does in fact take place, just like in the case of creative plasticity;
however, destructive plasticity is an unprecedented metamorphosis: it is “a plasticity that does
not repair, a plasticity without recompense or scar, one that cuts the thread of life in two or more
segments that no longer meet” (OA 6). Here lies the distinction between destructive plasticity
and traditional plasticity: the incapacity for reestablishing equilibrium. Yet, the language of
‘plasticity’ is still appropriate because it is an underlying aspect of our being: we are plastic
beings, and as Malabou notes, anyone of us has this plastic power of destruction within us and
can undergo such a metamorphosis (OA 2, 5).
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1. Explosive Plasticity: The Deserting of the Subject

Destruction can be understood in a number of ways: something could be destroyed to the state of
nonbeing, to the state that it disappears, or to the state that it becomes unrecognizable. On
Malabou’s account of destructive plasticity all three senses of destruction seem fitting and yet,
do not quite fit. Specific to her concept of destructive plasticity, destruction is “annihilation of
equilibrium,” but also a whole new being is formed, not one that is modified, but “one form
annihilates the other” (OA 5). “The formation of a new individual,” Malabou contends, “is
precisely this explosion of form that frees up a way out and allows the resurgence of an alterity
that the pursuer cannot assimilate” (OA 12). Note that Malabou equates the formation of a new
individual with the explosion; the formation is not a separate process; it is not the result of the
explosion—it is not the exploding IED which destroys the soldier, but the individual exploding
from the inside; “a molting of the inner sculpture” (OA 9). This means that both content and the
structure of experience undergo metamorphoses.
Yet, in Malabou’s account of destructive plasticity, the being is not destroyed to the state
of nonbeing. Malabou explains, “Something shows itself when there is damage, a cut, something
to which normal, creative plasticity gives neither access nor body: the deserting of subjectivity,
the distancing of the individual who becomes a stranger to herself, who no longer recognizes
anyone, who no longer recognizes herself, who no longer remembers her self. These types of
being impose a new form on their old form, without mediation or transition or glue or
accountability, today verses yesterday, in a state of emergency, without foundation, bareback,
sockless” (OA 6). Malabou lists what shows itself as “types of being.” That is to suggest, it is
not a distinction between different worlds, or a number of worlds the individual inhabits or takes
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up; it is not a matter of displacing worlds or giving one exceptional value; and it is not a
modification of body image and body schema.
What shows itself is a gap, but not an absence of being. This is the Lacanian formulation
of the Freudian unconscious: a gap in the symbolic order, the very order of subjects. The tuché
is the Lacanian lack, the missing subject—a rupture in the symbolic order and body. Thus, what
shows itself is the absence of subjectivity. The loss of subjectivity means a loss of the
individual’s sense of agency, autonomy, narrative history, and spatial-temporal world—the very
ingredients of the embodied feeling of being alive. Consequently, the phenomenological
experience includes a disassociation of the self and numbness towards the world. In order to
better elucidate what it is that “shows itself,” namely the deserting of subjectivity and
estrangement of the individual, I will focus on each element Malabou points out.

2. Flight Identity

Specifically, the new form imposed on the old form is what Malabou identifies as the form of
flight. When threatened by destruction, the individual wants nothing more than to flee,
instantaneously, with every bit of strength and force. In that moment, flight appears as “the only
possible solution”—flee or be destroyed (OA 10). Within traditional plasticity, as opposed to
fleeing, the individual transforms to evade the danger, or to recover from destruction. But, she
argues that “metamorphosis by destruction is not the same of flight; it is rather the form of the
impossibility of fleeing” (OA 10).
Malabou references Freud’s discussion of the drives to illustrate this impossibility of
fleeing. The drives are a constant force that cannot find release outside the psyche. He writes,
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“…no actions of flight avail against [the drives]” (cited in OA 10). The question then becomes
how to “eliminate” or satisfy the constant force of the drive. As we know from Freud, such
drives cannot be eliminated; yet, the subject desires release, and so makes the attempt. In the
case of the accident, “What follows,” Malabou writes, “is an attempt at flight.” Malabou draws
attention to the verb “what follows” to literally mean “what comes to be formed.” This attempt
constitutes itself; that is, Malabou explains, “The only possible way out from the impossibility
appears to be the formation of a form of flight” (OA 11). Rather than being able to take flight, a
simulated, virtual flight is formed. Malabou specifies this form of flight as “flight identity,”
which is, “…the formation of an identity that flees itself, that flees the impossibility of fleeing
itself” (OA 11). Despite any desire, any attempt, we cannot transcend the present or the body of
the past. As noted before in the case of trauma, Merleau-Ponty clarifies: “we never extricate
ourselves completely from it, time never completely closes over it and it remains like a wound”
(TPP 98). It is impossible to flee the overlapping worlds of world, body, and self: the whole of
consciousness and experience.
But, this is not quite what Malabou has in mind when she speaks of an identity that flees
itself. Instead, Malabou argues, it is an, “Identity abandoned, disassociated again, identity that
does not reflect itself, does not live its own transformation, does not subjectivize its change” (OA
11). This is because what forms the subject—the sense of embodied subjectivity, how we can
determine an individual self distinguishable between worlds—is absent. The individual attempts
to flee from the very thing which constitutes being—the body. In that case, the individual wants
to flee an impossible present.
The something that shows itself, though, is still a form of being, just not cognized as an
identifiable one, because any means by which the individual can know, recognize, remember, or

106

identify the new being is destroyed with it. As noted above, the formation of a new individual is
the explosion; the formation is not a separate process; it is not the result of the explosion. For
these reasons, flight identity is qualitatively and structurally different. The body of the
individual is incessantly destroying the self; the flashback of the IED exploding, explodes the felt
embodied-self.
All of this suggests that explosive identity is not accessible, identifiable, and intelligible.
This has already been suggested when Caruth notes that the trauma is that which happens too
soon and cannot be made intelligible. Further, the lack of a subject includes a lack of
ownership—something is happening to the individual, in which the individual grapples with
making it intelligible. Malabou steers in a different direction by indicating that the sense of
‘happening to’ can only occur in a coherent, continuous, recognizable self. If something is
happening to me, it is because I can recognize myself as a body and mind within a world,
subjected to external force. But in the instance of the accident, no prior subject is there to
cognize the ‘happening-to.’ Further, it is not an external force which is ‘happening to’ the
individual. The body ‘happens to’ itself. Here is the seed of the disassociation of the self—there
is no recognizable self and the dwelling of the missing self is experienced as foreign, external.

3. Negative Possibility

Respectively, this corresponds to what Malabou means by saying that the something that ‘shows
itself’ does so without mediation, transition, glue, or accountability. For example, repression can
be understood as a way for the individual to mediate between the painful memories and the
bearer of such memories. Merleau-Ponty describes repression as displacing worlds and
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privileging one world. On this account, the accident is just one of the individual’s worlds, a
particular way of being-in-the world. But in the case of flight identity, the individual is wrested
out of the world, disassociated from the self, in which the metamorphoses are not modalities of
recovery to maintain equilibrium for being-in-the-world. Malabou argues that “The accident—
trauma, catastrophe, injury—is not repressed. It is not relegated, not occulted, not admitted”
(OA 79). This is because there is a formation of a new being, not another way of being.
Malabou explains that, “The affective coldness [disassociation] and indifference of victims are
not strategies of escape” (OA 79). As discussed above, the affective coldness produced in the
subject is the phenomenon of the other living within—an unrecognizable being, that of flight
identity. With this, “Destructive plasticity prohibits envisaging precisely the other possibility,
even if it were an a posteriori possibility. It has nothing to do with the tenacious, incurable
desire to transform what has taken place, to reengage in the history of the phantasm of an other
history it does not match any unconscious tactical strategy of opening, the refusal of what is, in
the name of what could have been” (OA89). Flight identity is the impossibility of fleeing.
Malabou provides another reason why the accident does not work from repression. Often
repression is understood as the body denying the traumatic memories. But, Malabou contends
that “Denial always involves an act of faith, a faith that may be defined as faith in another
possible beginning, a source other than the real historical source of what really happened. When
I deny something, in other words, when I negate the evidence, I postulate without being able to
affirm it, that everything could have been otherwise, that everything could have been happened
differently” (OA 85). When imagining ‘what if it hadn’t happened,’ the subject imagines the
possibility of ‘it was not,’ placing faith into no-thing, having “the dumb good will to believe”
(Nietzsche, BGE 5). Denial is faith in a transformation of ‘it-was’ to ‘it-was-not.’ This implies
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the possibility of transitioning to maintain equilibrium, transforming instead of fleeing. Yet, ‘it
was’ cannot be transformed into the other possibility.
For Freud, the attempt at flight and failure to flee is expressed as the repetition
compulsion. The subject is compelled to bring back the scene of the trauma in the attempt to
annihilate it, disown it, and strip it out of the body. With that, Malabou argues that it
simultaneously brings back its denegation. Denegation is the subject imagining “what if it
hadn’t happened? What if something else had happened?” Yet, Malabou reasons, “The question
of the other possibility, the wholly other version, is not simply witness to a compulsive,
mechanical return; it also betrays an expectation, the expectation of the arrival of another way of
being. A way of being excluded from reality” (OA 87). This means that by going back to the
trauma, repeatedly, the subject cannot anticipate or even imagine any other possibility. This is
the “implacable harshness of the negative” (OA 87). The individual digs in its heels, hauling
itself back to the scene of the trauma, to un-imagine the un-imaginable. But, this is not possible
because the new form of being has no history to transcend. The torn tissue that connects one’s
past to its present cannot be glued back together.
This is why Malabou argues that flight identity is not a form of redemption. Redemption
is a way to answer to the past. To understand Malabou’s point, a little Nietzschean redemption
may be helpful here: “To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into ‘thus
I willed it’—that alone should I call redemption” (TSZ II, 251). Nietzschean redemption is to
will the past, to will backwards. Redemption, on this account, would mean to affirm ‘it was’ as
‘what must be’ and deny any other possibility—amor fati. In a scene in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
Zarathustra is confronted by hunchbacks, the blind, and cripples—the accident—who ask to be
healed. Zarathustra resists and explains: “when my eyes flee from the now to the past, they

109

always find the same: fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents…” (TSZ II, 250). The same
dreadful accidents exist in the past and present, indicating an inevitability. This is what creates
great suffering: to will against the past. “’It was,’ Zarathustra explains, “That is the name of the
will’s gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he
is an angry spectator of all that is past. The will cannot will backwards…” (TSZ II, 251). The
will is always fettered to the past, to ‘it was.’ The desire to undo the past, to remake history, to
will the other possibility, is to take revenge on life. ‘Thus I will it,’ is a creative gesture in which
the creative will is a liberator and devises to “get rid of his melancholy and to mock his
dungeon” (TSZ II, 251). But, Zarathustra suggests that it is not just a matter of reconciling with
the past, coming to terms with the past, or coping with the past—that would suggest that the past
is something which can be reconciled. Rather, ‘Thus I will it’ is even stronger than reconciling
or coming to terms with it: to will the past is to take it in, to create one’s identity out of it. This
means to do more than accept it, but to absorb it into being, narrative history, and identity as a
subject inhabiting a past in the present. In the case of the accident, this would mean to will both
‘it must be’ and ‘it could be otherwise’ at the same time—its denegation.
However, such creative elements and the creative will are not available to the subject
who encounters the accident or trauma. This is seen in a distinction between negation in the
sense of rejection (spitting out), and negation in sense of the negative possibility (“what must not
come into presence”). Malabou asserts that it does not mean a negation of possibility that is still
adopted by the subject, nor is it what is impossible. The negative possibility is understood as a
possibility of “how to say no, a cut and dry no, an inconvertible, irredeemable no; how to think
destruction without remission” (OA 75). Rejection has an affective origin in that being wants to
‘spit out’ what is bad or harmful; the ego seeks to expel it from being. This is not how negative
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possibility is characterized, though. Malabou explains: “Negative possibility does not proceed
either from rejecting or spitting out. Since the accident is in no way interiorized by the victim, it
remains foreign to the fate of the psyche and is not integrated into the history of the individual.
The individual does not reject the trauma outside of him- or herself and has no desire in relation
to it, wants neither to eat nor to vomit it” (OA 81). This is because rejection requires judgment,
but, with trauma, no judgment takes place. The accident or trauma is the moment of the
breakdown, the abandonment of subjectivity, and with that, a rupture in the essential foundation
of judgment and will—the agent. The ‘rejection’ happens on a much more primal, bodily level.
This suggests that there is no will in the moment of accident or trauma, that is, as Zarathustra
puts it, “Unless the will should at last redeem himself, and willing should become not willing”
(TSZ II, 251).
Therefore, the subject cannot reclaim the negative possibility as a positive—‘Thus I will
it’—because willing is not possible; there is no ‘it was’ to will. Also, the subject cannot reject ‘it
was’ as a bad thing—‘it should not be.’ The question asked, ‘what if something else happened?’
negates ‘Thus I will it,’ in the sense that the latter is the only reality; whereas the former is the
impossibility, a negation of the possible other—the formation of that impossible being: flightbeing. To put it simply, to flee is not to will, and thus, there is no recovery, no reconciliation,
and no redemption—the trauma is inevitable. “The negative possibility,” Malabou asserts,
“which remains negative until it is exhausted, never becomes real, never becomes unreal either,
but suspended in the post-traumatic form of the subject who misses nothing—who does not even
lack lack, as Lacan might have written—remains to the end this subjective form that is
constituted starting from the absence from the self” (OA 90). The concept of the Lacanian lack
implies a subject which lacks its own subjectivity at the moment of the trauma. But, what
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Malabou is adding to this notion of lack, is that the explosion of the self and formation of a new
being is not a lack.
The negative possibility never becomes real in the sense that it does not come into
presence, but also never becomes unreal as the negative possibility is always projected in the
traumatic experience, the returning of the subject to the scene of the trauma—‘what if it hadn’t
happened?’ The accident, though, prohibits this question from even being formed—there is no
other possible outcome. This is what torments the individual, this “harshness of the negative”:
the individual continues to ask this question, knowing that it is negated.
Negation, though, does not mean to reduce something into non-being, to what is “truly
thrown out of being” (OA 81). It also does not mean to assimilate. In that case, ‘thus I will it’
would mean to enfold it into one’s being, to interiorize and integrate it into the history of the
individual as a coherent being, one with a shared, recognizable past and felt present. But in the
case of destructive plasticity, what emerges is an unimaginable, unrecognizable being, one in
which the present has no past. Malabou notes that “Without reducing it to affirmation, the
negative possibility is not the expression of any lack or any deficit. It bears witness to a power
or aptitude of the negative that is neither affirmed nor lacking, a power that forms” (OA 75).
This is what allows an appearance or formation of the other: “…the only other that exists
in this circumstance is being other to the self” (OA 11). “The question,” Malabou proposes, “is
therefore how to think the void of subjectivity, the distancing of the individual who becomes an
ontological refugee, intransitive (he or she is not the other of someone), without any correlation,
genitive or origin. A new person, whose novelty is not, however, inscribed in any temporality”
(OA 24). In the face of danger, a refugee flees their place of home and comes to live in a foreign
land. The ontological refugee flees their being and comes to reside in another being.
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4. The Inevitable Accident

With the formation of a new being, there is no “today verses yesterday.” What is meant here is
that a present day cannot be contrasted with a past day. First, trauma repeatedly manifests in
sensory memory fragments, in which it is never a complete event with a definitive beginning and
end. During a flashback, the individual does not experience it as a past event; rather, it is taking
place in the present. All the sensations, images, meaning are present in the immediate
experience and the past. The present and past are conflated such that both are experienced in the
immediate now. In Merleau-Ponty’s account, the past remains our “true present,” meaning it is
what structures our world, yet it remains “hidden behind our gaze” (TPP 96). But, for Malabou,
in the case of a formation of a whole new being, the “present comes from no past” (OA 2).
Second, to make the distinction between today and yesterday implies a continuous,
coherent history of the individual. Yet, that is not possible in trauma, as Malabou stresses that a
whole new being is created. Malabou explains: “As a result of serious trauma…the path splits
and a new, unprecedented persona comes to live with the former person, and eventually takes up
all the room. An unrecognizable persona whose present comes from no past, whose future
harbors nothing to come, an absolute existential improvisation” (OA 1-2). With that, the whole
new being also has a whole new past. An example may help here: presently, any allusion to “a
smashed up face,” whether in memory, imagination, film, art, text, or speech, summons the same
sensations as the traumatic memory for me. If I am to recall a scene from a movie I watched
before the trauma, I cannot remember that scene without experiencing the same sensations if I
see the film now. A past in which I was not affected by the image is not my past and does not
coincide with my present experience. A world in which I am indifferent to such an image does
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not exist for me. I cannot even possibly imagine such a past, as in imagining, what it would be
like to not have “a smashed up face” incite traumatic sensory fragments, I conjure up those
fragments. Such a past simply does not exist. Moreover, I do not need to remember images of
his face to experience such sensations—they are there, hidden behind my ‘gaze,’ shaping my
engagement with the world. Thus, there is not a singular history shared by the prior form and
new being.
Additionally, one aspect of trauma is that the individual lives in a state of perpetual fear:
the fear of the next flashback; the fear of a potential nightmare; the fear of an image, a smell, a
sound; the fear of inescapability; the fear of the other living within; the fear of the inevitable.
This is what makes the individual feel as if they are always in a state of emergency: everything is
potentially destructive, even one’s own body. The body interprets the world as dangerous in
which at any moment, there is a call for immediate action. And the only action available is to
flee; and yet, that is not possible, reinforcing the urgency. The inevitable chance is a constant
threat.

5. Bareback and Sockless

The flight being is always in a state of emergency, an improvisation, an incessant attempt to flee,
an impossibility of fleeing, a stranger to oneself, without subjectivity, and without foundation.
To have the sense of a foundation means that there is an element of predictability based on a
familiar narrative history, one that is recognizable to the individual. Identity is formed on the
model of experience. The individual experiences both retention and protention and inhabits an
assumptive world, able to carry out intentional actions and commitments. Additionally, the
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individual’s body schema and body image, while plastic, maintain a consistent relation. The
individual’s set of beliefs and dispositions toward the world are fairly stable in that questions of
everyday existence and identity do not often arise. The world is familiar; the self is present; the
body is available.
On the other hand, with trauma, identity is perpetually at issue, the world is potential
destruction, the body is destruction. When one’s world is incessantly interrupted by traumatic
sensations, the individual lives in a state of ambiguity—in the world, flailing, with no script, no
future, improvising, completely exposed to the world. Malabou captures this sensation when she
describes what shows itself as bareback and sockless. What shows itself is not just the loss of
subjectivity, disassociation, and a broken history; simultaneously, the body exposes the accident,
though it may not be available to visual perception. The body perceives the accident; it knows
the accident; it knows its destructive nature. Thus, the accident exposes how the individual is
exposed to the world.

6. Accidental Brushmarks

In order to grasp how the accident shows itself in the body, I return to Merleau-Ponty’s analogy
of the body to a painting. If we recall, in order to “paint from nature” Cézanne sees himself as
the medium through which nature shows itself: “The landscape thinks itself through me. I am its
consciousness.” Analogously, we can ask: how is the body the consciousness of the accident?
How does the accident think itself through the painter? Painter Francis Bacon hints at an answer.
Through a series of interviews, he draws a connection between his paintings and the accident.
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He states, “I always think of myself not so much as a painter but as a medium for accident and
chance” (FB 140).
Bacon discusses one of his paintings of a triptych (May-June 1973), in which there is a
distorted figure hunched over a basin, apparently sick—in the very moment of being sick. On
the shoulder of the figure, there is a “whip of white paint.” Bacon states, “I did it at the very last
moment, and I just left it. I don’t know if it’s right, but for me it looked right” (FB 94). Bacon
remarks on how he could have scrubbed out the white mark, painted over it, or incorporated it
into the figure’s body; but, he allowed the accident—“it looked right.” What might look like a
mistake is the accidental brush mark Bacon tries to capture. Throughout the series of interviews,
Bacon often suggests that involuntary marks, which he describes as haphazard, non-rational,
irrational, non-illustrational, and anti-illustrational, are much more deeply suggestive, unlocking
areas of sensation other than a simple illustration of an image (FB 56). While there is always a
manner of manipulation in painting, Bacon claims to work “by chance.” He explains: “I think
that accident, which I would call luck, is one of the most important and fertile aspects of [my
work], because if anything works for me, I feel it is nothing I have made myself, but something
which chance has been able to give me. …I never know how much it is pure chance and how
much it is manipulation of it” (FB 90).
Yet, Bacon tells the interviewer, that he does not know exactly what chance is.
Comparatively, he says that it is like trying to explain the unconscious. For this reason, he states
that, “It’s also always hopeless talking about painting – one never does anything but talk around
it – because, if you could explain your painting, you would be explaining your instincts” (FB
100). In an attempt to get at what Bacon means, the interviewer offers a distinction between
“conscious activity” and “accidental activity.” He wonders if painting by accident is like
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entering into something like a trance-like state, similar to what Cézanne was talking about when
he said that, “if he took thought when painting, everything was lost” (FB 96-97). Bacon replies
that it is difficult to distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious (or instinctive)
activity. He cannot explain “why an image will tend to look more inevitable the more it comes
about by accident” (FB 99). He asks, “Does one know why very often, or nearly always, the
accidental images are the most real? Perhaps they’ve not been tampered with by the conscious
brain and therefore come across in a much more raw and real sense than something which has
been tampered with by consciousness?” (FB 177-178). Bacon concludes that accident and
chance in painting work to make the images “fresher, not interfered with,” “more organic,”
“raw,” and “immediate” (FB 57, 92, 120). For this reason, he wants “the paintings to come
about so that they look as though the marks had a sort of inevitability about them” (FB 94).
“What so-called chance gives you,” he explains, “is quite different from what willed application
of paint gives you. It has an inevitability very often which the willed putting-on of the paint
doesn’t give you” (FB 53; 99, emphasis mine). Chance hands over the inevitable.
If one is familiar with his paintings, it seems strange to say that the images he creates are
more organic and not tampered with—his work is a collection of haunting distortions of the
human body, animal forms, objects, and obscure landscapes. It takes some time to know what
you are looking at. For instance, many of the portraits he paints do not have distinct eyes, noses,
or mouths. Rather, there are, as he puts it, just sockets—hollowed out, dark forms. Yet, the
colors, contours of paint, and forms are suggestive enough that we can make out a human face.
Likewise, with the human figures, body parts are enlarged, distorted, placed where they do not
go and objects are blurred, their shapes mere suggestions formed by the opposing colors. All of
this is quite disorienting, and yet, orienting. What I mean by this, and what Bacon emphasizes, is
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that the distorted images orient us in the sensational aspect of the image, as opposed to just an
illustrational image. Bacon explains, “There is a kind of sensational image within the very, you
could say, structure of your being, which is not to do with a mental image – when that image,
through accident, begins to form” (FB 160). Out of the accident, images emerge which are as
gestural as the human body; the image is as palpable as the skin.
This method of distortion, for Bacon, gets closer to what we could call the
facticity being represented in the image. What he aims to do is to “trap” not just the
appearance, but also the “energy within the appearance”—“I’m trying to make images as
accurately off my nervous system” (FB 175; 82). And so, “I’m always trying through
chance or accident to find a way by which appearance can be there but made out of other
shapes” (FB 105). He notes that the forms he attempts to make are extremely
“unrepresentational” (FB 104). In order to capture what cannot be represented, he starts
with unrepresentational forms: “What I want to do is to distort the thing far beyond the
appearance, but in the distortion to bring it back to a recording of the appearance” (FB
40). What this accomplishes, according to Bacon, is that distortion produces a mood as
he explains, “you can’t make an image without its creating a mood” (FB 26). Thus,
Bacon’s method of distortion is actually similar to Cézanne’s “painting from nature.”
Cézanne desires that his paintings “attempt to display the density of the world, to capture
immediate perception;” “this indivisible whole…presence, insurpassable plentitude” of
the world, without scientific exactness (CD 275; 279). Bacon also attempts to capture the
real of the world, the thickness of the world; he states, “I think the only thing is that my
paint looks immediate” (FB 92).
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Yet, he says that this is extremely difficult and even if he is able to do so, the way
appearances are formed is still mysterious to him. This is because, Bacon says, with
“some accidental brushmarks suddenly appearance comes in with a vividness that no
accepted way of doing it would have brought about” (FB 105). Bacon explains that, “It’s
really a question in my case of being able to set a trap with which one would be able to
catch the fact at its most living point” (FB 54). It is this “living quality” which is hard to
“move over” to painting. To have one’s portrait really trapped and given through the
medium of paint, Bacon says, it must capture all the pulsations of a person. This is
because, “The sitter is someone of flesh and blood and what has to be caught is their
emanation” (FB 174). A portrait for Bacon is not just a record their face, “but with their
face you have to try and trap the energy that emanates from them” (FB175). He tells the
interviewer, “When I look at you across the table, I don’t only see you but I see a whole
emanation which has to do with personality and everything else. And to put that over in a
painting, as I would like to be able to do in a portrait, means that it would appear violent
in paint” (FB 82). He believes that, “it’s the slight remove from fact, which returns me
onto the fact more violently” (FB 30). Bacon has to destroy the individual to capture
their most “living quality.” Bacon notes, “What has never yet been analyzed is why this
particular way of painting is more poignant than illustration. I suppose because it has a
life completely of its own. It lives on its own, like the image one’s trying to trap; it lives
on its own, and therefore transfers the essence of the image more poignantly. So that the
artist may be able to open up or rather, should I say, unlock the valves of feeling and
therefore return the onlooker to life more violently” (FB 17).
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Bacon notes that the “human body is in a sense a filter, apart from its other
attributes” (FB 199). All experience is filtered through the body. The body is the
medium of the accident, the material real of the accident, without which the accident does
not exist. Additionally Bacon asserts that, “We merely always live through screens – a
screened existence. And I sometimes think, when people say my work looks violent, that
perhaps I have from time to time been able to clear away one or two of the veils or
screens” (FB 82). Both painting and body are, as Merleau-Ponty intimates, “beings in
which the expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their meaning,
accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no change of their temporal
and spatial situation. ...the nexus of living meanings” (TPP 174). The way in which the
meaning of the painting is stored in the painting, only known by direct display, is the way
in which the meaning of the trauma is stored in the body. The trauma forms a whole
new, permanent filter—a whole new body.
The annihilation of form, then, both unveils the screens by which we engage with
the world, and exposes the raw, immediate, materiality of our existence. The accident in
painting damages to the point that it returns the materiality of life back—the thick,
immediate flesh of the world. Likewise, trauma distorts, disfigures, and destroys the
being far beyond recognition. Consequently, the self returns to the world more violently,
and the world returns to the individual more violently— at its most living point. What
happens, then, is that the accident is absorbed into the body, as the paint is absorbed into
the painting, though the phenomenological experience is one of the impossibility of
flight, not absorption.
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The accident in the painting is the painter’s secret. It is inside the display, visible to all,
but known to one. It does not ruin the painting, but the accident in the painting destroys the
meaning of the painting. That is, if we can only understand the painting because it is on display,
if the material content changes, the display changes. And with that, the identity is new.
However, unlike in art in which the extraordinary is made available by display, with trauma, the
coercive, transformation of the body is not communicated through display. It is the sufferer’s
secret. This is where we see a distinction between those who know and those who do not. The
display of trauma is not made available for all to know, yet, the individual who experiences
trauma is in on the secret.
I had not noticed the whip of white paint before. I was always transfixed by the distorted
figure and other features of the painting. It always makes me think about what it feels like to be
hovering over a basin, miserable. It also always conjures disturbing memories—the distorted
figure becomes his smashed up face. To have these experiences does not entail any reflection or
interpretation; rather, immediately, and every time, the painting displays knowledge which I
share: I know what it feels like to be in that miserable state. Similarly, to have a shared
understanding of trauma, there is no reflection, interpretation, expression; there is no need to
bring it into the conversation: I know what it feels like to be that miserable state.

7. Pain: Tearing the Canvas

The image of the figure hunched over the basin, sick, communicates a shared knowledge of the
felt-experience of being sick. It is something like this form of embodied knowledge that is
understood and shared by individuals who experience trauma. Illness and pain also affect one’s
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sense of autonomy, ownership, and temporality, although not to the extent that trauma does. The
distinction can be made clear by looking to a model of physical pain and seeing how it is similar
to and different than traumatic experience.
Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, provides a
phenomenology of physical pain. In Scarry’s account, one of the main points is that physical
pain, for the one who experiences it, cannot be denied; there is a certainty in its reality.
However, when the sufferer reports their pain, it cannot be confirmed, and thus, there is always
some potential for doubt. This means that knowledge of physical pain is simultaneously certain
and ambiguous. The uncertainty of knowledge lies in the fact that physical pain is an
exceptional state, though we are all capable of experiencing it. That is to say, physical pain
differs from any other bodily and psychic event, such as the capacity to hear, touch, desire, fear
(BP 161). In the case of seeing, desiring, fear, hunger, etc., Scarry explains that there is a
bonding of interior states with “companion objects in the outside world” (BP 162). For instance,
“desire is desiring of x, fear is fear of y, hunger is hunger for z…” We do not have to invent a
world that one is extended out into; “the object is an extension of, an expression of, the state…”
(BP 162). On the other hand, pain does not have an object in the external world—it is not “of”
or “for” anything (BP 161-162). This is what makes it resistant to language, as it is not
referential (I discuss this further in the next chapter).
Scarry compares the state of physical pain to the imagination. In imagination, she says,
there is “no activity, no “state,” no experienceable condition of felt-occurrence separate from the
objects: the only evidence that one is “imaging” is that imaginary objects appear in the mind”
(BP 162). Likewise, there is no activity, no experienceable condition or felt-occurrence separate
from the pain. The only evidence that one is in pain, is that pain ‘appears’ in the body. For this
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reason, Scarry explains that, “pain “intends” nothing; it is wholly passive; it is “suffered” rather
than willed or directed.” She states that, “one can say that pain only becomes an intentional state
once it is brought into relation with the objectifying power of the imagination: through that
relation, pain will be transformed from wholly passive and helpless occurrence into a selfmodifying and, when most successful, self-eliminating one” (BP 164). Thus, pain can be
considered “an intentional state without an intentional object” (BP 164).
Yet, there is a shared knowledge in which one individual will understand what the
sufferer is experiencing without the exact embodied knowledge of that pain. This is what makes
something such as torture effective in the way that it is. In examining the structure of torture,
Scarry lays out eight attributes of the felt-experience of pain. These elements belong ‘equally’ to
the torturer and the tortured; both the torturer and the tortured have an equivalent, shared
understanding of how pain works. The torturer knows that the tortured has a sheer aversion to
pain, and this is what the torturer uses as the tool of torture. This sheer averseness is the most
essential aspect of pain, underlying the eight other aspects Scarry describes.
The first aspect Scarry discusses is how in physical pain the sufferer feels as though they
are being ‘acted on.’ The sufferer can have the experience that either the world is acting on the
individual, or in the case of intense pain, the sufferer experiences their own body as the agent of
their agony. This experience is seen in common idiomatic expressions, for instance, “My
stomach is killing me!” The structure of pain, its very being, is a negation, in the sense that it is
other to the individual and an unwanted intruder in the body. “Pain,” Scarry states, “is a pure
physical experience of negation, an immediate sensory rendering of “against,” of something
being against one, and of something one must be against. Even though it occurs within oneself,
it is at once identified as “not oneself,” “not me,” as something so alien that it must right now be
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gotten rid of” (BP 52). The individual instantaneously rejects the sensation, both bodily and
subjectively.
In the case of feeling “not me,” agency is displaced. Scarry explains that, “While pain is
in part a profound sensory rendering of “against,” it is also a rendering of the “something” that is
against, a something at once internal and external” (BP 52). In the first case, the individual has a
sense of internal agency, even when there is a weapon of some sort being used on their body.
What the individual feels is not the knife, but the body the knife is entering into. This illustrates
how pain is an exceptional state. For instance, in the case of touch, one feels the smoothness of
the blade and the coolness of the metal. But as the blade enters the body, the sensations of
smooth and cool are not registered; the individual does not feel the blade, but their body. In that
case, it is one’s own body which is hurting the individual. We could say the body is ‘up and
against itself.’
Whereas, Scarry contends, when there is no weapon present, “there often arises a vivid
sense of external agency.” This shows up in our everyday vocabulary for pain: “knifelike pains,
stabbing, boring, searing pains” (BP 53). This is how one can make a distinction between
internal and external agency: “My stomach is killing me!” as opposed to “I feel a stabbing pain in
my stomach!” The first expression is an example of the felt sense of internal agency; and the
latter, external agency, in which pain is an effect, not a cause or agent of the pain. The
individual is ‘up and against the pain.’ This frayed agency makes it so that “one feels acted
upon, annihilated, by inside and outside alike”—“suicide and murder converge” (BP 53).
In that case, physical pain not only dissolves the inside and outside boundary, it also
collapses the distinction between the private and public. Scarry explains that pain “brings with it
all the solitude of absolute privacy with none of its safety, all the self-exposure of the utterly

124

public with none of its possibility for camaraderie or shared experience” (BP 53). This
conflation of the private and public is often artistically objectified. In particular, she describes
the solitary figure in the typical canvas of Francis Bacon: “the solitary figure…is made
emphatically alone by his position on a dais, by an arbitrary geometric box inserted over him,
and by his naked presence against a uniform (and in its uniformity, almost absolute) orange-red
background; yet while he is intensely separate from the viewer…he is simultaneously
mercilessly exposed to us, not merely because he is undressed, unshielded by any material or
clothing, but because his melting body is turned inside out, revealing the most inward and secret
parts of him” (BP 53). The combination of isolation and exposure are not always visible to the
outside, but, Scarry notes, it is “always present in the felt-experience of pain” (BP 53-54).
The fifth attribute is one that Scarry takes time to develop throughout the text: the
relationship between physical pain and language. She maintains that pain has the ability to
destroy language—“the power of verbal objectification, a major source of our self-extension, a
vehicle through which the pain could be lifted out into the world and eliminated” (BP 54). First,
physical pain monopolizes language and becomes the only subject. Any complaint, becomes the
exclusive mode of speech. But also, pain intensifies and “deepens” such that “the coherence of
complaint is displaced by the sounds anterior to learned language” (BP 54). Verbal expression is
silenced by the human cry.8 Complaints, such as, “my stomach is killing me,” are taken over by
grunts, moans, winces, and cries; or even hunching over, clutching the stomach. At this point,
objective, coherent language is absent and not accessible to the individual, whose agency is
displaced.

8

Francis Bacon states that he wanted to make the best painting of the human cry. He obsessively repeated the
image of the human cry in several distorted paintings of Velasquez’s painting of Pope Innocent X.
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In line with that, pain destroys the contents of consciousness. What this means,
according to Scarry, is that, “Pain annihilates not only the objects of complex thought and
emotion, but also the objects of the most elemental acts of perception” (BP 54). The sufferer is
no longer thinking about or of the pain, or anything for that matter. Pain intervenes and owns the
consciousness and body, in which it has no object and intends nothing. Any intentional activity
taking place in consciousness is shut down with physical pain.
This ties in with the seventh attribute of pain, which is, that it is its totality. Scarry states
that, “Pain begins by being “not oneself” and ends by having eliminated all that is “not itself”
(BP 55). Pain takes over to the point that it annihilates anything other. She continues, “At first
occurring only as an appalling but limited internal fact, it eventually occupies the entire body and
spills out into the realm beyond the body, takes over all that is inside and outside, makes the two
obscenely indistinguishable, and systematically destroys anything like language or world
extension that is alien to itself and threatening to its claims. Terrifying for its narrowness, it
nevertheless exhausts and displaces all else until it seems to become the single broad and
omnipresent fact of existence” (BP 55). Pain is world destroying—the world (of others and
objects), the world of the self, and the world of the body.
This leads to the eighth element, one that Scarry says is the “most frightening,” which is
pain’s resistance to objectification. Scarry explains that, “Though indisputably real to the
sufferer, it is, unless accompanied by visible body damage or disease label, unreal to other. This
profound ontological split is a doubling of pain’s annihilating power: the lack of
acknowledgement and recognition (which if present could act as a form of self-extension)
becomes a second form of negation and rejection, the social equivalent of the physical
aversiveness” (BP 56). She continues, “The person’s pain being subjectively real but
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unobjectified and invisible to all others, it is now hugely objectified, everywhere visible, as
incontestably present in the external as in the internal world, and yet it is simultaneously
categorically denied” (BP 56).
Given that physical pain has no object in language, Scarry states that the existing
vocabulary of pain amounts to limited use of adjectives. With that, she explains, “one passes
through direct description very quickly and almost immediately encounters an ‘as if’ structure
(BP 15). For example: it feels as if…; it is though…. What follows the ellipse are “two and only
two metaphors,” which are very problematic. This is because “The first specifies an external
agent of the pain, a weapon that is pictured in producing the pain; and the second specifies bodily
damage that is pictured as accompanying the pain” (BP 15). Scarry argues that pain is not the
same as agency or damage; yet, because agency and damage are referential, we readily employ
them in order to express the experience of physical pain itself (BP 15).
Take, for example, when someone communicates that they are in pain by stating
something like, “It feels as if there is someone stabbing me in the stomach.” The statement does
convey the experience of the sufferer to someone else. In the case that there is an actual weapon
or wound, the pain is immediately conveyed. For instance, if someone were actually being
stabbed in the stomach, the scene would convey that the one stabbed in the stomach is in pain;
the sufferer does not need to state that they are in pain, and how much, as the event already does
so. On the other hand, if the sufferer has not been stabbed but is using the metaphor to
communicate the intensity of the stomach pain, the person on the outside of the sufferer’s body
could still grasp the feeling of pain. This is accomplished through imagining the scene. The
person on the outside of the sufferer’s body does not need to have experienced being stabbed in
the stomach either. An actual agent is present with the immediate proximity of the weapon to the
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body; whereas in the case of “it feels as if…,” there is an imagined agent, in which both can
convey the felt-experience of the sufferer to someone outside the sufferer (BP 15). This, then,
makes it so that the pain is ‘externalized,’ objectified, and made sharable even though it
originated in an interior experience. The pain can be apprehended in the presence of the agent or
image, but it cannot be apprehended without either.
Thus, to express pain, “one must both objectify its felt-characteristics and hold steadily
visible the referent for those characteristics.” That is, Scarry explains:

The image of the weapon only enables us to see the attributes of pain if it is clear
that the attributes we are seeing are the attributes of pain (and not of something
else). The deeply problematic character of this language, its inherent instability,
arises precisely because it permits a break in the identification of the referent and
thus a misidentification of the thing to which the attributes belong. While the
advantage of the sign is its proximity to the body, its disadvantage is the ease with
which it can then be spatially separated from the body. (BP 17)

The process of imagining a visible referent to express the pain is also what produces the
uncertainty of knowledge.
Despite this ambiguity, there is an attempt at objectification, for instance, the pain scale
used by the medical field, and also, the act of simply pointing to the region of the body where the
pain is felt. For example, the sufferer may be asked: “Where does it hurt?” “What does it feel
like?” “On a scale of 1 to 10, how much does it hurt?” “Is it a sharp pain, dull pain, stabbing
pain…?” The sufferer can point to the body and provide testimony: “It hurts here, in my
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stomach below my sternum. It feels as if I am being repeatedly punched in the stomach. The
pain is so intense it is radiating to my back and chest. It is a throttling, stabbing pain. I would
say it is probably around an 8—not the worst pain I have ever felt, but pretty bad.” And when
the pain is so intense that it takes over the individual, it can be communicated by the human cry.
Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s example of anger, in observing the individual wincing and
screaming, one does not need to recall feelings of pain, but can read pain in these gestures.
Consequently, we may observe the veteran wince during a flashback of the traumatic
scene, and that gesture could be interpreted as physical pain. Van der Kolk says, “The emotions
and physical sensations that were imprinted during the trauma are experienced not as memories
but as disruptive physical reactions in the present” (BKS 204). Pain too is a disruptive physical
reaction that takes place in the present. Thus, we could say trauma is experienced as if the body
is in pain. But, the outsider does not read trauma when the veteran winces. This is because
bodily gestures, such as wincing, are not associated with traumatic experience. Also, for the
most part, trauma is not accompanied by visible bodily damage. Further, the individual may not
display any affect whatsoever during the flashback or traumatic memory.
In regard to memory, there is a distinction between physical pain and trauma. If we are
to recall moments that we have experienced some pain, those memories do not have the same
disruptive physical effect. I can remember having knee surgery and that it was quite painful, but
I do not feel the knee pain presently. Also, if I were to experience knee pain presently, I may be
reminded of the surgery, but that memory is just that: a memory. The knee pain I experienced
with surgery is in the past. There may be residual effects, such as the painful osteoarthritis I
experience now, but this is a separate event. Likewise, my knee does not start hurting when I
think of the snowboarding accident that caused it, or if I see snow, or a snowboard, or anything
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that was particular to that event. With the lasting effects on the individual there may be subtle to
dramatic changes in body schema and body image. But, pain, even chronic pain, is temporal—it
has a beginning and an end, and when the pain fades, it becomes just a memory.
In both trauma and physical pain, agency is jeopardized. However, another distinction
lies in the fact that agency in trauma is completely compromised, as opposed to fragmented in
physical pain. The sensation of being ‘acted on’ or ‘happening to’ can only be experienced by a
continuous, coherent self that can recognize oneself as a body and mind. This means that in the
case of physical pain, subjectivity remains intact, though there is a displacing of agency. With
trauma, there is an annihilation of the self, a subject who no longer recognizes herself. Beyond
the wounded body, both the body and identity are wounded, and remain an open wound.
So while we can look to embodied knowledge of physical pain as an archetype for
understanding the type of embodied knowledge of trauma and how we might say there is a
shared knowledge, the difference lies in the embodied experience of agency and temporality.
With that, such questions to gauge the felt-experience of trauma are incomprehensible. The
individual cannot point to a place in the body; trauma is ungeometrical. There are no visible or
imagined weapons, and further, the language used to express traumatic experience is even more
remote to the body. For example, when asked “What does it feel like?” the individual may
express the sensation of trauma in ways in which we cannot determine the sign and its proximity
to the body, such that it enables us to see the attributes of trauma. The individual may say, “It
feels as if my world is falling apart.” The imagined reference to a crumbling world is so far
removed from any object in relation to the body. Or, “It feels like a dark man is living inside
me.” Or, they may say, “I do not feel like myself.” The imagined referent is absent, already
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destroyed. Or, perhaps the response is, “I don’t feel anything.” Trauma is even more resistant to
language.

8. At the Most Living Moment

On the classical model of embodiment, trauma compromises the embodied feeling of being alive.
As Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher understand it, embodiment is to be tied to a certain world; to be
intervolved in a definite environment; to identify oneself with certain projects; to be
continuously committed to such projects; to have a continuous narrative history; and to have a
sense of temporality, ownership, and agency. Trauma, with its destructive force, forms a sense
of disassociation, temporal disorientation, and an uninhabitable body—the very site of identity
and world. With trauma, one is wrested out of the world, and it is world-destroying. But,
Malabou’s account of destructive plasticity and the accident reveals how the experience of
trauma simultaneously makes the very ‘real’ of the world known, in which the individual is
buried in the world in the most violent, intimate way. The instance of trauma is encountering the
intense, immediate, inevitable feeling of being alive “at its most living point.” Thus, while we
can say that it compromises the embodied feeling of being alive on account of subjectivity, it is
not a matter of disembodiment. Rather, traumatic experience is the most violent embodied
feeling of being alive, in abeyance of the inevitable chance.
There is a shared knowledge of this abject feeling of being alive, which makes it such
that it can be communicated from person to person. Painting and other imagery is able to
communicate this exceptional state by display. But, without a display, absent any image or
referent, this abject state demands the invention of an image, created out of language, harbored in
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writing. Thus, the relationship between language and the body—the symbolic and semiotic—
must be established in order to know what is distinct of trauma-writing.

132

CHAPTER FOUR:
THE HORROR OF THE OTHER LIVING WITHIN

I read the words, “A smashed up face is still a…”—I squint, shudder, rattle my head, my
heartbeat quickens, I desperately, impulsively look away from the page, engulfed in a flood of
images, too quick to anticipate, engulfed in “a twisted braid of affects and thoughts;” a response
which disrupts, disturbs, throws off being, creating a state of ambiguity, in-between, in abeyance.
What takes place such that the words “a smashed up face” cause such a visceral reaction,
bodily rejection, and revolt of being? What takes place such that the words bring a whole new
world of meaning and reveal a whole new being? The metamorphosis does not take place in the
symbolic order; they are the same words I have encountered in the past and they carry a counderstanding of an image one might recall from memory of a scene in a film, for instance, or
imaginatively create based on other visual memories. The meaning of the independent words
remains the same by use and function. In my case, though, the words “a smashed up face” are no
longer solely symbolic. The words do not make me think of a smashed up face; there is no
decisive association of resemblance or reasoning by analogy. The words are not analogous to the
traumatic memory, and yet they impart the same interruptive power as a flashback. The words
are as violent as the sensory memory fragment. The locution “A smashed up face” is his
smashed up face.
Language is jeopardized in traumatic experience because it is this experience which
compromises the foundation of language: temporality, subjectivity, and identity. Yet, in this
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moment, what is unassimilated, a missing encounter, resistant to being captured in language, is
captured in language, not in the sense that it is able to communicate the traumatic experience
through description, thus disseminating the embodied knowledge of trauma. The words are not
just a signifying chain of signs. Rather, the locution captures the significance of the traumatic
memory much like how Francis Bacon captures the immediate, accidental, most living quality of
the flesh of the world within the painting. At this moment language acts back on itself and
occupies the position of the real, the gap in the symbolic order. The cut becomes that which
cuts.

1. I Am Pain

Given that the tuché is a break in the symbolic order, then establishing any kind of relationship
with language, other than its absence, is problematic. Scarry makes this point in regard to
physical pain, which shares similar features to the embodied knowledge of trauma. Scarry
describes how physical pain resists language as it compromises temporality, agency, and
ownership. But, she adds, language in turn “betrays” physical pain. She writes,

[O]ne of two things is true of pain. Either it remains inarticulate or else the
moment it first becomes articulate it silences all else: the moment language bodies
forth the reality of pain, it makes all further statements and interpretations seem
ludicrous and inappropriate, as hollow as the world content that disappears in the
head of the person suffering. Beside the initial fact of pain, all further
elaborations—that it violates this or that human principle, that it can be
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objectified in this or that way, that it is amplified here, that it is disguised there—
all these seem trivializations, a missing of the point, a missing of the pain. But
the result of this is that the moment it is lifted out of the ironclad privacy of the
body into speech, it immediately falls back in. (BP 60)

When we speak of the pain of the tortured and how it is a violation of some moral principle, or
attempt to objectify pain according to the pain scale, or use intensifiers and adjectives to create a
more robust imagery, all of this is human measurement. Any further statement or interpretation
does not have meaning in the sense of what the pain means to the individual, or rather, the
significance that it has in the body. For this reason, all measures of pain seem trivial and
inappropriate. There is no effectual translation over into actual embodied knowledge. To place
any value or distinction on pain is to grant it a meaning other than itself, but also, to interpose a
purpose, reason, or intention. Pain is extended out into the world through such measures9 in that
it is through supplementing it with purpose, reason, or intention we can make sense of its
existence. Yet, it does not have any such external or empirical referent. And this is why it
quickly falls back into the privacy of the body.
For instance, often when I experience the intense stomach pain from the stomach
condition I have, the moment I attempt to make known my experience, I not only fail and betray
the pain, but incite the conditions for modulated, seemingly contrived recognition. And what is
worse, articulating my pain does nothing for it. Language offers no solace or relief. There are
times when it is so intense that all my attention is drawn to it, and any such desire to express it
drops out. In fact, all desire drops out, so to speak. There is no desire to express it or remain

9

This excludes instrumental pain.
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silent because all desire is condensed into relief. And when allowed enough reprieve to bring it
into speech, I am compelled to articulate the inarticulate in order to explain my ‘body language’:
clutching my chest at the sternum, rocking back and forth, breathing short, heavy breaths, and,
blurting out strained groans. Yet, such bodily expressions remain ambiguous as this behavior
can be mimicked—the truth as to whether I am in pain is not established in language or within a
language of the body. This suggests that there is no necessary connection between my
convulsing body and pain. Even more so, there is no necessary relationship between my
convulsing body and language. One individual can be convulsing due to extreme stomach pain
and another silent, though experiencing extreme pain due to reconstructive surgery. Pain is
equally significant to each individual, yet pain’s meaning to the individual is not given. With
this in mind, there is no measurement of pain.
In any attempt to bring pain into speech, I interpret the experience according to a given
encoded grammar. The interpretation is a process of a series of translations from embodied
knowledge to “verbal images.” According to Merleau-Ponty, these “verbal images” are “traces
left in us by words spoken or heard,” (TPP 202-203). I must conjure what image seems to best
reflect the pain as there is no visible referent, no object to be experienced anywhere outside the
body. In selecting the imagery to connote the experience, all via metaphor (“it feels as
though…”), I impose a secondary judgement. First, I judge the severity or ‘type’ of pain, and
then select the expression or verbal-image which best communicates this judgement from a set of
trace words. And for there to be co-understanding, there must be a co-imagination.
Communicating the pain effectively requires an ability to translate the experience into imagery
such that another individual can ‘imagine’ what it is like. The reciprocity happens at the level of
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the imagination. And this is why we have the affected response, “Oh, I can only imagine what it
feels like…” or “I can’t even imagine what it must feel like…”
As language is a sensible presentation of thought, it is a way in which the self is extended
out into the world. According to Merleau-Ponty, “[Language] presents or rather it is the
subject’s taking up of a position in the world of his meanings. The term ‘world’ here is not a
manner of speaking: it means that the ‘mental’ or cultural life borrows its structures from natural
life and that the thinking subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate” (TPP 225).
Language is a psychic link between the individual and the cultural world of meaning. It is
through language that we draw the other into our world and enter into the world of the other.
Merleau-Ponty explains that it is “a taking up of others’ thought through speech, a reflection in
others, an ability to think according to others which enriches our own thoughts” (TPP 208).
Additionally, he explains that, “In order that I may understand the words of another person, it is
clear that his vocabulary and syntax must be ‘already known’ to me. But that does not mean that
words do their work by arousing in me ‘representations’ associated with them, and which in
aggregate eventually reproduce in me the original ‘representation’ of the speaker” (TPP 213).
Though while someone can claim to “imagine what it feels like,” which implies a mutual
understanding, it is not established through an articulation of the same image. Second, to claim
that one “can’t even imagine what it must feel like,” suggests a necessary connection in the sense
that there “must” be a way in which it is felt—a purpose, reason, or intention—which the other
individual cannot comprehend. The vocabulary and syntax must already be known such that an
individual can either identify or not identify with the other’s imaginative description of their
pain.
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Beyond the denotative meaning, syntax, etc., language is incarnate and requires a body.
That is to say, meaning is communicated through the body, specifically phonetic gestures.
Merleau-Ponty explains that, “…a contraction of the throat, a sibilant emission of air between the
tongue and teeth, a certain way of bringing the body into play suddenly allows itself to be
invested with a figurative significance which is conveyed outside us” (TPP 225). Merleau-Ponty
details:

The phonetic ‘gesture’ brings about, both for the speaking subject and for his
hearers, a certain structural co-ordination of experience, a certain modulation of
existence, exactly as a pattern of my bodily behavior endows the objects around
me with a certain significance both for me and for others. The meaning of the
gesture is not contained in it like some physical or physiological phenomenon.
The meaning of the word is not contained in the word as a sound. But the human
body is defined in terms of its property of appropriating, in an indefinite series of
discontinuous acts, significant cores which transcend and transfigure its natural
powers. (TPP 225)

Symbolic meaning is not communicated in gesture or word alone—the body modulates the
coming together of the two, in which the significance transcends the word and gesture into an
imaginary world, but one that is then superimposed on the world and is meaning-giving. We
communicate via reciprocity; just as we read bodily gestures, we ‘read’ gesticular language.
Though while intense pain is at best expressed through metaphor, the metaphor stated within
gesticular language allows for some reciprocity.
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However, as noted above, as physical pain is brought forth into language, it equally
retreats back into the body. This is because, Scarry explains, “Nothing sustains its image in the
world; nothing alerts us to the place it has vacated. From the inarticulate it half emerges into
speech and then quickly recedes once more. Invisible in part because of its resistance to
language, it is also invisible because its own powerfulness ensures its isolation, ensures that it
will not be seen in the context of other events, that it will fall back from its new arrival in
language and remain devastating. Its absolute claim for acknowledgement contributes to its
being ultimately unacknowledged” (BP 60-61). Acknowledgement requires that there be coimagination on the part of the sufferer and the witness. And in communicating the image, all
measurement of pain is speculative and figurative. Unable to communicate the pain, it is the
individual’s private embodied-knowledge, which the sufferer knows without the need for any
image or metaphor—the body knows, the body keeps the score.
Scarry stresses that pain is not just resistant to language, it destroys language. What is
meant by this is that pain consumes the individual’s reality to the point that they are stripped of
all world content and pain is the only possible reality. Language is silenced by the guttural
noises and bodily compulsions. But, beyond this, language is destroyed in terms of its very
structure of being. Pain forces language to betray itself; pain consumes the body and the
signification of the words. The statement, “my stomach hurts” cannot possibly communicate
such intense pain. What would serve as the possessive adjective of “my,” implying a subject,
object, and Other, collapses into meaninglessness. “My,” as the possessive adjective, refers to
the individual possessing an object. To have a sense that it is one’s possession, there must be a
distinction between the object and the self, as well as the self and another—my stomach, not
yours, or hers. This utterance implies a subject, object (body), the Other, and pain serving as
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both object and Other. Yet, as in the case of severely intense pain, the ‘world’ closes in and the
whole totality of existence and reality is pain. There is no I separate from the pain; there is no I
separate from the stomach; there is no stomach separate from the pain. So, if the individual can
even muster the words, a more effective expression would be “I am pain.” But “pain,” here, is
empty in the sense that there is not even an imaginable referent to tie it to the external world.
Tying it to the “I”—the subject—is even more obscure as there is no image for “I” other than the
self as body. But this occurs within the imaginary realm, not yet symbolic. That is, “I” as the
Ideal Ego is the barred subject, the child desiring the unification with the image in the mirror, the
object petite a.
As discussed in the first chapter, the sign is given as the signifier over the signified. So in
this case, it would be the signifier “I” over the concept—the Ideal Ego, a singular, coherent
identity. This is represented as the barred subject in the Lacanian algorithm. Keeping with this,
the algorithm for “I am pain” would be symbolized as
"𝐼"
$

→

"𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑛"
𝑎

in the sense that in the sign “pain,” the signifier is over what cannot be signified. As discussed
before, the acoustic image “pain” is solely acoustic, lacking any proximal image. In
signification, a sign is dependent on its context, but with pain, that context is buried deep within
the body. Pain is not at the level of the symbolic, but rather the semiotic—where there are no
laws which govern the signs. Pain returns the individual to the pre-linguistic stage and this is
how it “destroys” language. Scarry explains that, “Intense pain is also language-destroying: as
the content of one’s world disintegrates, so the content of one’s language disintegrates; as the
self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and its
subject” (BP 35). This implies that physical pain not only lacks an object in the external world,
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but also a subject—it is not of or for; it is not from or to. Physical pain lies outside the symbolic
order where speaking subjects are constituted in a realm of shared cultural meaning. Thus, it is
not so much “I am pain” but rather, pain exists. As the totalizing, engulfing reality of existence,
pain is both flesh and world.

2. The Primordial “No!”

There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed
against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected
beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite
close, but it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire,
which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Apprehensive, desire turns,
aside; sickened, it rejects. A certainty protects it from the shameful—a certainty
of which it is proud holds on to it. But simultaneously, just the same, that
impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an elsewhere as tempting as it is
condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons
and repulsion places the one haunted by it literally beside himself. (PH 1)

The figure hunched over the basin, at the moment of being sick—vomit, repugnance, gagging,
filth, defilement, tears, bile, sobs, sickly acrid smell of sweat, decay, shit, terror, a hatred that
smiles, a pile of dolls at Auschwitz, black blood, a smashed up face—that physical revolt of
being, that primordial “no”—the abject. The body’s first signifiance: divide, reject, repeat; a
significance that not only lacks symbolic signification, but resists it. This is what Francis Bacon
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desires to capture within his paintings by chance: malformed bodies, hollowed out sockets, the
accident. That which disturbs and fascinates, repulses and compels, calls out and silences—this
is the marshland of trauma.
Trauma goes beyond a resistance to language—it destroys the very mimicry within the
constitution of the symbolic. In the case of physical pain, the resistance to language does not
intensify the felt-experience of the actual pain; that is, the physical pain does not increase or
decrease when brought into speech or expressed in bodily gestures. For example, when I
experience the intense stomach pain I frequently have, whether I alert someone else to it or
remain silent, the pain persists at the same intensity. At the point in which pain obliterates
language in the sufferer, as Scarry describes, it is not the obliteration of language which hurts. In
this sense, we could say, pain hurts language, but language does not hurt the sufferer. On the
other hand, with trauma, the ineffability of the felt-experience is part of, contributes to, and
intensifies the ‘pain.’ This feature of trauma places it within the realm of the abject, in which
this impossibility of communication is symptomatic of the impossible subject.
Kristeva writes, “If it be true that the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the
subject, one can understand that it is experienced at the peak of its strength when that subject,
weary of fruitless attempts to identify with something on the outside, finds the impossible within;
when it finds that the impossible constitutes its very being, that it is none other than abject” (PH
5). As in the case of intense physical pain in which the self “disintegrates” into nothing other
than pain, in trauma, the self is “pulverized” into nothing other than the abject—its very identity
is abject. Without a foundation. Bareback. Sockless.
Malabou’s description of flight identity is suggestive of the abjection of self: it is not just
a transference in agency, but rather, with identity and ontology. The new being wants to ab-ject
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flight-identity, cast it off, flee, leap, take flight. But, the impossibility of fleeing, this revolt of
being, is its very being. The abject beseeches the individual, calls on the individual to respond
and confront the abjection of self. Kristeva writes, “The abjection of self would be the
culminating form of that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its objects are
based merely on the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being. There is nothing
like the abjection of self to show that all abjection is in fact recognition of the want on which any
being, meaning, language, or desire is founded” (PH 5). Something shows itself when there is
damage, a cut, and that something is the inaugural loss that lays the foundation of being—the
loss of the mother’s body, that which provides the possibility of knowledge and meaning.
This loss is magnified with the interjection of language, the Law of the Father. This is
not just because the individual fails to identify with any ‘outside,’ but also any ‘inside.’ The
abject, Kristeva explains, is “essentially different from “uncanniness,” more violent, too,
abjection is elaborated through a failure to recognize its kin; nothing is familiar, not even the
shadow of a memory” (PH 5). Kristeva conceptualizes this by imagining “a child who has
swallowed up his parents too soon, who frightens himself on that account, “all by himself,” and,
to save himself, rejects and throws up everything that is given to him” (PH 5). Initially, the
mother and child are one body. Then at birth, there is a separation, a tearing away from the
mother; yet, the two bodies are still connected through touch, nutrition, and protection. It is the
mother’s body which gives life to the child, the mother’s body sustains the child’s body.
In Kristeva’s metaphor, she explains that “what [the child] has swallowed up instead of
maternal love is an emptiness, or rather a maternal hatred without a word for the words of the
father; that is what he tries to cleanse himself of, tirelessly” (PH 6). With the introduction of the
father, the child recognizes an Other which is not the mother-child. This primordial “not” is the
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soil for any desire—there must be an absence or lack for there to be a desire-for. This otherness,
then, subverts the child such that the child recognizes that the other body is not its own body; it is
not the body sustaining the child’s life. Thus, the father’s presence introduces the very
possibility for the symbolic: separation.
Before the Law of the Father, the child’s known world is that of touch. The child’s world
is and is known through the overlapping, but distinct, dimensions of touch:

A touching of the sleek and of the rough, a touching of the things—a passive
sentiment of the body and of its space—and finally a veritable touching of the
touch, …where the “touching subject” passes over to the rank of the touched,
descends into the things, such that the touch is formed in the midst of the world
and as it were in the things. (VI 134)

The bodily knowing of touch is the mother’s and child’s canvas. Before an image is formed on
the canvas, the paint touches the canvas; the blue touches the red. All knowing and meaning are
given and received in the touch, absent of any symbol.
The separation—the initial absence of touch—is revealed with the introduction of the
symbolic. And this is what gives the abject its horrifying power. Kristeva explains, “The
symbolic light that a third party, eventually the father, can contribute helps the future subject …
in pursuing a reluctant struggle against what, having been the mother, will turn into an abject”
(PH 13). The mother’s receptivity, though, drives back the separation, rejects the separation of
the mother and child, this separation being the formation of the new being. In the giving and
receiving of the mother’s body, a new being is formed and nourished. This new being rejects
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itself as separated from the mother’s body—its own, separate body. The separation is the
miserable condition of helplessness, hopelessness, having been thrown out, cast off the mother’s
body. This is how we can understand Kristeva’s metaphoric child who swallows up emptiness
and maternal hatred.
Kristeva notes, “In this struggle, which fashions the human being, the mimesis, by means
of which he becomes homologous to another in order to become himself, is in short logically and
chronologically secondary. Even before being like, “I” am not but do separate, reject, ab-ject”
(PH 13). The mimesis of the child’s body to the mother’s is secondary to the abject. Before the
“I” is formed, either in “I am not” (the father’s body) or “I am like” (the mother’s body), there is
already a motility of separation and rejection. This is what precedes the misrecognition in the
mirror stage: the child already rejects its body as separate from the mother, which is required for
the child to have any desire to be the coherent object in the mirror. The abject is logically prior
to any formation of subject and object. “The abject,” Kristeva writes, “is not an ob-ject facing
me, which I name or imagine” (PH 1). Kristeva states that “abjection, and even more so
abjection of self, is its only signified” (PH 5). There is no kin, no mimicry, no representation, no
sign, not even a signifier other than the abject. The embodied knowledge of the abject, thus, is
constituted in the pre-linguistic realm—a barren frontier devoid of signification. This prelinguistic realm is that of the semiotic.
The semiotic (le sémiotique) is the non-expressive totality of the meaning of drive,
instinct, emotion, and, sensation. It is the rhythmic motility of the world, the pulsating flesh of
the world—the musical, poetic, prosodic, and rhythmic topographies—a range of signification
devoid of structure and sign, which is not encoded into grammar. It is the gesticular expression
Merleau-Ponty speaks of, without which, the symbolic order of language would communicate
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nothing other than symbol. That is to say, as Merleau-Ponty explains “language is equally
uncommunicative of anything other than itself, that its meaning is inseparable from it. We need,
then, to seek the first attempts at language in the emotional gesticulation whereby man
superimposes on the given world the world according to man” (TPP 219). Thus, the semiotic
underpins all significance, both body and sign.

3. The Primordial Space

According to Kristeva, energies move through the body which are always already involved in the
semiotic process, that is, they move through the body as rhythms, phonatory rhythms, gestural,
acoustic, tactile, motor, visual devices. This is the signifying system of the semiotic. Drives in
the body displace and condense energies, and are ‘articulated’ through the semiotic, rhythm,
kinetic, phonemic stage—marks of the stases of the drives. The chora, is “a modality of
signifiance10 in which the linguistic sign is not yet articulated as the absence of an object and as
the distinction between the real and symbolic” (RPL 36). The chora lacks an object, but is the
medium of the connection between the body, objects, and subject, all of which are not yet
constituted as such. Kristeva derives this language of the chora from Plato’s Timaeus, in which
Plato associates the chora with the mother’s body in the sense that he sees it as material and
maternal. The mother’s body mediates the symbolic law which structures social relations, the
other, and the subject as it is the primary “space” of the chora. But, it is “unnamable,
improbable, hybrid, anterior to naming, to the One, to the father, and consequently, maternally

Signifiance or meaning: Kristeva uses this term to refer to operations that are both fluid and archaic. “It refers to
the work performed in language (through the heterogeneous articulation of semiotic and symbolic dispositions) that
enables a text to signify what representative and communicative speech does not say” (DL, translator’s note, 18).
10
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connoted to such an extent that it merits “not even the rank of syllable”” (DL 133, citing the
Timeus).
Kristeva advises, though, that we must be careful to make a distinction between the
provisional, uncertain articulation of the chora and the descriptive phenomenological, spatial,
and temporal intuition. Namely, there is a distinction between the theoretical or ‘symbolic’
representation of a chora, which we would see as ‘evidence’ of the chora, and the semiotic chora
which precedes any ‘evidence.’ As Kristeva notes, “the chora precedes and underlies figuration
and thus specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm” (RPL 36). The chora
“shows up” for us through the constraints on the body by the family and social structures, and
thus, is ordered through such socio-historical and natural constraints (RPL 36). These social
constraints are always already symbolic, however, as Kristeva notes, not according to law but
through an objective ordering (RPL 36).
The theoretical is a mode of this constraint which involves symbolic structures of
verisimilitude, spatiality, and temporality. That is, we make a connection to the semiotic marked
out by nonverbal rhythms, etc. and yet speak of it through linguistic forms of temporality and
spatiality, for instance. To put it abruptly, we ‘see’ the marks of kinetic, chromatic, phonic
energies at the semiotic stage, which are ordered through a social, temporal space. This is what,
for us, provides ‘evidence’ of the chora. Kristeva writes, “Though deprived of unity, identity, or
deity, the chora is nevertheless subject to a regulating process, which is different from that of
symbolic law but nevertheless effectuates discontinuities by temporarily articulating them and
then starting over, again and again” (RPL 26). However, to reiterate, this ‘evidence’ is in the
organization of structures of temporality and spatiality, in which case, the totality of the drives as
motility, rhythms, etc., precede this ‘evidence.’ The totality of drives and their stases as motility
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are a mode of signifiance, in the sense that the semiotic chora ‘articulates;’ yet, the semiotic is
not reducible to such structures, and moreover, it is not organized according to law (the
symbolic). The distinction here is that signifiance, and further still language, is always
structured in that it is a function of its context and grounded in a given set of elements.
However, what is not presupposed are given laws which govern the semiotic. That is, the
semiotic is able to articulate and communicate without the grammatical ordering of the Law of
the Father.
Even so, the semiotic chora is necessary for the acquisition of language. As a knowing
subject, the semiotic process is constitutive of the subject insofar as it functions within the
signifying process (RPL 38). That is to say, the semiotic processes are always already in
operation within the socialized body of the subject. The symbolic signifiance is created under
explicit socio-historical relations simultaneously with the signifying process of the semiotic,
which constitutes the subject. The subject, not being reducible to the chora or symbolic alone, is
constituted both within the semiotic and symbolic realms. The drives connect and orient the
body to the mother. “The mother’s body,” Kristeva explains, “is therefore what mediates the
symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic
chora, which is on the path of destruction, aggressively, and death” (RPL 37). Kristeva is
referring to the death drive, which for Freud is the most instinctual drive. She explains that the
drives “are always already ambiguous, simultaneously assimilating and destructive” (RPL 37).
There are what we could call dueling “positive” and “negative” motilities which ultimately lead
to a “destructive wave.” She writes, “In this way, the term “drive” denotes waves of attack
against stases, which are themselves constituted by the repetition of these charges; together,
charges and stases lead to no identity (not even that of the “body proper”) that could be seen as a
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result of their functioning” (RPL 37). The chora, then, is where the subject is both created and
annihilated: “the semiotic chora is no more than the place where the subject is both generated
and negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that
produce him. We shall call this process of charges and stases a negativity to distinguish it from
negation, which is the act of a judging subject” (RPL 37). (This echoes the distinction between
negation and negativity that Malabou makes in regard to the accident; see Chapter 3, pg. #).
The drives and their stases as motility are ruptures in the body in the sense that the body
is never static, but moves as semiotic rhythms, phonatory rhythms, gestural, acoustic, tactile,
motor, visual devices, etc. (BH 53; BS 62). If we think of how sound disrupts silence, so long as
sound persists, the silence is continuously ruptured. Kristeva notes that the semiotized body is
constant rupture, not a lack, but a continuum “that connect[s] zones of the fragmented body to
each other and also to “external” “objects” and “subjects,” which are not yet constituted as such”
(RPL 38). We think of the unconscious as a gap in the symbolic order; we can also think of the
chora as a “permanent scission” (RPL 37).
The unconscious emerges as there is a gap in the symbolic, that is, an absence points to a
presence. But, with the chora, it is not the absence which points to ‘something,’ it is a presence:
something shows itself in the cut—“a nonassimilable alien, a monster, a tumor, a cancer that the
listening devices of the unconscious do not hear” (PH 11). With that, Kristeva notes, “We are no
longer within the sphere of the unconscious but at the limit of primal repression that,
nevertheless, has discovered an intrinsically and already signifying brand, symptom, and sign:
repugnance, disgust, abjection. There is an effervescence of object and sign—not of desire but
of intolerable significance; they tumble over into non-sense or the impossible real, but they
appear even so in spite of “myself” (which is not) as abject” (PH 11). Object and sign do not
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emerge because there is a desire for an object, an Other; rather, before the subject can
unconsciously thrust the desire for an object deep into the void of the unconscious, there is the
ability “to divide, reject, repeat” (PH 12). Primal repression, though, is not like repression in the
sense of rejection, as noted by Malabou: “the only possibility of being that such and such an
object has when it is judged harmful or bad by the ego is that of being expelled from being. Not
reduced to non-being, but well and truly thrown out of being. Excluded from the register of
beings. In this sense the repressed or denied is ontological spit. A rejection from presence” (OA
81). There is a presence which the body wants to expel, spit out, an aspect of being itself, as it is
there within its presence—it is part of the being. In the case of repression, for there to be
something to reject and spit out, there must be a formed ego. However, the stage of primary
repression is before any formation of the ego, of the being which will decisively, though
unconsciously, reject and spit. It is not the ego which is repulsed and negates some aspect of its
being; it is the body, which in rejecting itself, is a negativity.

4. The Revolt of Being

The repulsion “appears” to the body in primordial repression as somatic symptom. The
symptom is the language of the body, a structure within the body which is “outside the paths of
desire” (PH 12). As discussed in Chapter One, Lacan states that the “symptom is a
metaphor…just as desire is metonymy” (E 439). The symptom is “a metaphor in which flesh or
function is taken as a signifying chain” (E 431). In metaphor there is an immediate association
of the signifier (acoustic image) as signified (concept). This signification is “inaccessible to the
conscious subject;” that is to say, the symptom signifies without any mental operation required.
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It is a substitution through relations of similarity. Metonym, Lacan points out, is an exchange of
name, a relation of material to object, or container to contents. It is when the symptom correlates
to a geometrical part of the body that allows one to assign it a cause, and thus, establish a
signifier (acoustic image) to signified (concept) relation. A mental operation is required to
establish the relation and meaning of the metonym. This is how we can understand that the
abject emerges as symptom (metaphor) and not as desire (metonym). With the abject, though,
there is no distinction between the container and contents or the material to object; the material is
that of the flesh, the content and container are flesh. In the case of the abject, the symptom does
not correspond to any geometrical part of the body. Kristeva explains, “In the symptom, the
abject permeates me. I become abject” (PH 11).
This is not to say that the abject permeates the body in the sense that the body absorbs or
interiorizes the abject. Rather, as Malabou notes of the accident, it “is in no way interiorized by
the victim, it remains foreign to the fate of the psyche and is not integrated into the history of the
individual. The individual does not reject the trauma outside his- of herself and has not desire in
relation to it, wants neither to eat nor to vomit it” (OA 81). The body is “always already haunted
by the Other,”—the symptom—a foreigner in the body alerting us to an alien presence. It is the
revolt of being that alerts us of its presence.
This might seem to be at tension when we speak of how the body keeps the score in the
case of trauma. On the one hand, the body keeps the score and the abject permeates the body to
the point that the being becomes the abject. On the other hand, the accident is in no way
“interiorized” in the body, as Malabou puts it, as the body revolts against the abject. To clarify,
first, we can say that what Kristeva means when she says it permeates the body is that there is no
distinct ‘location’ of the abject; there is no topology or geography. The abject permeates being
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to the point that the subject becomes the revolt of being—the body is repulsed by its own
existence, gagging, hurling, straining to vomit out its own repugnance, its own ability to “divide,
reject, repeat,” left dry-heaving, incessantly. And second, the body records the presence of an
alien Other. To revolt there must be a suppressor, an aggressor. Outside of any desire, the body
records the presence of the aggressor. There is no Stockholm syndrome in the case of the abject
and its relation to the body, assimilating the captor’s desire so that it is the same as the hostage’s.
There is no break in the abuse which is then identified as the captor’s kindness. The traumatic
bonding of the aggressor and the hostage never takes place in the sense that there is no reward,
only punishment. The body is both aggressor and hostage at the same time; there is no liberator
to allow the individual to flee trauma.
In addition to somatic symptom, the abject is manifested in the body through sublimation.
According to Kristeva, sublimation “is nothing else than the possibility of naming the prenominal, the pre-objectal, which are in fact only trans-nominal, a trans-objectal” (PH 11). The
sublime is trans-objectal in the sense that it transcends objectification and naming. It is not preobjectal in the sense of coming to be before the subject forms the distinction between self and
object at the stage of primal repression. Rather, the sublime can be thought of as pre-objectal as
it is an immediate experience of the flesh. Within the sublime moment, Kristeva describes,
“there is a cluster of meaning, of colors, of words, of caresses, there are light touches, scents,
sighs, cadences that arise, shroud me, carry me away, and sweep me beyond the things that I see,
or think” (PH 12). All of these touches of the world bring the subject back to where all that is
known is communicated through touch—the pre-objectal, pre-subjectal, pre-nominal body of the
mother. Kristeva writes, “The “sublime” object dissolves in the raptures of a bottomless
memory. It is such a memory, which, from stopping point to stopping point, remembrance to
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remembrance, love to love, transfers that object to the refulgent point of dazzlement in which I
stray in order to be. As soon as I perceive it, as soon as I name it, the sublime triggers—it has
always already triggered—a spree of perceptions and words that expands memory boundlessly. I
then forget the point of departure and find myself removed to a secondary universe, set off from
the one where “I” am—delight and loss.” (PH 12). In this sense we consider the sublime
experience as transcendent of the self and world, but in the sense that the self is immersed in the
world such that the distinction is dissolved and there is a loss of self.
Physical pain edges on the sublime in a similar way: the subject’s world is consumed by
the pain, all sense of the agential self and other are obliterated, the world and objects dissolve,
language is annihilated, and the self is removed to another ‘universe.’ Both cases are exceptional
states. With pain, the individual is carried off, though not in delight. And yet, with pain there is
always a supplemental, most subtle, momentary, exhilarating, sublime delight—at the moment of
its release. The self returns, the world is present again, and the body sighs a breath in relief, no
longer in pain, no longer other-worldly.
Abjection is far more malicious, though. “Abjection,” Kristeva writes, “is immoral,
sinister scheming and shady: a terror that dissembles, a hatred that smiles, a passion that uses the
body for barter instead of inflaming it, a debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs you. …”
(PH 4). There is delight in being swept up in the sublime, delight in being released of pain, but,
the abject is beyond the pleasure principle. The sublime and release of pain are what we could
call negative pleasures; that is, pleasure is obtained with loss or absence. This loss or absence
can be imagined and then sought after due to the temporal structure of the events. One is aware
of the experience pre-, during, and post- encounter with the sublime. Likewise, an individual
knows of the relief of pain as they are aware of what it feels like to not be in pain; pain manifests
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because there is such a feeling of relief. The temporal structure, then, allows for the loss of
absence to show up as an object of desire, despite it being a lack.
With the abject, though, the body does not revolt in seeking pleasure—the abject has no
object. With trauma, the revolt of being has no purpose or use similar to what we can say of
physical pain, but, unlike with pain, there is no release. It is not as though the body sighs in
relief with the secession of the immediate traumatic memory fragments. The body perpetually
desires the exhilarating, sublime delight of relief—the object a. For this reason, Kristeva states:

Jouissance alone causes the abject to exist as such. One does not know it, one
does not desire it, one joys in it. Violently and painfully. A passion, as in
jouissance where the object of desire, known as object a, bursts with the shattered
mirror where the ego gives up its image in order to contemplate itself in the Other,
there is nothing either objective or objectal to the abject. It is simply a frontier, a
repulsive gift that the Other, having become alter ego, drops so that “I” does not
disappear in it but finds, in that sublime alienation, a forfeited existence. Hence a
jouissance in which the subject is swallowed up but in which the Other, in return,
keeps the subject from foundering by making it repugnant. One thus understands
why so many victims of the abject are its fascinated victims—if not its submissive
and willing ones. (PH 9)

Rather than release, there is jouissance: the incessant attempt to transgress what is barring the
delightful release. This malicious jouissance is what makes trauma traumatic in the sense that
the individual experiences the desire, but it is a desire for a non-object, for an impossible
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‘object,’ one that cannot even be imagined—there is no “it could be otherwise.” And, given the
compulsive repetition of trauma, any sense of reprieve, by withdrawal of memory fragments or
forgetting, is always, incessantly interrupted. That is, specific to the traumatic experience is that
of repetition. Traumatic memory is traumatic because it repeats all the sensations that the being
revolts against—it brings that “No!” back to “Yes!” and “Once more!”
This is echoed by Zarathustra when, settling back into his cave, returning from teaching
the eternal return, he asks, “What does joy not want? It is thirstier, more cordial, hungrier, more
terrible, more secret than all woe; it wants itself, it bites into itself, the ring’s11 will strives in it; it
wants love, it wants hatred, it is overrich, gives, throws away, begs that one might take it, thanks
the taker, it would like to be hated; so rich is joy that it thirsts for woe, for hell, for hatred, for
disgrace, for the cripple, for world—this world, oh, you know it!” (TSZ 435). This is how we
are to understand Kristeva’s claim that jouissance is what causes the abject to exist as abject: joy
desires itself so much that it desires what causes it to be joy: woe, hell, hatred, disgrace, the
cripple (accident), the abject.
Thus, the abject has this element of repetition as Kristeva explains that, “the abject from
which he does not cease separating is for him, in short, a land of oblivion that is constantly
remembered. Once upon blotted-out time, the abject must have been a magnetized pole of
covetousness. But the ashes of oblivion now serve as a screen and reflect aversion, repugnance.
The clean and proper (in the sense of incorporated and incorporable) becomes filthy, the soughtafter turns into the banished, fascination into shame. Then, forgotten time crops up and
condenses into a flash of lightning an operation that, if it were thought out, would involve
bringing together two opposite terms but, on account of that flash, is discharged like thunder.

11

The eternal ring of the eternal return.
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The time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion and thunder, of veiled infinity and the
moment when revelation bursts forth” (PH 8-9). Memory becomes filthy, banished in the
conscious, condensed into bodily memory fragments that can strike by chance. It is both a
matter of forgetfulness but also there is always a storm brewing, just below the surface of the
skin, an ominous thunder sounding—it is always present—a heavy, dark promise of memory.

5. Living-Death

“What death unmasks was never more than a mask; to discover the grin of the skeleton, one need
only lift off something that was neither beauty nor truth, but only a plaster and tinsel face.” –
Foucault, The History of Madness

It is chance which heightens the abject: that we should stumble upon it by chance, by accident.
Kristeva describes the significance of chance in regard to the abject with the image of the corpse,
the upmost of abjection:

The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably come a
cropper, a cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently the one who
confronts it as fragile and fallacious chance. A wound with blood and pus, or the
sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does not signify death. In the presence of
signified death—a flat encephalograph, for instance—I would understand, react,
or accept. No, as in true theater, without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses
show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body fluids, this
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defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the
part of death. (PH 3)

The corpse shows death not through a cognitive process of recognition, rather, it is an immediate,
semiotic, ‘felt’ knowing. There is nothing like the smell of decay, even before we see the image
of the corpse, we recognize death is present and when present, the altogether lack of rhythmic
movements of breath and heartbeat signify death. If we anticipate the corpse, we go through a
process of meaning-giving—they died because of some scientifically explained phenomenon or
through a god’s will—which puts the immediate experience at somewhat of a distance. A filter
is placed over the image, though the smell pushes through. That immediate encounter with the
corpse is beyond uncanny. Kristeva writes, “In that compelling, raw, insolent thing in the
morgue’s full sunlight, in that thing that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies
anything, I behold the breaking down of a world that has erased its borders: fainting away. The
corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the upmost of abjection. It is death infecting
life. Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not
protect oneself as from an object” (PH 4). Next to the corpse, in the raw sunlit room, one
experiences that embodied feeling of being alive at the most living point: not this, not me.
Kristeva writes, “The abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to
I. If the object, however, through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a desire
for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it,
what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward
the place where meaning collapses” (PH 2). Desire for the meaning of the object is coexistentially a desire to know what is in opposition to, or other than, the object: the I. The abject,
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though, is contrary because the revolt of being draws one into a world of obscurity and
nonmeaning. Kristeva states that, “abjection is above all ambiguity” (PH 9). This ambiguity is
registered in the body. “On the one hand,” Kristeva explains, “objects and signifiers, denied to
the extent that they are identified with life, assume the value of nonmeaning: language and life
have no meaning” (BS 51-52). Objects and signifiers are what represent life, existence, but, in
the abjection of self, being revolts against its own being. Language has no meaning in the sense
that it cannot possibly capture the abject. Moreover, the abject is the world of disorientation and
ambiguity. The significance of objects and language moves to a zero point—nothing in the
abject experience reflects language and life—it is a living death.
In trauma the subject is like a corpse: death-in-life. What has provided meaning and a
sense of self decays like the organs in the body, still within the confines of the outer structure,
encased by skin and skeleton. Though there are no apparent cuts or lesions, the flesh is wounded
in the sense that it now bears that unbearable cut, “the in-between, the ambiguous, the
composite” of the abject (PH 4). “I live a living death,” Kristeva states, “my flesh is wounded,
bleeding, cadaverized, my rhythm slowed down or interrupted, time has been erased or bloated,
absorbed into sorrow… Absent from other people’s meaning, alien, accidental…” (BS 4).

6. The Coatlicue State

“How can I be without border?” (BS 4)

Just as the corpse disturbs the living, Kristeva states that the abject is “what disturbs identity,
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules” (PH 4). This world of revolt, of
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dissolving borders, is the Coatlicue state. Coatlicue is both the creator and destroyer of life
within Aztec mythology. She is a flesh eating goddess, the devouring mother feeding on
corpses. Gloria Anzaldúa, in Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, describes the
Coatlicue State as the distinct experience of living on the borderlands—that of the mestiza, the
mixed identity. Anzaldúa specifically speaks of her own mixed Chicana identity, which she
names the mestiza, and describes how living between the various cultures is disorienting. She
uses the imagery of Coatlicue, the serpent goddess, to illustrate this particular lived-experience.
The composite of animals and body parts are brought together such that, “The image of the
goddess Coatlicue represents the “life-in-death” and the “death-in-life.” Anzaldúa states that
Coatlicue represents “duality in life, a synthesis of duality, and a third perspective—something
more than mere duality or a synthesis of duality” (BF 68-69). Twin rattlesnakes face off in place
of Coatlicue’s severed head. She wears a necklace of human hands, hearts, and a skull. Her
chest is deflated from giving birth. Her feet are eagle talons, able to dig graves. The hearts on
her necklace perhaps represent the taking of lives through the practice of sacrifice. The skulls of
the necklace and on the belt suggest life and death as one process.
Anzaldúa associates the Coatlicue state with images of a gap and cracks in the earth,
cracks called Nepantla, which is the Nahuatl word for “the space between two bodies of water,
the space between two worlds” (BF 237). Anzaldúa explains that in a constant state of mental
nepantilism, an Aztec word meaning “torn between ways,” this experience of being manifests as
paralysis: “Petrified, she can’t respond, her fate caught between los intersticios, the spaces
between the different worlds she inhabits” (BF 43). From her personal experience as a mestiza,
Anzaldúa explains, “My resistance, my refusal to know some truth about myself brings on that
paralysis, depression—brings on the Coatlicue state. At first I feel exposed and opened to the
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depth of my dissatisfaction. Then I feel myself closing, hiding, holding myself together rather
than allowing myself to fall apart” (BF 70). The refusal to know some truth about the self, a
revolt to being, brings on paralysis in the sense that the individual embodies a sense in which all
is construct: world, meaning, objects, the self. If everything is a construct, then that means
nothing is absolute, except death. Any sense of identity or orientation in the familiar is an
illusion—all truth is illusion. This is the realm of the abject: the chasm between the body of the
mother and the child, the permanent scission of semiotic and symbolic. The image of the
primordial earth goddess symbolizes the world of ambiguity. The separation from the mother’s
body creates an embodied ambiguity as the child is thrown into a world of disorientation.
Before, all was known through touch, but now the child is “torn between ways,” within the
“space between two worlds.”
Likewise, the depressed are torn between ways. Kristeva notes that the depressed
individual is aware of how her mood and depression are constitutive of the ‘self’, yet the ‘self’ is
resistant to speaking about their experience (BS 46). This does not suggest that the abject has no
signifying process, just that, in the case of the depressed for instance, meaning appears to be
arbitrary, alien, secondary, and a “will to mastery” (BS 43). That is to say, “The depressed speak
of nothing, they have nothing to speak of…they are without objects” (BS 51). Depression is not
a depression for or depression of. It is objectless just like physical pain and abjection. There is
no reason, no purpose. Being depressed does not resolve anything. Further, it cannot be
measured. Any elaborations “seem trivializations, a missing of the point, a missing of the pain.”
Despite this, though, we are still driven to make meaning of it. But, with abjection, the
affect and primary semiotic processes come into conflict with the linguistic order and symbolic
constructs. Kristeva notes that for depressed persons, they do not forget how to use signs in
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speaking; even though signs do have signification, they are experienced as empty (BS 52). And
“without a sign,” Kristeva states, the abject “beseeches a discharge, a conclusion, a crying out
(PH 2). Kristeva writes, “…lacking the filter of language, I cannot inscribe my violence in “no,”
nor any other sign. I can expel it only by means of gestures, spasms, or shouts” (BS 15).
We speak not for the sake of ourselves, not for the sake of truth, meaning, or a will for
mastery—none of this is present in the abject. If we do speak, we speak for the sake of the
Other. Desire for knowledge is on the part of the Other, not the individual who experiences
abject trauma. Kristeva explains, “It is not the white expanse or slack boredom of repression, not
the translations and transformations of desire that wrench bodies, nights, and discourse; rather it
is a brutish suffering that “I” puts up with, sublime and devastated, for “I” deposits it to the
father’s account: I endure it, for I imagine that such is the desire of the other. A massive and
sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have been in a opaque and
forgotten life now harries me as radically separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not
nothing, either. A “something” that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of meaninglessness,
about which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of nonexistence
and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me” (PH 2). The fashioning
of the “I” is meaningless, trivial, alien. This accounts for the phenomenological experience of a
disassociation of the self and numbness towards the world, as described by Malabou.
Why speak when anything I utter does not communicate the experience, and in fact,
betrays its immediate, raw, most living moment? Why speak when in speaking I beckon the
abject, held in abeyance, suspended in every word? Why speak when objects and signifiers,
meant to identify with life, do not identify with what I know?—that unbearable knowledge.
Why add the violence of language to the violence of the abject? The “I” annihilates the
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individual in the sense that their identity is subsumed under the sign. Yet, the sign of “I” stands
in for impossibility: a living-corpse, an impossible being, flight identity, being revolting against
being. And then to put content to that “I,” such as “it feels as though I am…,” disturbs identity,
creates more ambiguity. Anzaldúa states that when facing what is behind Coatlicue’s eyes,
“getting too close to the mouth of the abyss. She is teetering on the edge, trying to balance while
she makes up her mind whether to jump in or to find a sager way down. That’s why she makes
herself sick—to postpone having to jump blindfolded into the abyss of her own being and there
in the depths confront her face, the face underneath the mask” (BF 96). Yet, Anzaldúa writes,
“When I reach bottom, something forces me to push up, walk toward the mirror, and confront the
face in the mirror. But I dig in my heels and resist. I don’t want to see what’s behind
Coatlicue’s eyes, her hollow sockets” (BF 70).
Kristeva explains that, “on account of splitting, an intense, extravagant value is
attributed…to the unsignifiable” (BS 51-52). Anzaldúa recognizes this as well:

Fear develops the proximity sense aspect of la facultad.12 But there is a deeper
sensing that is another aspect of this faculty. It is anything that breaks into one’s
everyday mode of perception, that causes a break in one’s defenses and resistance,
anything that takes one from one’s habitual grounding, causes the depths to open
up, causes a shift in perception. This shift in perception deepens the way we see
concrete objects and people’ the senses become so acute and piercing that we can
see through things, view events in depth, a piercing that reaches the underworld

Though “la facultad” translates as “the faculty” in Spanish, it is apparent from the way that Anzaldúa describes
and utilizes the term, that she intends a different, specific meaning. Part of this significance is captured in how she
uses the definite article “the,” rather than the indefinite “a.”
12
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(the realm of the soul). As we plunge vertically, the break, with its accompanying
new seeing, makes us pay attention to the soul and we are thus carried into
awareness—an experiencing of soul (Self). (BF 61)

Attention to the phenomenon of fragmented selves, ambiguity, and fear allow us to “have access
to other worlds through the cracks” (BF 237). It is not a cognitive recognition of the ambiguity
of meaning and identity. Any cognitive recognition of a world of nonmeaning is executed
through linguistic structure and the symbolic which is negated in the very process.
The Coatlique state, on the other hand, is an embodied knowledge of ambiguity and
nonmeaning. Nonmeaning, in this sense, does not suggest that there is no meaning or nothing, a
complete absence of signifiance. With this embodied knowledge, meaning can be experienced
as insignificant, superficial, arbitrary, and empty. But, the Coatlique state also affords the ‘self’
recognition that meaning is multitudinous, abundant, boundless, and crosses borders. Anzaldúa
explains that, “Every increment of consciousness, every step forward is a travesía, a crossing. I
am an alien in new territory. And again, and again. But if I escape conscious awareness, escape
“knowing,” I won’t be moving. Knowledge makes me more aware, it makes me more
conscious” (BF 70).
This bodily awareness of ambiguity is a distinct embodied knowledge specific to trauma.
Anzaldúa explains that, “There is a prejudice and a fear of the dark, chthonic (underworld),
material such as depression, illness, death and the violations that can bring on this break.
Confronting anything that tears the fabric of our everyday mode of consciousness and that thrusts
us into a less literal and more psychic sense of reality increases awareness and la facultad” (BF
61). Anzaldúa describes la facultad as “the capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of
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deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface. It is an instant “sensing,” a quick
perception arrived at without conscious reasoning. It is an acute awareness mediated by the part
of the psyche that does not speak, that communicates in images and symbols which are the faces
of feelings, that is, behind which feelings reside/hide. The one possessing this sensitivity is
excruciatingly alive to the world” (BF 60).
That abject feeling of being alive: one never feels as alive as when they feel living-death.
It is the “unbearable weight of being;”13 the weightiness of meaninglessness feels as though the
individual is dragging a corpse around, making it go through the movements of life, trying to
animate the corpse, the paralyzed body. As noted before, the abject reaches its peak strength
when it is confronted by language (interfaced with language, violated by language). There is a
drive for meaning formation but at the same time a resistance to this because in order to create
meaning, one has to confront what is behind Coatlicue’s hollow sockets. Anzaldúa notes that
““Knowing” is painful because after “it” happens I can’t stay in the same place and be
comfortable. I am no longer the same person I was before” (BF 70). It is the unbearable
knowledge of trauma and the abject.
To attempt meaning formation, we do so with the language of the father—the symbolic—
at the expense of the language of the mother—the semiotic. The experience is pressed to be put
into comprehensible language in which “The sign represses the chora and its eternal return” (PH
14). This is problematic in that the individual is “situated at the precise point at which meaning
is produced in nonmeaning” (E 423). To produce meaning outside of the body, in language, one
does so as a betrayal to this embodied knowledge of ambiguity.

13

To modify Milan Kundera’s expression.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE MOVING BODY OF METAPHOR

The intertwining of the symbolic order and semiotic processes is reflected in Nietzsche’s
description of the dueling drives of the will to truth and will to illusion. According to Nietzsche,
a pervasive multitude of drives, desires, and instincts wills ‘things’ into existence. Nietzsche
contends that this will reaches its highest echelon in humans (TL 54). He grounds the will in
suffering. The will to manifests because, as Nietzsche explains, “something was lacking, that
man surrounded by a fearful void … He did not know how to justify, to account for, to affirm
himself; he suffered from the problem of his meaning. He also suffered otherwise, he was in the
main a sickly animal: but his problem was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the
crying question, “why do I suffer?” (GM 598). The question of suffering and its apparent answer
of meaninglessness drives us to make meaning out of our condition. In turn, Nietzsche states,
“man was saved thereby, he possessed a meaning, he was henceforth no longer like a leaf in the
wind, a plaything of nonsense—the “sense-less”—he could not will something; no matter at first
to what end, why, with what he willed: the will itself was saved” (GM 598). This is not to say
that the will to truth and the will to illusion are cognitive, agential processes, though. Rather, the
will permeates consciousness and the unconscious, and we are continuously compelled by it.
This will is an attempt to master over life—the uncertain, strange, frightful, and
ambiguous—in which there are distinct styles. The will to truth is the vertical driving force
behind scientific knowledge as it is a will to have “inextinguishable, ever-present, unforgettable,
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“fixed,”” concepts as a way to order the world (GM 497). It is the condition for “foresight,
prudence, regularity,” with concepts and abstractions which satisfy a longing for certainty (TL
60). Such ‘truth’ allows for one to predict, explain, and control the world. As opposed to
preserving codified constructs for understanding the world, the will to illusion is an artistic drive
which creates and destroys, throws things into confusion, and disregards the vertical drive for
certainty. It is the drive for the creation of art, poetry, fiction, music, and dance.
Although Nietzsche makes a distinction here, the two drives are not so easily isolated.
This is because the material of Truth14 is what is illusory—this illusion being that there is such a
stopping point, in which one reaches and knows the Truth. The will to truth is not truth itself,
but rather, “that which shall count as ‘truth’” (TL 54). It is a continuous drive, and being that it
is a kinetic process, there is no stopping point. Also, the truth drive does not create or invent
‘truths’ so much as it establishes that there is truth, a truth which coincides with a given reality.
Yet, what is already assumed is that there is such a thing as a unified, identifiable, intelligible
Truth. It is this will which invents such a distinction as opposed to the Truth being out there, to
be discovered, grasped, tested, and documented. Nietzsche notes that the will to truth is not the
creator of religions, metaphysics, and convictions, all of which assert a ‘truth of the world,’ but
that which preserves such truths (GS 181). The ‘creator’ of such systems is the artistic drive, a
fundamental human drive of metaphor formation, which erects and forms religions, metaphysics,
convictions, etc., all of which are illusory and fictitious, according to Nietzsche.
Truth is a product of the dueling drives; produced by one, preserved by the other. If we
are going to assert a truth, then there is also an implication that there can be a falsity, a lie. “The

I capitalize “truth” to represent scientific knowledge, a singular, uncontestable system of knowledge-law, for
instance, laws of nature. This is to distinguish it from the element of truth that appears within embodied knowledge:
a certain but ambiguous truth of the body, something like physical pain, in which there can be multiple ‘truths.’
14
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liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is
unreal appear to be real” (TL 54). (This is why the will to illusion is sometimes referred to as the
will to deception). Truth and lie, then, are nothing other than language. Nietzsche describes
‘truth’ as “A moveable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum
of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and
embellished, and which after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding.
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become
worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are
now considered as metal and no longer as coins” (TL 56 ). The will to truth and language are
intimately connected. To establish what will count as truth, “a uniformly valid and binding
designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first
laws of truth” (TL 54). What comes to be known as truth is nothing other than metaphors and
metonyms, hardened and fixed as concepts, preserved for generations, thus seeming absolute and
necessary.

1. Mapping Metaphor

Metaphor formation is a process of moving from one metaphorical sphere to another. This
process produces a stratification between truth and knowledge. Nietzsche makes such a
distinction as he describes the process: “The ‘thing in itself’ (which is precisely what the pure
truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite
incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for.
This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he
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lays hold of the boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image:
first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there
is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different
one” (TL 55). Note that this is not an overlapping, but an overleaping.
We can understand this process by referring back to the Lacanian ‘real.’ Nietzsche grants
that the ‘thing in itself’ is incomprehensible within language which is suggestive of how the
tuché is a disruption in the symbolic order, a gap. In the immediate, raw encounter with the
‘real,’ there is no process of reflection by which one can determine the consequences. Such
consequences are only observed retroactively. Any recognition of the tuché is metaphorical as
the very notion and language of “tuché” stands in for what is no longer available as an immediate
experience. Thus, the sphere of the tuché and the symbolic order never overlap.
This is also indicative of how Lacan asserts that the symptom is metaphor and desire is
metonymy (E 439). As noted in Chapter 1, Lacan states, “Metaphor’s two-stage mechanism is
the very mechanism by which symptoms, in the analytic sense, are determined. Between the
enigmatic signifier of sexual trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying
chain, a spark flies that fixes a symptom—a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a
signifying element—the signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious subject, by which the
symptom may be dissolved” (E 431). In metaphor formation, “an effect of signification is
produced that is creative or poetic, in other words, which is the advent of the signification in
question” (E 431). The first metaphor is generated through transference of an immediate nerve
stimulus, the symptom—spark of flesh—to an image, which is perceived in place of the nerve
stimulus. A second metaphor is created when the image is then imitated in sound, such as
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through phonatory rhythms, gestural, and acoustic semiotic processes, music and speech. The
word is thus an image coinciding with sound, or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, an ‘acoustic-image.’
It is here that we see Lacan’s signification of the sign, in which he emphasizes primacy of
the signifier over the signified. In language, we encounter the word as acoustic metaphor, then
associate sound with image, and then image with object, though not in such a linear, cognitive,
calculative process. Accordingly, Nietzsche states, “Every word instantly becomes a concept
precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual
original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it
simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases – which means, purely and simply,
cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal” (TL 55). Nietzsche uses the example
of a leaf to make this point:

Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain
that the concept ‘leaf’ is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual
differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea
that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the ‘leaf’; the original model
according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured,
colored, curled, and painted – but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has
turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model.
(TL 55-56)

Yet, what is lost in metaphorical formation is the original nerve stimulus; that is why it is
unavailable to the conscious subject and escapes our grasp.
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In the genesis of a concept, there is a transition from one sphere to another, each able to
serve as a metaphor for the other. The image and the word are not equivalent; rather, “each time
there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and
different one” (TL 55). To say that any ‘thing’ exists in terms of “it is X,” is to privilege one
metaphorical sphere, to make a “dogmatic assertion,” and to arbitrarily ascribe a sign. Nietzsche
notes that, “the further inference from the nerve stimulus to a cause outside of us is already the
result of a false and unjustifiable application of the principle of sufficient reason. If truth alone
had been the deciding factor in the genesis of language, and if the standpoint of certainty had
been decisive for designations, then how could we still dare to stay ‘the stone is hard,’ as if
‘hard’ were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation!”
(TL 55).
What we take to be truth, in any discourse, is a scaffolding of condensed concepts
generated through a genealogy of metaphorical activity. Nietzsche states that, “The concept –
which is as bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die – is nevertheless merely the residue of
metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus
into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept” (TL 57). When
describing concepts, Nietzsche uses imagery of cooler, lifeless structures, whereby their meaning
is only significant if tied to a given context. For example, if we take the notion of a transposable
die in the quotation above, it is a cube with numerated sides, in which the significance and value
depends on how it is played in the game (always with an element of chance). The concept is
transposable in this way, which suggests, as Merleau-Ponty claims, “language is equally
uncommunicative of anything other than itself [;] … its meaning is inseparable from it. We
need, then, to seek the first attempts at language in the emotional gesticulation whereby man
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superimposes on the given world the world according to man” (TPP 219). Yet, Nietzsche says,
“We believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees,
colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors
which correspond in no way to the original entities” (TL 55). This is why, despite how it may
seem from the quotation above, Nietzsche asserts that there is no ‘thing in itself,’—any such
‘thing’ is merely metaphor, constructed through language, in which an individual “forgets that
the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves” (TL
57). “Thus,” Nietzsche contends, “the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any
case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the
philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is at least not derived
from the essence of things” (TL 55). We can question: “Is language the adequate expression of
all realities?” (TL 54).

2. Sober Realists and Smock-less Artists

With this in mind, the presentation of ‘truth’ as a metaphorical process in which language is
arbitrary undermines any attempt of asserting binding, scientific knowledge. Some metaphors
are better fit to express experience. Accordingly, Nietzsche introduces two figures whose
strength is judged by how they relate to the conditions of life: the rational man and the man of
intuition. Both desire to rule over life. The rational man does so by regularity, fixation, and
preservation of concepts and Truth; whereas the man of intuition does so through the creative
activity of myth and art.
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In The Gay Science, Nietzsche denotes these two figures as “realists” and “creators.” He
calls out to the realists:

Ye sober beings, who feel yourselves armed against passion and fantasy and
would gladly make a pride and an ornament out of your emptiness, ye call
yourselves realists, and give to understand that the world is actually constituted as
it appears to you; before you along reality stands unveiled, and ye yourselves
would perhaps be the best part of it—oh, ye dear images of Sais! But are not ye
also in your unveiled condition still extremely passionate and dusky beings
compared with the fish, and still all too like an enamored artist? And what is
“reality” to an enamored artist? Ye still carry about with you the valuations of
things which had their origin in the passions and infatuations of earlier centuries!
There is still a secret and ineffaceable drunkenness embodied in your sobriety!
(GS 57).

The realists are ascetic, serious beings; they pride themselves on being devoid of passion and
fantasy (GS 57). Yet, despite their sobriety, realists still are “passionate…dusky” and are still
“like an enamored artist.” The language of passion and drunkenness, with the allusion to artistry,
is to suggest that the realists embody both the will to truth, in their pursuits of knowing the world
as it is actually constituted, and the artistic drive.
The man of intuition is also invested in this game of signifying reality, but, as Nietzsche
suggests, remains closer to the ‘site’ of metaphorical formation. Nietzsche uses examples of
painting and music to illustrate this point: “A painter without hands who wished to express in
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song the picture before his mind would, by means of this substitution of spheres, still reveal more
about the essence of things than does the empirical world” (TL 58). The illusion created through
sound sparks a nerve stimulus—it returns the individual back to the first and second metaphors.
Yet, there is always still an uncertain, manifold diversity and abundance which is indecipherable
and cannot be contained in any metaphorical sphere. Nietzsche uses the example of Chladni’s
sound figures to suggest this, in which sound vibrations are represented in nodal patterns in sand.
The metaphor shows that while the figure would seem to show the formal structure of sound, it
cannot express what sound is—it is not the same as encountering sound. For one, it is perceived
with a different part of the body. Chlandni’s sound figures are viewed with the eyes rather than
heard with the ears. The visual metaphor of the sound figures cannot possibly express the direct,
immediate experience of sound.
However, the meaning of the music or the painting cannot be separated from the medium.
We are reminded of how the significance of the painting is only experienced in the direct,
immediate encounter—one must be present before it, and any interpretation is a multiplication of
the artist. Merleau-Ponty echoes that, “The musical meaning of a sonata is inseparable from the
sounds which are its vehicle: before we have heard it no analysis enables us to anticipate it; once
the performance is over, we shall, in our intellectual analyses of the music, be unable to do
anything but carry ourselves back to the moment of experiencing it.” With music, “…the notes
are not only the ‘signs’ of the sonata, but it is there through them, it enters into them. …The
meaning swallows up the signs…” (TPP 212). For music to make any sense, to have any
signification, to be supplemental to just noise, the relation of the notes, the signs, must be
maintained.
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However, Nietzsche notes that neither sphere causes the other or is necessary for the
other’s existence. He explains: “For between two absolutely different spheres, as between
subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an
aesthetic relation: I mean, a suggestive transference, stammering translation into a complete
foreign tongue – for which there is required, in any case, a freely inventive intermediate sphere
and mediating force” (TL 58). Likewise, Lacan states that the, “metaphor’s creative spark does
not spring forth from the juxtaposition of two images, that is, of two equally actualized signifiers.
It flashes between two signifiers, one of which has replaced the other by taking the other’s place
in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present by virtue of its (metonymic)
connection to the rest of the chain” (E 422). The musical meaning of the sonata, though
inseparable from the notes (signs), is an aesthetic relation—an anthropomorphism. The sounds
created through the condensation of breath, material, and rhythm are ‘articulated’ through the
semiotic, rhythmic, kinetic, phonemic stage.
Aesthetic expression, whether in music, painting, or writing, expresses existence, “a
remainder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin”
(TL 55). Merleau-Ponty explains that, “Aesthetic expression confers on what it expresses an
existence in itself, installs it in nature as a thing perceived and accessible to all, or conversely
plucks the signs themselves—the person of the actor, or the colors and canvas of the painter—
from their empirical existence and bears them off into another world” (TPP 212). An example is
Francis Bacon’s hollowed out sockets—the shapes and colors suggest the presence of a human
body. But to flash between the image in the painting and that of the human form, is an aesthetic
translation, in which we confer that meaning onto the canvas. But also, Bacon contends that the
painting, “has a life completely of its own. It lives on its own and therefore transfers the essence
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of the image more poignantly. So that the artist may be able to open up or rather, should I say,
unlock the valves of feeling and therefore return the onlooker to life more violently;” return the
onlooker to the original experience (FB 17).
We can also understand this point in reference to Malabou’s description of the accident
and Kristeva’s description of the abject. In both cases, the subject and object binary is produced
through language—a separate, distant process, removed from the immediate event. At the
moment of the accident, the subject is not present in the sense that the accident obliterates a
sense of ownership, agency, linear temporality, and historical narrative. The subject is
transformed to the point that it is unrecognizable, by going through a metamorphosis of nature.
With that, there is “the deserting of subjectivity, the distancing of the individual who becomes a
stranger to herself, who no longer recognizes anyone, who no longer recognizes herself, who no
longer remembers her self. These types of being impose a new form on their old form, without
mediation or transition or glue or accountability, today verses yesterday, in a state of emergency,
without foundation, bareback, sockless” (OA 6). Malabou argues, it is an, “Identity abandoned,
disassociated again, identity that does not reflect itself, does not live its own transformation, does
not subjectivize its change” (OA 11). Any mediation, transition, or glue is a secondary aesthetic
relation.
Metaphorical expressions such as ‘flight identity’ and ‘ontological refugee’ are
translations of this deserting of subjectivity, a way to paint the experience. Malabou creatively
invents such expressions in order to capture, as best as possible, the experience of the accident—
life at its most living moment, that “mysterious X” of the nerve stimulus. The imagery of a
bareback, sockless individual is a metaphorical “stammering translation” of the symptom. At the
moment of the accident, the individual is exposed, bare, lacking any cloak or covering protecting
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one from the elements, from the immediate environment, devoid of any human, linguistic
constructs that provide a foundation of meaning. The concept of ‘flight identity’ is metonymic
condensation of the repetition compulsion, the desire for flight, and the impossibility of flight.
To make sense of the metonym, then, a mental operation is always required in which the
connection between the signifier (S) and the second signifier (S¹) is re-established. During this
process, there is a lot of chance for reinterpretation, the same as with communicating the
meaning of the painting.

3. Necessity: An Aesthetic Relation

We may think that this transference, the relation of nerve stimulus to image, is necessary, but we
are accustomed to think this only because we think our concepts are necessary. Nietzsche
remarks,

We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its
relation to other laws of nature – which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of
relations. … All that we actually know about these laws of nature is what we
ourselves bring to them – time and space, and therefore relationships of
succession and number. But everything marvelous about the laws of nature,
everything that quite astonishes us therein and seems to demand our explanation,
everything that might lead us to trust idealism: all this is complete and solely
contained within the mathematical strictness and inviolability of our
representations of time and space. (TL 58-59)
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To have the result of the concept, there is a necessary transference from one metaphoric sphere
to the next. Because this process is necessary for the production of the concept, the result, it
appears as necessarily true. It is this mathematical formulation of cause and effect, or rather
effect and cause in this case, which produces for us a necessary connection. Nietzsche states
though that, “If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to
be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms. For they must all
bear within themselves the laws of number, and it is precisely number which is the most
astonishing in things. All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement
of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which we bring
to things. Thus it is we who impress ourselves in its way” (TL 59).
Further, “In conjunction with this it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor
formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus
occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new
conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of
these original forms. That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial,
and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor” (TL 59). What appears as absolutely
given in ‘nature’ is nothing other than our aesthetic relation to ‘nature,’ as it is also a human
construct.
What is familiar passes for necessary and is transposed everywhere through these
generalizations. Therefore, what counts as knowledge is what we are familiar with (GS 91). Yet,
“the hardening and congealing of a metaphor guarantees absolutely nothing concerning its
necessity and exclusive justification” (TL 58). Nietzsche claims that, “There is only a
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perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about
one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will
our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be” (GM 555). This suggests that a concept is
never complete as there are always more eyes coming into existence. Our concepts change with
the shifting eye. Nietzsche, likewise, tells us to be on guard against the “dangerous old
conceptual fiction… [because] these always demand that we should think of an eye that is
completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and
interpreting forces, through which along seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be
lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense” (GM 555). To privilege a
particular concept, is to privilege the ascetic ideal. “In a certain sense,” Nietzsche says, “the
whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present,
unforgettable, “fixed,” with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and intellectual system
with these “fixed ideas”—and ascetic procedures and modes of life are means of freeing these
ideas from the competition of all other ideas, so as to make them “unforgettable”” (GM 497).

4. Reality: Inherent Forgetting

Metaphorical activity at the level of the concept is the most dangerous because it arranges the
world without realizing the ongoing metaphorical activity. With hardened, condensed concepts
readily at our grasp, we no longer tolerate ‘sudden impressions.’ “Our eye,” Nietzsche explains,
“finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing once more an image
that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is different and new in an
impression” (BGE 295). We forget this aspect of life: that it is full, abundant, and diversified; it

178

cannot be captured in any one particular metaphorical sphere, and certainly not in a concept. It is
only by forgetting that we can possess any ‘truth’ in which only the result is preserved and the
process is hidden. Nietzsche explains that, “Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor
can one live with any repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the petrification and
coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the primal faculty of human
imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is
a truth in itself, in short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does
man live with any repose, security and consistency (TL 57). We forget the creative power of the
fundamental human drive for metaphoric formation, the anthropocentric center of any ‘truths,’
‘reality’, measurements, and evaluations—we forget that we are artists.
Metaphorical activity, in that it is a constantly flowing drive which breeds the conditions
for concept formation, is always already forgotten in the word, the concept, the drive for truth.
That is, the drive for truth maintains a forgetfulness of the process and genesis of the metaphor.
“Forgetting,” then, “is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in
the strictest sense positive faculty of repression, that is responsible for the fact that what we
experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it…” (GM 493).
Nietzsche adds,

But purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of
something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function; and the
entire history of a “thing,” an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous
sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even
have to be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and
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alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion. The “evolution” of a thing,
a custom, an organ is thus by no means its independent progressus toward a goal,
even less a logical progressus by the shortest route and with the smallest
expenditure of force—but a succession of more or less profound, more or less
mutually processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts
at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of
successful contractions. The form is fluid, but the “meaning” is even more so.”
(GM 514)

Specifically in the case of the concept ‘reality,’ a concept which preserves a certain type
of the ascetic ideal, maintains a forgetfulness of the process and genesis of the metaphor.
‘Reality’ is a metaphysical fiction and thus it is a supplement which is added to life. Nietzsche
explains that, “The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been lyingly
added” (TI 46). But, what is ironical here is that reality prohibits fiction: to assert a real world is
to deny any fictitious, creative process, in which it is merely produced. Nietzsche asks though,
“Why couldn’t the world that concerns us—be a fiction? (BGE 235). When Nietzsche asks the
realists, “And what is “reality” to an enamored artist?” the answer is that we forget: “Remove the
phantasm and the whole human element therefrom, ye sober ones! Yes, if ye could do that! If
ye could forget your origin, your past, your preparatory schooling—the whole history as man and
beast!” (GS 57).
In this case, the active force of forgetting is a stripping away, mummification,
preservation, and abstraction. Forgetting is a process of formation and deformation—transition
of the affirmation of life in its diversified plurality, to the will to nothingness and the ascetic
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ideal. Nietzsche states that, “this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming,
death, wishing, from longing itself—all this means—let us dare to grasp it—a will to
nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life;
but it is and remains a will! . . . And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man
would rather will nothingness than not will” (GM 598-599). The drive for meaning continues,
even if what we make of life, the meaning we provide, is ultimately an offense to life—lifenegating. The will to truth, then, can be understood as something like the death drive, “the task
of which is to lead organic life back into the inanimate state” (Freud, MP 380).
Along with this, we also negate the abundance of life and the fact that we cannot get at
the mysterious x. It is un-measurable and un-weighable, and yet we arbitrarily set up evaluations
and measurements because we value valuations. Likewise, we see ourselves as creatures that
measure, a “valuating animal as such,” “Setting prices, determining values, contriving
equivalences, exchanging” (GM 506). As Nietzsche points out,

The reputation, the name and appearance, the importance, the usual measure and
weight of things—each being in origin most frequently an error and arbitrariness
thrown over things like a garment, and quite alien to the essence and even to their
exteriors—have gradually, by the belief therein and its continuous growth from
generation to generation, grown as it were on-and-into things and become their
very body; the appearance at the very beginning becomes almost always the
essence in the end, and operates as the essence! (GS 58)
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He explains further, “In every feeling, in every sense-impression, there is a portion of this
old love: and similarly also some kind of fantasy, prejudice, irrationality, ignorance, fear,
and what else has become mingled and woven into it. There is that mountain! There is
that cloud! What is “real” in them?” (GS 57). The human element of metaphor
formation, the will to truth and illusion: “It is we, who think and feel, that actually and
unceasingly make something which did not before exist: the whole eternally increasing
world of valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, gradations, affirmations and negations.
This composition of ours is continually learnt, practices, and translated into flesh and
actuality, and even into the commonplace, by the so-called practical men (our actors, as
we have said)” (GS 57).
Thus, “An illusion, however, is his constant accompaniment all along: he thinks
he is placed as a spectator and auditor before the great pantomime and concert of life; he
calls his nature a contemplative nature, and thereby overlooks the fact that he himself is
also a real creator, and continuous poet of life” (GS 148). “But,” as Nietzsche points out,
“it is precisely this knowledge that we lack, and when we get hold of it for a moment we
have forgotten it the next…” (GS 301; 148). Here he suggests that forgetting is just as
immediate as metaphorical activity.

5. Free-Spirit: Self-Forgetting

In a schemata, which is the dissolution of images into concepts, a pyramidal order is constructed,
a creation of a new world of laws, knowledge, veracity, etc. This new world replaces the vivid
first impressions. It becomes more solid, universal, more known, and ‘more human,’ thus, it
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becomes regulative and imperative. For humans it is language that we identify as human
activity, not belonging to any other creature. Or better put, we are familiar with language, it is
what we do and use, and so if something has a language, it has human understanding. On the
other hand, the non-human, alien—the original, raw, disconcerting, uncertain ambiguity—does
not have language. Thus, with a lack of language, the artistic force is what drives us to create
such metaphors.
A construction though, according to Nietzsche, is the subordination of the multiplicity of
drives to the strongest drive which then serves as the provisional center of perspective. In this
sense, not everyone participates in the construction of worlds; rather the ‘herd’ preserves the
world of hardened concepts because they are familiar, as the concept of the metaphor is always
in operation. They do so through naming and “more depends on what they are called than what
they are” (GS 58). The concept is not possible without language—language preserves what is
similar, what results from identification of what is non-identical, and what designates
impressions which are common. The problem with language is that explaining means naming,
including within a category, reducing difference, which is to strip life of life—it is life-negating.
Yet, each language introduces new categories and divisions. To name is to be the master.
As Nietzsche puts it, “…whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again
reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it;
all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and
becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adoption through which any previous
“meaning” and “purpose” are necessarily obscured or even obliterated” (GM 513). Accordingly,
Nietzsche states that, “…the self-renewing impulse to play calls new worlds into being” (PTG
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111). This involves a process of creation through annihilation as the drives consistently
condense and displace energies in the body. With that, Nietzsche remarks,

This drive is not truly vanquished and scarcely subdued by the fact that a regular
and rigid new world is constructed as its prison from its own ephemeral products,
the concepts. It seeks a new realm and another channel for activity, and it finds
this in myth and in art generally. This drive continually confuses conceptual
categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, metaphors, and
metonymies. It continually manifests an ardent desire to refashion the world
which presents itself to waking man, so that it will be as colorful, irregular,
lacking in results, coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams.
Indeed, it is only by means of the rigid and regular web of concepts that the
waking man clearly sees that he is awake; and it is precisely because of this that
he sometimes thinks that he must be dreaming when this web of concepts is torn
by art. (TL 59)

Given the destructive power of the artistic drive, “the scientific investigator builds his hut right
next to the tower of science” because “he requires shelter, for there are frightful powers which
continuously break in upon him, powers which oppose scientific ‘truth’ with completely
different kinds of 'truths' which bear on their shields the most varied sorts of emblems” (TL 59).
The instability of the tower of science is always threatened to be exposed by the will to illusion.
This is because, as Nietzsche points out, “Art, as the goodwill to illusion,” displays a multitude
of ‘truths,’ directly confronting the one truth of scientific knowledge (GS 91).
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The creator, who confuses the concepts, does so by being a destroyer—smashing in
frameworks. A stabilized framework is just a toy for the creator and, similar to how children
discard their toys, the creator shows they have no need of these concepts and can as easily
discard them. Nietzsche explains: “That immense framework and planking of concepts to which
the needy man clings his whole life along in order to preserve himself is nothing but a
scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes
this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion,
paring the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of
these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by
concepts” (TL 60).
Nietzsche here introduces a different kind of knowledge contrary to that of scientific
knowledge—intuition. But unlike scientific knowledge which is constructed by language and
concepts, intuition does not have a name, so to say, or a language. That is because it is an
immediate sense impression, felt and known by the body. Nietzsche states that “There exists no
word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in
forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by
shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the
impression of the powerful present intuition” (TL 60). The individual who shatters and mocks
conceptual barriers and prohibitions is the ideal spirit. It is not a “spirit” in the sense of the
mythical or other-worldly—that would be life-negating—but spirited in the sense of being full of
sensation, full of breath, full of life-force. That is, as Nietzsche puts it:
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The ideal of a spirit who plays naively (that is to say involuntarily and from
overflowing abundance and power) with everything that has hitherto been called
holy, good, inviolable, divine; to whom the loftiest conception which the people
have reasonably made their measure of value, would already imply danger, ruin,
abasement, or at least relaxation, blindness, or temporary self-forgetfulness. (GS
225)

The ideal spirit rolls “in the dice game of Heraclitus’ “great child,” be he called Zeus or
chance” (GM 21).15 Like a child on the beach, the creator builds sand castles—“he piles them
up and tramples them down” (PTG 111). The creator again destroys these structures because, “it
is only as creators that we can annihilate!” (GS 58). But this is not a closed event, but a
continuous creating through annihilation. The ideal spirit starts the game anew calling new
worlds into existence. And as mentioned above, it continues to play, as the artistic drive is never
vanquished. For this reason, the creative impulse also leads to the construction of worlds and
concepts which can become hardened over time. Thus, “when it does build, it combines and
joins and forms its structures regularly, conforming to inner laws” (PTG 111). And in doing so,
Nietzsche remarks, “he gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as if with
him something were announcing and preparing itself, as if man were not a goal but only a way,
an episode, a bridge, a great promise” (GM 521).
Nietzsche’s use of the child as a metaphor for the creator suggests that creating and
destroying worlds is without morality and measure; it is innocent child’s-play, before the world
of measurement and identification. Nietzsche states, “In this world only play, play as artists and
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Heraclites, fragment 52: Lifetime is a child playing, moving pieces in a backgammon game; kingly power is in the
hands of a child.
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children engage in it, exhibits coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying,
without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence” (PTG 111). Art allows us to play games
with concepts and language, and distance ourselves from our own evaluations. On the other
hand, for the rational man, this play is seen as “danger, ruin, abasement,” and thus, the will to
truth drives him to construct morally binding, unconditional commands in the form of a formal
conscience. The rational man then, “According to its strength, impatience, and tension…seizes
upon things as a rude appetite, rather indiscriminately, and accepts whatever is shouted into its
ears by someone who issues commands—parents, teachers, laws, class prejudices, public
opinions” (BGE 300). In other words, the rational man in his need for foresight, prudence, and
regularity: “Without that art we should be nothing but foreground, and would live absolutely
under the spell of the perspective which makes the closest and the commonest seem immensely
large and like reality in itself” (GS 67).
However, for Nietzsche, a system is not evaluated for its ‘truth’ or morality, but for its
beauty, force, and strength. What makes a system superabundant and life-affirming is to will
illusion, to express itself as the mask of mask, to allow for ambiguity, and behold the beauty of
the overflowing, excess of life. Nietzsche calls this the “art of commanding” (BGE 300).
Conversely, a weak comportment towards the world is neediness, forgetfulness, and life-denying
through preserving concepts and clinging to ascetic scientific knowledge. This is what Nietzsche
calls the ‘herd instinct,’ developed through obedience in one direction for a long time, which
teaches the narrowing of our perspective” (BGE 292). The will to truth is a will to obedience,
whereas the will to illusion is a will to will:

187

When a man arrives at the fundamental conviction that he requires to be
commanded, he becomes “a believer.” Reversely, one could imagine a delight
and a power of self-determining, and a freedom of will, whereby a spirit could bid
farewell to every belief, to every wish for certainty, accustomed as it would be to
support itself on slender cords and possibilities, and to dance even on the verge of
abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence. (GS 182)

To say goodbye to every belief, value, and certainty—Truth, that tower we take shelter in—
demands laisser aller. This is a familiar Nietzschean notion of “letting-go.” The will to truth,
though, teaches the “hatred of the laisser aller,” the “all-too-great freedom” (BGE 291).

6: Rigidity Means Death

“Learn to think with pain” –Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster

Letting-go requires strong will, great strength, and independence. It is not just accepting a
‘principle’ of ambiguity, it is living it. If we embrace the overflowing, excess of life, then we
embrace all its ambiguities, uncertainties, possibilities—the Coatlique state. This is not easy as
it can be gut-wrenching, and also, we already have a resisting force built within—the will to
truth. Yet, Nietzsche sees this potential for the self-determination and the will to illusion as
liberating. Anzaldúa does as well in the sense that the mestiza embodies aspects of the ideal
spirit. Anzaldúa explains that for the mestiza,
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In perceiving conflicting information and points of view, she is subjected to a
swamping of her psychological borders. She has discovered that she can’t hold
concepts or ideas in rigid boundaries. The borders and walls that are supposed to
keep the undesirable ideas out are entrenched habits and patterns of behavior;
these habits and patterns are the enemy within. Rigidity means death. Only by
remaining flexible is she able to stretch the psyche horizontally and vertically. La
mestiza constantly has to shift out of habitual formations; from convergent
thinking, analytical reasoning that tends to use rationality to move toward a single
goal (a Western mode), to divergent thinking, characterized by movement away
from set patterns and goals and toward a more whole perspective, one that
includes rather than excludes. (BF 101)

The will to truth, as is hinted at by Anzaldúa, is never completely stifled; it continues to drive the
mestiza to habits and thinking that resist ambiguities, the dissolving of borders, contradictions in
life. There is a continuous drive toward a singular (Western scientific) truth established through
rigid concepts and scaffolding. While this singular Truth offers an answer to why we suffer and
can quiet alarm to meaninglessness, which the mestiza embodies, Anzaldúa states that, “The new
mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity” (BF 101).
It is not just that the mestiza allows for these contradictions and ambiguity—she wills the
excruciating feeling of being alive. Anzaldúa explains: “Not only does she sustain
contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else. She can be jarred out of
ambivalence by an intense, and often painful, emotional event which inverts or resolves the
ambivalence” (BF 101). Anzaldúa expresses uncertainty as to how the ambivalence is resolved,
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but remarks that, “The work takes place underground—subconsciously” (BF 101). And although
this ambivalence, “is a source of intense pain, its energy comes from continual creative motion
that keeps breaking down the unitary aspect of each new paradigm” (BF 101-102).
This is indicated in how she explains her process of creating:

The way that I originate my ideas is the following: First there has to be something
that is bothering me, something emotional so that I will be upset, angry or
conflicted. Then I start meditating on it, sometimes I do that while I am walking.
Usually I come up with something visual of what I am feeling. So then I have a
visual that sometimes is like a bridge, sometimes like a person with fifty legs, one
in each world; sometimes la mana izquierda, the left-handed world; the rebollino,
et cetera and I try to put that into words. So behind this feeling there is this
image, this visual, and I have to figure out what the articulation of this image is.
(BF 236).

“For example,” she illustrates, “the feeling of not belonging to any culture at all, of being an
exile in all the different cultures. You feel like there are all these gaps, these cracks in the world.
In that case I would draw a crack in the world” (BF 236). She moves from nerve-stimulus to
image.
Anzaldúa notes that “An image is a bridge between evoked emotion and conscious
knowledge; words are the cables that hold up the bridge. Images are more direct, more
immediate than words, and closer to the unconscious. Picture language precedes thinking in
words; the metaphorical mind precedes analytical consciousness” (BF 91; emphasis mine).
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Picture language comes before the symbolic—language as nominative, syntax, and sign. With
picture language, the way Anzaldúa describes it, the spheres of the nerve stimulus and image
collapse: she feels the images. However, adding the third element of language still is in
question: how can the nerve-stimulus-images be captured in language? Without Anzaldúa’s
picture in front of us—our eyes touching the canvas—without its presence, missing that
encounter, how can we, the Other, feel—embody, ‘know’—these gaps and cracks in the world?

7. Poetic language: Between Body and Sign

It is possible to connote the sensation of trauma-knowledge, the abject, the Coatlique state, but
not in scientific language. It requires a language of its own: one of imagery, semiotic rhythm,
discordance, life, flesh—poetic language.
According to Kristeva, poetic language is spatial in that it “does not involve lines and
surfaces but space and infinity;” it stretches horizontally and vertically (DL 88). This spatial
dimension is created as poetic language is a double: “the minimal unit of poetic language is at
least double, not in the sense of the signifier/signified dyad, but rather, in terms of one and
other.” (DL 69). The sign (signifier/signified) is a 0 – 1 sequence. This is a product of scientific
abstraction: “(identity-substance-cause-goal as structure of the Indo-European sentence),
designating a vertically and hierarchically linear division” (DL 69). On the other hand, Kristeva
explains, “Saussure’s poetic paragram (“Anagrams”) extends from zero to two: the unit “one”
(definition, “truth”) does not exist in this field. Consequently, the notions of definition,
determination, the sign “ = ” and the very concept of sign, which presuppose a vertical
(hierarchical) division between signifier and signified, cannot be applied to poetic language—by
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definition an infinity of pairings and combinations” (DL 69). According to Kristeva, this
suggests that “poetic language functions as a tabular model, where each “unit” (this word can no
longer be used without quotation marks, since every unit is double) acts as a multi-determined
peak” (DL 69).
“Poetic logic” connotes “the concept of the power of the continuum [which] would
embody the 0-2 interval, a continuity where 0 denotes and 1 is implicitly transgressed” (DL 70).
Kristeva states that “Within this “power of continuum” from 0 to a specifically poetic double, the
linguistic, psychic, and social “prohibition” is 1 (God, Law, Definition). The only linguistic
practice to “escape” this prohibition is poetic discourse” (DL 70). God, Law, and Definition
prohibit anything other than the 1. This is what poetic language transgresses—this limit,
stopping point.
An example of what Kristeva means can be understood in the child’s utterance referred to
in Chapter 1. When the child utters, “There is a dark man living inside of me, telling me to kill
people,” from what we know, the child actually believes or knows what he is saying or intends to
communicate. Yet, scientific language bars the utterance from having any truth or ‘real’
significance. That is, in scientific language of the 0-1 interval, the signifier “dark man” signifies
a human being and the color of his skin. Yet, poetic language can transgress this prohibition.
The “dark man” can be referring to the child’s father, any other man, a character from a movie or
book, etc., and “dark” can be used to indicate color, character, mentality, sinister, evil,
maliciousness…there are many possible subjects permitted, an infinite number of pairings of
“dark man.” This is how we can think of it as a multi-determined peak. The interval of 0-2 of
poetic language means that poetic language always carries with it prohibition and transgression:
“it cannot be” and “it can be otherwise.”
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Poetic language is also spatial in that it permeates the body. Another distinction between
scientific discourse and poetic language is the function of the semiotic. In scientific discourse,
the semiotic component is reduced as much as possible. “On the contrary,” Kristeva states, “the
signifying economy of poetic language is specific in that the semiotic is not only a constraint as
is the symbolic, but it tends to gain the upper hand at the expense of the thetic and predicative
constraints of the ego’s judging consciousness” (DL 134). The semiotic constrains in the sense
that it expresses meaning and significance, which is always a limiting feature—it has a specific
meaning. “Thus,” Kristeva intimates, “in any poetic language, not only do the rhythmic
constraints, for example perform an organizing function that could go so far as to violate certain
grammatical rules of a national language and often neglect the importance of an ideatory
message, but in recent texts, these semiotic constraints (rhythm, phonic, vocalic timbres in
Symbolist work, but also graphic disposition on the page) are accompanied by nonrecoverable
syntactic elisions; it is impossible to reconstitute the particular elided syntactic category (object
or verb), which makes the meaning of the utterance undecidable.” She continues:

However elided, attacked, or corrupted the symbolic function might be in poetic
language, due to the impact of semiotic processes, the symbolic function
nonetheless maintains its presence, it is for this reason that it is a language. First,
it persists as an internal limit of this bipolar economy, since a multiple and
sometimes even uncomprehensible signified is nevertheless communicated;
second, it persists also because the semiotic processes themselves, far from being
set adrift (as they would be in insane discourse), set up a new formal construct: a
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so-called new formal or ideological “writer’s universe,” the never-finished,
undefined production of a new space of significance. (DL 134-135).

Citing Bakhtin, Kristeva states that language has a double character: 1) syntagmatic, manifested
through extension, presence, and metonymy; and 2) systemic, manifested through association,
absence, and metaphor. What is present and lost within the symbolic order of metonymy and
metaphor can be recovered in the semiotic. Kristeva notes that the semiotic “posits its own
process as an undecidable process between sense and nonsense, between language and rhythm
… between the symbolic and semiotic”—“situated at the precise point at which meaning is
produced in nonmeaning” (DL 135; Lacan, E 423).
Poetic language also is disconcerting in that it “awakens our attention to this undecidable
character of any so-called natural language, a feature that univocal, rational, scientific discourse
tends to hide—and this implies considerable consequences for it subject” (DL 135). Poetic
language has the ability to reactivate what the individual wants to forget, but cannot. It may
reactivate all of the overwhelming feelings of chance, accident, meaninglessness, and ambiguity.
Kristeva states that, “the unsettled and questionable subject of poetic language (for whom the
word is never uniquely sign) maintains itself at the cost of reactivating this repressed instinctual,
maternal element” (DL 136). It can return the subject to the chora and that primary splitting: the
abject.
Poetic language, in this sense, has a feeling of eternality. This is contrary to scientific
language. The 0-1 interval is temporal in the sense that it stops at 1; it is a closed event; the
simple past, the simple present, the simple future. But, in poetic language, the doubling does not
stop. The subject is always in question as there is always a one and other and an ongoing
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interaction between the two. The subject can always be called into question. When the child
utters, “a dark man lives inside me,” the dark man is multiplied in that it could be naming an
other outside the child’s body, the otherness of self, or the other of horror living within, for
instance. For this reason, we are to understand the subject of poetic language as nontemporal,
continuous, abundant, overflowing: a “questionable subject-in-process.” Kristeva explains that
“the subject of poetic language continually but never definitively assumes the thetic function of
naming, establishing meaning and signification, which the paternal function represents within
reproductive relation” (DL 138). Rather, (describing Céline’s literary style) Kristeva explains
that it is “a dissonance” with this paternal function in language—it is “neither imaginary
discourse of the self, nor discourse of transcendental knowledge, but a permanent go-between
from one to the other, a pulsation of sign and rhythm, of consciousness and instinctual drive”
(DL 139).
Similar to how Anzaldúa describes her own experience of living on the borderlands,
between two worlds, in Nepantla. She remarks that it is “very awkward, uncomfortable and
frustrating to be in that Nepantla because you are in the midst of transformation,” like a person
with fifty legs, standing on multiple peaks (BF 237). From this perspective, “You see the cracks
and realize that there are other realities” (BF 237). Kristeva too notes that poetic language shows
up at times of symbolic and social unrest. It is a means of overriding the constraints of
transcendental rationality—scientific discourse. This is because it has a “disruptive form
(unreadable for meaning, dangerous for the subject)” (DL 140). That is to say, “So-called
“artistic” practices have always exerted fascination because they elude this boundary, owing to
which signification—always already in the form of a sentence—comes into being, and they
revive the uneasiness that goes with regressing to a time before the mirror stage” (DL 168).
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Within poetic language there is free-play in the sentence structure and meaning
formation: techniques of displacing verbs; using obscenities, lacking objective referents. The
semiotics of poetic language “connect it to gesturality, kinesthesia, the drives’ body, the
movement of rejection and appropriation of the other;” creating hesitation and rhythm through
breaks and ellipses, etc. These movements allow for “multiple connotations that no longer
depend on the framework of the sentence, but on a free context” (DL 141). Referring again to
Céline’s literature, Kristeva notes that “The elided object in the sentence relates to a hesitation (if
not erasure) of the real object for the speaking subject. That literature is witness to this kind of
deception involving the object … that the existence of the object is more than fleeting and indeed
impossible” (DL 141-142). Such style “obliges the reader not so much to combine significations
as to shatter his own judging consciousness in order to grant passage through it to this rhythmic
drive constituted by repression and, once filtered by language and its meaning, experience as
jouissance” (DL 142).
Anzaldúa states that, “The art of composition, whether you are composing a work of
fiction or your life, or whether you are composing reality, always means pulling off fragmented
pieces and putting them together into a whole that makes sense” (BF 238). When the audience
engages with poetic language, we make sense of it by entering it back into the order of the
symbolic; we can “restore” the sentence. Kristeva explains that language “has a specificity that
no other system based on differences possesses: it divides (signifier/signified) and joins
(modifier/modified = sentence) (DL 168). But, Kristeva notes, by “restoring” the sentence, “we
lose semantic and logico-syntactic ambiguities, but we mainly lose a music” (DL 167). “By
music,” she explains,” I mean intonation and rhythm, which play only a subordinate role in
everyday communication but here constitute the essential element of enunciation and lead us
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directly to the otherwise silent place of its subject” (DL 167). Thus, the creators of poetic
language must be like composers, creating symphonies, which return us to the original, colorful,
vivid experience.
Poetic language is a form of creation through annihilation; it is a tearing apart of the logic
of the sentence, and rebuilding meaning; creating meaning out of nonmeaning. Kristeva explains
this process:

“Musicating” this dividing-joining movement involves exploding rhythm into
division, of course, but also, into juncture: into the metaphoric-metonymic
slippage that corrugates lexemic items and lifts even the signifier/signified
censorship; but especially, into the juncture of logic and sentence where sociosymbolic order is rebuilt and ignores anything having to do with the previous,
underlying (semic, morphemic, phonic, instinctual) explosion. (DL 168)

Destructive, accidental, creative, poetic language intervenes in the symbolic order; it is the cut
which cuts, and in that cut, something shows itself. Kristeva explains, “Intervening at the level
where syntactic order renders opaque the outlay underlying the signifying practice; intervening at
the point where sociality constitutes itself by killing, by throttling the outlay that keeps it alive—
that means intervening precisely when the sentence pulls itself together and stops. The problem
is to raise and transform this very moment, to allow it to sing.” (DL 168).
But poetic language is more than song—it is song and paint; a singing of the image, “A
composition with texture: more-than-a-sentence, more-than-meaning, more-than-significance”
(DL 168). It is not a lack, or absence, but an overflowing. “If there is a loss,” Kristeva states, “if
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an outlay is made, they never result in less, but always more: more-than-syntactic” (DL 168).
Thus poetic language involves an excess, abundance, overflowing of meaning, whether the
syntactic unit of a sentence is disrupted, missing, exploded, or overdetermined. Poetic language
is illusory—it gives the illusion of music, song, dance, and paint. It is an expression of the
instinctual drives and the drive to illusion, perpetually confronting and resisting the drive to
truth. This is not to say that poetic language does not express truth, rather it is a bridge between
the body and the other, an outpouring of embodied knowledge.
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CHAPTER SIX:
THE FRAGMENTARY IMPERATIVE

It’s not enough
deciding to open.
You must plunge your fingers
into your navel, with your two hands
split open,
spill out the lizards and horned toads
the orchids and the sunflowers,
turn the maze inside out.
Shake it.
Yet, you don’t quite empty.
Maybe a green phlegm
hides in your cough.
You may not even know
that it’s there until a knot
grows in your throat
and turns into a frog.
It tickles a secret smile
on your palate
full of tiny orgasms.
But sooner or later
it reveals itself.
The green frog indiscreetly croaks.
Everyone looks up.
It’s not enough
opening once.
Again you must plunge your fingers
into your navel, with your two hands
rip open,
drop out dead rats and cockroaches
spring rain, young ears of corn.
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Shake it.
This time you must let go.
Meet the dragon’s open face
and let the terror swallow you
—You dissolve in its saliva
—no one recognizes you as a puddle
—no one misses you
—you aren’t even remembered
and the maze isn’t even of your own making.
You’ve crossed over.
And all around you space.
Alone. With nothingness.
Nobody’s going to save you.
No one’s going to cut you down,
cut the thorns thick around you.
No one’s going to storm
the castle walls nor
kiss awake your birth
climb down your hair
nor mount you
on a white steed.
There is no one who
will feed the yearning.
Face it. You will have
to do, do it yourself.
And all around you a vast terrain.
Alone. With night.
Darkness you must befriend if
you want to sleep nights.
It’s not enough
letting go twice, three times,
a hundred. Soon everything is
dull, unsatisfactory.
Night’s open face
interests you no longer.
And soon, again, you return
to your element and
like a fish to the air
you come to the open
only between breathings.
But already gills
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grow on your breasts.
……
Why write more when Anzalúa’s poem ““Letting Go,” captures the experience of writing-trauma
so well? The poem presents the various fragments of trauma I have described thus far. First, the
reference to opening the navel with one’s own two hands hints at the embodiment of traumaknowledge. The body knows the traumatic feeling of being alive without cognitive memory or
recognition. The individual forgets and “may not even know it is there” until the flashback,
nightmare, or traumatic memory fragment demands recognition and insists on its own reality;
until “the frog indiscreetly croaks.”
Second, the poem reflects the element of explosive plasticity in regard to the accident. At
the moment of the accident, the individual undergoes a metamorphosis such that there is a
“molting of the inner sculpture.” Metaphorically, the individual “dissolves in its saliva.”
Simultaneously, something reveals itself, as Malabou puts it, “the deserting of subjectivity, the
distancing of the individual who becomes a stranger to herself, who no longer recognizes
anyone, who no longer recognizes herself, who no longer remembers her self” (OA 6). The new
being, flight identity, takes over such that the individual is unrecognizable and there is no ‘self’
to save or redeem—“nobody’s going to save you.”
Third, images of dead rats, roaches, horned toads, and green phlegm invoke the abject.
To plunge into one’s navel is suggestive of returning to the chora, the site of the abject. Here is
where the individual meets the dragon’s open face, and resides in the Coatilique state of
uncertainty and ambiguity.
Fourth, to let go in the Nietzschean sense of laissez-aller, means to be able to tolerate
ambiguities, to not only resist, but annihilate absolutes, such that one can create their own
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meaning. The way letting-go is expressed in the poem means to plunge into the deepest, darkest,
defiled aspects of being, willfully. And this is why it is not enough to decide just to open—you
must let the terror swallow you. This is not a matter of the will to truth, but an incessant crying
out of embodied knowledge. Also, the language by which one “opens” is not handed over in
scientific concepts, but must be poetically, independently invented—you will have to do it
yourself.
Finally, if one does decide to open and write, it is not enough to let go once, twice, or a
hundred times, given the repetition compulsion in trauma. Anzaldúa’s poem highlights the
aspect of the eternal return of trauma and its disastrous effects, and also, what must take place
such that an individual can open and let-go. Words themselves are dangerous because they
embody images, fragments, and pulsations which can haul the individual back to the scene of the
trauma. The reference to returning to one’s element can represent both returning to the traumatic
scene, but also ‘returning’ from that scene. Returning to and from the scene is a matter of selfovercoming, not strictly in the Nietzschean sense, but beyond, in multiple aspects.
With all of this in mind, the question of why write more, for the trauma-being, is effaced
by the question of why write at all? Why write when writing means dissolving of the self,
confronting the dragon’s open face, becoming the unrecognizable being, swallowed up by terror,
recognizing nothingness, befriending darkness? And the futile attempt to empty oneself only to
return again to choke on pain—why write?
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1. let the terror swallow you

“It is not you who will speak; let the disaster speak in you, even if it be by your forgetfulness or
silence.” (WD 4)

In The Writing of the Disaster, Maurice Blanchot affirms that writing the disaster is disaster. He
observes, “a disaster ruins everything, all the while leaving everything intact” (WD 1). What
remains intact—or appears to remain intact—are those who are spared. Still those who are
spared are transformed, and it is questionable how intact they remain in light of this
transformation. In the disaster, Blanchot notes, death comes too late. The individual must
endure their survival, for it is this survival which marks the disaster and trauma—trauma is in
having survived.
It is for this reason that the disaster comes to pass under a “here in excess of all
presence,” (WD 1). This is due to the immediacy of the disaster. When the disaster comes upon
us, it does not come, as its ruinous effects have not fully come. It watches over us and we live
“under the surveillance of the disaster” (WD 4). We are always under its threat—the threat of the
disaster yet to come, the disaster we experience in the immediate present, and the disaster that
came upon us. Blanchot explains that “Before it is there, no one awaits it; when it is there, no
one recognizes it: for it is not there—the disaster. It has already diverted the word “be,” realizing
itself to such a degree that it has not begun” (WD 36). The disaster continues to unfold, and in
the immediate ‘here’ we do not know it as disaster as its effects have not yet come to pass—it is
not here. Further, we are not able to situate it in the future because, Blanchot explains, “it cannot
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be prescribed and formulated, how we will encounter it, and how it will effect us, is in the future:
the disaster is yet to come”—it is not there (WD 1).
Temporality is further complicated through our relationship with the past. Blanchot asks,
“How can one enter a relation with the passive past, a relation which would itself be incapable of
presenting itself in the light of a consciousness…?” (WD 29). That is to say, “We can no more
think of the immediate than we can think of an absolutely passive past” (WD 24-25). The
disaster, which has come upon us, continues to affect us in the immediate present. This ‘past’
lives in us, and as it lives, it is active. Further still, when we think of the disaster, if at all
possible, we reawaken this past, and thus, the disaster is the return of the return; “the disaster
comes back; it would always be the disaster after the disaster” (WD 6). Therefore, we can ask
with Blanchot, “Can the disaster be interrogated? Where might one find the language in which
answer, question, affirmation, negation may well intervene, but without any effect?” (WD 2425). In questioning the disaster, we intervene, and, to highlight the double play of Blanchot’s use
of language, we are “the incessant that interrupts.”
Not only is it paradoxical to interrogate the disaster, as it cannot be reached, but also
because in interrogating it, we are passive to the disastrous knowledge of the disaster.
“Knowledge which goes so far as to accept horror in order to know it,” Blanchot notes, “reveals
the horror of knowledge, its squalor, the discrete complicity which maintains it in a relation with
the most insupportable aspects of power” (WD 82). It is, perhaps, just the kind of suffering for
knowledge that Nietzsche describes:

Have you suffered for knowledge’s sake?” This is asked of us by Nietzsche, on
the condition that we not misunderstand the word “suffering”: it means, not so
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much what we undergo, as that which goes under. It denotes the pas [“not”] of
the utterly passive, which drawn from all sight, from all knowing. Unless it be the
case that knowledge—because it is not knowledge of the disaster, but knowledge
as disaster and knowledge disastrously—carries us, carries us off, deports us
(whom it smites and nonetheless leaves untouched), straight to ignorance, and
puts us face to face with ignorance of the unknown so that we forget, endlessly.
(WD 3)

The type of knowledge being described here is like trauma-knowledge. It is the horror of
knowing horror and yet, not knowing it. What I mean by this is that it is privileged knowledge
of having survived, for instance, the knowledge of what the Holocaust survivor knows, “saved at
the last minute, … forced to live that last instant again and each time to live it once more” (WD
82). The Holocaust survivor survives his own death, and in doing so, undergoes the death of all
the others. He lives such that others die. When asked how he can bear it, Blanchot shares that
his response is just to observe what he knows. But this is an impossible question, to ask how one
can bear it. The only response, Blanchot notes, is that “he could find no other alibi than the
search for knowledge, the so-called dignity of knowledge: that ultimate propriety which we
believe will be accorded us by knowledge. And how, in fact, can one accept not to know?” This
is why, “The wish of all, in the camps, the last wish: know what has happened, do not forget, and
at the same time never will you know” (WD 82). Blanchot explains that this forgetfulness is not
a negative, but also not a negation of an affirmative, because it is immemorial; it cannot be a
memory. The memory fragments are not memories but disaster.
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This burden of having to answer the impossible question of unbearable knowledge
discloses Blanchot’s understanding of passivity in the disaster. The way Blanchot describes the
notion of passivity is not to be understood in a simple ‘non-action.’ Rather, passivité, coming
from passif, is referring to suffering or undergoing hardship. The notion of ‘non-action’ is
implied in the idea of undergoing suffering without resistance. With trauma we undergo
suffering whether we resist it or not—we are passive in regard to it, especially given the chance
repetition of the traumatic memory fragment or flashback. This is reflected in the passivity in
regard to the disaster, as Blanchot describes it, “the absolute passiveness of total abjection” (WD
15). As Kristeva remarks, the abjection of self, for the individual, it is a “forfeited existence,” in
that the abject permeates the subject such that they become abject (PH 11).
Blanchot coins a new expression to capture this idea: “le subissement.” The term “is
[partnered on subir, “to undergo,” but is also] simply a variation of subitement [“suddenly”], or
the same word crushed; we might invent that term, le subissement, in an attempt to name the
inert immobility of certain states said to be psychotic, … dispossession, that is, the self wrested
from itself, the detachment whereby one is detached from detachment, or again the fall (neither
chosen nor accepted) outside the self” (WD 15). In one sense we are passive to resist the
disaster, but beyond that, we are passive in the sense that it always returns, and this is what
makes it disastrous. It is always too late—the disaster returns, incessantly—trauma happens too
soon, too fast, too suddenly for us to resist it, and so we are le subissement.
Yet, we are challenged to move on, obliged to survive, beckoned to respond: we are
responsible for it, not necessarily for its ‘cause,’ but in terms of how we are called to respond—
write, speak, blurt obscenities, scream, sob, go numb. We are called on to respond to what we
have passively encountered, outside the realm of choice and agency, where subjects are deserted;
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we are called to respond to suffering, without resistance. The disaster is in excess of all presence
and so there is not any chart or plan, no way to resolve it, to solve it, to absolve it. The notion of
‘coming-to-terms-with’ the disaster, the accident, trauma, and grief, is the illusion of
transcendence.
This means that in regard to writing, the disaster returns whether we write or not.
Blanchot notes, refusing to write, is in itself, a form of writing. The refusal to write is a form of
writing itself and how in writing the event that resists or cannot be captured in words in a stable
way, we are led to find this state of affairs unbearable, “as though he were being obliged to
survive” (WD 10). Trauma is in having survived, and in writing-trauma, we undergo our own
survival at Blanchot explains, “with respect to the disaster, one dies too late. But this does not
dissuade us from dying; it invites us—escaping the time where it is always too late—to endure
inopportune death, with no relation to anything save the disaster as return” (WD 4). In
responding, we undergo, we suffer, which is the upmost of passivity, of abjection: there is no
action, no will, no suffering for a purpose, or suffering to some end—the maze isn’t even of your
own making. Yet passivity allows us to respond to the unending demand of responsibility, which
is an impossible demand, for the damaged, deserted, speechless subject. The decision to write or
not is a moment in which ones relation to the content of the embodied knowledge is both
passively and actively known—accessed by “opening up” the navel into the body.
This moment is unbearable, as reflected within the imagery of Anzaldúa’s poem. The
loss of meaning and state of ambiguity, makes the narrative of this disaster unbearable. Kristeva
notes that “the narrative is unbearable in the case of the abject” because “its linearity is shattered,
it proceeds by flashes, enigmas, short cuts, incompletion, tangles and cuts” (PH 141). For
someone who experiences trauma, a linear narrative is disrupted and thus a single story of the
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‘self’ appears as meaningless, arbitrary, superficial, supplementary, impossible. Consequently, it
is also that in telling the narrative, the individual has to reconstruct trauma from the residue,
which, according to Anzaldúa, makes her physically sick. She explains, “writing invokes images
from my unconscious, and because some of the images are residues of trauma which I then have
to reconstruct, I sometimes get sick when I do write. I can’t stomach it, become nauseous, or
burn with fever, worsen” (BF 92). Kristeva adds that,

At a later stage, the unbearable identity of the narrator and of the surroundings
that are supposed to sustain him can no longer be narrated but cries out or
descried with maximal stylistic intensity (language of violence, of obscenity, or of
a rhetoric that relates the text to poetry). The narrative yields to a crying-out
theme that, when it tends to coincide with the incandescent states of a boundarysubjectivity that I have called abjection, is the crying-out theme of sufferinghorror. (PH 141)

On the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty explains, the poem, though “indistinguishable from the
cry,” makes use of body and language “in such a way that the existential modulation, instead of
being dissipated at the very instant of its expression, finds in poetic art a means of making itself
eternal” (TPP 174). The narrative, Kristeva explains, occupies the place that it does—it decks
itself out “in the sacred power of horror.” In writing the individual succumbs to the trauma, and
elaborates it; it involves an unveiling, “an elaboration, a discharge, and a hollowing out of
abjection…” (PH 208). And this is why for Blanchot, the disaster is the limit of writing. He
reiterates, “this must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes. Which does not mean that the disaster,
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as the force of writing, is excluded from it, is beyond the pale of writing or extratextual” (WD 7).
The disaster is a force of writing and for this reason it is not beyond writing or outside the text—
it is in writing, but at its very limit. For Kristeva and Blanchot, writing is passive inasmuch as it
does not and cannot be the site of ultimate resistance.
In conjuring trauma fragments through writing, it is not as though the individual has any
more control over the destructive power the disaster. Although Anzaldúa suggests some potential
for a creative, agential relation between the words and images in the process of writing— “I feed
[my inner demons] no words”—this does not protect the individual against the accident.
Whether in writing or not, a sudden flashback can swallow the individual, paralyze them, destroy
them. This is the risk the individual undergoes in writing. Thus, writing is not a form of
resistance, as some would have it, not a presentation of the meaning of the individual’s thoughts,
but a crying out, a discharge of the disaster, an over-spilling of the embodied knowledge of
horror—the source of such poetic language.

2. Shake it.

“Write in order not simply to destroy, in order not simply to conserve, in order not to transit;
write in the thrall of the impossible real, that share of disaster wherein every reality, safe and
sound, sinks” (WD 38).

With other modes of writing, scientific, narrative, epic, to name a few, writing is an expression of
the will to truth and with that it drives toward coherency. But writing-trauma is a force of
writing, a risk, not toward some coherent truth, but crying out of the body in pain. The style of
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writing which captures the sensory memory fragments of trauma in language is what Blanchot
describes as fragmentary writing. Fragmentary writing is jarring, disruptive, unnerving,
arrhythmic, unpredictable, a chance encounter. Blanchot himself employs the fragmentary
writing style. Sometimes he will write a small paragraph expressing an idea, such as le
subissement, and sometimes just a sentence, or even less, just a fragment of a sentence. What
will come next, in terms of form, style, and content, cannot be anticipated as he moves and shifts
directions within the discussion—if you can even call it that—annihilating any coherent, logical,
predictable (scientific) whole. The fragmentary writing is opposite the writing that is the will-totruth in that “…fragmentation is the pulling to pieces (the tearing) of that which never has
preexisted (really or ideally) as a whole, nor can it ever be resembled in any future presence
whatever. Fragmentation is the spacing, the separation effaced by a temporalization which can
only be understood—fallaciously—as the absence of time” (WD 60).
Helen Cixous expresses the desire to be able to write in such a way as to capture
fragments. She states, “I would like to write like a painter. I would like to write like painting”
(PG 583). What Cixous means by writing like painting is being able to capture that
instantaneous experience one has when in front of the painting. When the eyes touch the canvas,
there is a transference of meaning in multiple directions. Face to face with the painting, the
individual is brought into its world, the momentary “frozen distortions,” to put it into Cézanne’s
language, which “would remain walled up in the separate life of each consciousness” were it not
for the painting (CD 278). Likewise, Cixous describes the painter as “A bird-catcher of instants”
(PG 583). This type of writing-painting is “closer to the painter’s gesture.” She states, “My
words can’t tell you the simultaneously infinite and yet finite” (PG 584). This is because
language, even poetic language, is not instantaneous. The colors of the paint produce certain
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sensations, similar to how Merleau-Ponty explains words: “the spoken or written words carry a
top coating of meaning which sticks to them and which presents the thought as a style, an
affective value, a piece of existential mimicry, rather than as a conceptual statement. We find
here, beneath the conceptual meaning of the words, an existential meaning which is not only
rendered by them, but which inhabits them, and is inseparable from them” (TPP 212). But, it is
in placing particular words next to each other that one forms the fragment. This is similar to how
Cézanne describes painting, that is, “to the extent that one paints, one outlines; the more the
colors harmonize, the more the outline becomes precise…When the color is at its richest, the
form has reached plentitude” (CD 279).
Thus, unlike in the immediate impression of the painting, there is always a mental
process of translation from sign to signifier in the circumference of the semiotic; but also, there
is a process of aligning the words such that the fragment of language carries meaning. It is one
thing to stand before one of Francis Bacon’s canvases and another to describe it. And in
describing the frozen distortions, it is impossible to communicate how the paint touching paint
forms the human form through such grotesque distortion. Yet, Bacon’s paintings are able to
capture that moment through distortion. And so is the same with fragmentary writing—it is a
form of distortion. A painting provides the image, but leaves the interpretation open. Unlike
with the painting, in which the observer’s response is unpredictable, writing creates an
unpredictable image which is then open to unpredictable interpretations. The multiple imageinterpretation—the double of poetic language—fragments language even more so. With that,
“Fragmentary writing is a risk, it would seem: risk itself. It is not based on any theory, nor does
it introduce a practice one could define as interruption. Interrupted, it goes on. Interrogating
itself, it does not co-opt the question but suspends it” (WD 59). Fragmentary writing is a risk in
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that the fragments could be senseless, nonsense, an orphan with no theory to house it, nor
practice to connect it to other writing nor other writing to interrogate (WD 59). The sensorymemory-image fragments of fragmentary language are unpredictable, with meaning always
suspended, in abeyance, and multiplied. Fragmentary writing, then, can act back on itself,
tearing itself to pieces—what was never whole to begin with.
Fragmentary writing, through fragmentation and distortion, captures and paints the
trauma fragments by chance. Trauma is an incessant interruption and is best captured in
language which interrupts itself—language which transforms the cut into that which cuts. This
“interruption of the incessant,” is “the distinguishing characteristic of fragmentary writing:
interruption’s having somehow the same meaning as that which does not cease” (WD 21). The
fragment takes on the same meaning as the eternal return. This is similar to how, in his
paintings, Bacon destroys the individual to capture their most “living quality,” fragmentary
writing destroys language and the self in order to capture the most living quality of disaster,
trauma, accident, grief, and abjection. In this way, we could say of fragmentary writing, as
Bacon did of painting: “…it has a life completely of its own. It lives on its own, like the image
one’s trying to trap; it lives on its own, and therefore transfers the essence of the image more
poignantly. So that the artist may be able to open up or rather, should I say, unlock the valves of
feeling and therefore return the onlooker to life more violently” (FB 17).

3. And all around you space.

“In a world where God is dead once and for all, and where we know, despite the promises from
all sides, from the Right and from the Left, that we won’t find happiness, language is our only
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resource, our only source. It reveals to us in the very hollow of our memories and beneath each
of our words, beneath each of those words that gallop through our head, it reveals the majestic
freedom of being mad” (LMD 27).

Language may be all we have, for those of us who cannot paint, and whether we write or not
write, we are passive before it. It too has a life of its own and cannot be stopped, cannot be
slowed down, for above all, language is repetition. Foucault, in “What is the Language of
Literature?” reiterates that, “Language may be the only being in the world that is absolutely
repeatable” (LMD 72). There are of course other beings, things, which are repeatable, but they
are never one and the same. There may be more than one leaf, but that leaf is not materially,
precisely identical to the next. Foucault remarks that “in the natural order, repetition is, in
reality, only a partial identity and, moreover, one that can be easily analyzed discursively. There
are no repetitions in the strict sense outside the order of language” (WD 72). He notes that if we
are going to say that there is an ontology of language, it is repetition: “This phenomenon of
repetition in language is, of course, a constitutive property of language, but this property is not
neutral and inert with respect to the act of writing. Writing does not mean sidestepping the
necessary repetition of language; I believe that writing, in the literary sense, involves placing
repetition at the very heart of the work” (LMD 72-73). The function of writing is to repeat for
the sake of repeating.
When we think of repetition, normally we think of repetition in time, as repetition is a
sequence of an initial unit, followed by a copy, and so on. But, it is not time which preserves
language; language preserves time. The simple unit of the verb points to the function of time in
language. But, at heart, language is space, which functions to express time. Words take up
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space—space on a page, space in breath, space in sound—and so this space is contended for by
other words, words which will stand in the space of the other: the metaphor. This movement is
what highlights the function of time in language.
Foucault makes a distinction between language, literary work, and literature. Language
is the accumulated words through history, a “murmur of everything that is pronounced,” and at
the same time a “transparent system that results in the fact that when we speak, we are
understood” (LMD 46). It is the promise of meaning that makes it language—it is not just the
words but the systemic order of the words that makes up a language. The literary work, is
“inside” of language, a “configuration of language that dwells on itself, that remains motionless,
that constitutes a space of its own, and which holds in that space the flow of the murmur, which
thickens the transparency of signs and words, and which thus establishes a certain opaque
volume…” (LMD 46). The third term literature is a language, “a text made of words, of words
like any others, but words that are so appropriately and carefully chosen and arranged that
something ineffable passes through them,” but, which, Foucault modifying the description, states
is “non-ineffable” in that it is made from a fable (LMD 46).
Foucault holds that literature as a language is really born in the nineteenth century. That
is, within the seventeenth century, it would be considered something like a familiarity, usage, and
frequency of literary works (LMD 46-47). It is a passive relationship between language and the
work, that of knowledge and memory. Literature in the nineteenth century, on the other hand, is
active. It is active in the sense that it doubles itself to determine what literature is—its object is
itself (LMD 47). The question “what is literature?” is an essential blankness. Literature is not
required for a language to transform into “a work.” It describes an empty space, dismembered,
fractured from language and the work. It is external to the literary work, which is inside
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language as an immobile, opaque flow of language. The work is thick because it flows over and
over such that the language is fixed, opaque—the words are not transparent in that they… unlike
with literature, which oscillates, or vibrates, but not as if between two poles, language and
literature.
As soon as a word is written on the blank page, in space, it becomes literature, but no
longer is literature at the same time. That is because it transgresses the pure, empty sacred
essence of literature. This might be understood in the relationship between sound and silence.
The eruption of words, as soon as they are spoken, are not a fulfillment of silence, but its rupture:
Written words are distinct from “ordinary,” “normal,” “real” words in that they points to an
other—literature. Written work is the death of speech, the organic, spontaneous movement of
speech, and the creation of a larger body, that of literature. Fragmentary writing, in poetry or
prose, enters into a much larger, oscillating body of literature that promises its repetition.
Literature is repetition; it is not just repetition for the writer, but then for Other and the world.
For this reason, literature is a risk. Foucault explains that, “…literature is the risk always
taken and always assumed by each word of a sentence of literature, the risk that, after all, this
word, this sentence, and all the rest, might not obey the code” (LMD 71). The spoken word has a
very limited audience in the immediate present. But the written word becomes timeless, crosses
borders, and space. It stretches forward and backward, inward and outward.
The space of the page, bound in the space of the book, bound in the space of literature, all
create ample more space for trauma to spill out into. This un-geometricizes trauma even more
than in just reference to the body. The thickness of the book intertwines with the thickness of
flesh—the flesh of the body touching the flesh of the page, where meaning is transferred, in both
directions. The meaning is transferred through the touch of body to text, the semiotic rhythm is
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felt in the meaning of the sign, and the signs, with their top coat, express meaning in the specific,
material context. Returning back to the point at which knowledge is known through the flesh,
we imprint fragments into the flesh of the blank sheet of paper, and simultaneously, seal trauma’s
fate in the eternal return beyond the body.

4. And soon, again, you return

“Still, it is possible that, as soon as we write, and however little we write (the little is only too
much), we know we are approaching the limit—the perilous threshold—the chance of being
turned back” (WD 8).

The question of the eternal return featured in Nietzsche’s works lends itself to many
interpretations, but for the trauma-being, it is not a question of ‘what if;’ rather, it is a question of
responsibility. That is to say, we know that we will be hauled back to the scene of the trauma, by
chance; that is not uncertain or ambiguous. Acknowledging this horror of knowing is
acknowledging the heaviest weight of Nietzsche’s proposal. In section 341 of The Gay Science,
Nietzsche proposes:

What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest
loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will
have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing
new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same
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succession and sequence--even this spider and this moonlight between the trees
and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned
upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!”

Would you throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you
would have answered him: “You are a god and never have I heard anything more
divine.” If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are
or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, “Do you desire this
once more and innumerable times more?” would lie upon your actions as the
greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and
to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate and eternal confirmation
and seal? (GS 341)

I would gnash my teeth – I do gnash my teeth. And yet, I pick up my pen and write. The
question of the eternal return is not a theoretical question for one who experiences trauma; it is
an ethical question—ethical in the sense that it is a call to respond to le subissement. As soon as
we write, we know we are approaching a perilous threshold—the chance of being turned back,
hauled back. And yet, this is our responsibility: le subissement—the sudden going under, such
that the self dissolves into the saliva of the words. The Other places this burden on us—we must
haul this burden along while being hauled along, back to the scene of the trauma. Repetition, as
Lacan explains through the transliteration of wiederholen, is the “hauling of the subject who
always drags its thing into a certain path that he cannot get out of” (XI 51). Recall that what is
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proposed by Freud, Lacan, and echoed by Caruth is that the repetition compulsion is an endeavor
to master the stimulus retroactively, an attempt to master what was not completely grasped in the
first place. From this perspective, writing-trauma would be the materialization of the repetition
compulsion, and the repetitive act of writing-trauma could be a function of mastering the painful
experience, the memory, the self, and the body.
However, the notion of le subissement offers a different way to regard this explanation of
repetition for the sake of mastery. The moment the ink bleeds into the natural fibers of the paper,
the will bleeds into the paper, with the past, the present, and a future yet to come—the eternal
return of that horror of knowing horror, cemented in time and space, moving forward and
backward at once. Writing-trauma is not at attempt at mastery but the ultimate subissement as it
is to will backwards. In writing-trauma, “‘The will is a creator.’ All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a
riddle, a dreadful accident—until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I willed it.’ Until the
creative will says to it, ‘But thus I will it; thus shall I will it’” (TSZ 253). In the sudden going
under of writing-trauma, the individual does not attempt redemption in terms of willing ‘it could
be otherwise,’ but rather, the eternal, repetitive seal of writing wills ‘it must be.’ But of course
there is an eternal revolt of being because the individual wants nothing other for it to be
otherwise and to expel the trauma from their body. This points to another force within the
process of writing-trauma: self-overcoming.
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5. But already gills grow on your breasts.

“I overcame myself, the sufferer; I carried my own ashes to the mountains; I invented a brighter
flame for myself” (TSZ 143).

Nietzsche’s notion of self-overcoming is mainly proposed as a form of ‘resistance’ to selflimiting obedience to the will to truth, scientific knowledge, the desire for certainty,
measurement, and mastery. As reflected in Zarathustra’s own journey, it is not a state or status
that one reaches and resides in; conversely, it is a perpetual drive. Blanchot echoes this
sentiment and urges us to abandon the drive for any certainty:

Abandon the futile hope to find in being the basis for a separation, a break, a
revolt that could be achieved, and verified. For thus you are still in need of the
truth and of putting it above “error,” just as you want to distinguish death from
life and death from death. Thus you stay loyal to the staunchness of a faith which
dares not recognize its emptiness and is content with a transcendence of which
being would still be the measure. Seek, then—seeking nothing—that which
exhausts being exactly where it represents itself as inexhaustible. Seek the vanity
of the incessant, the repetitiveness of the interminable where there is perhaps no
cause to distinguish to be and not to be, truth and error, death and life, for each
refers back to the other, just as similarity depends into sheer resemblance—
resembling nothing, incomparable. Seek the ceaselessness of the return, effect of
disastrous instability. (WD 88-89)

219

Writing-trauma is not done for the sake of certainty, truth and error, life and death, or verifying a
‘truth-event.’ Writing-trauma is letting go of the notion that there can be a cut from the cut; that
somehow the flight identity can flee, the revolt of being can usurp the abject, rid the body of
traumatic fragments, redeem the subject, reconcile, transcend. There is only repetition, no break
in the eternal return. The will to truth, the attempt at mastery, through scientific discourse or
verifying the truth-event, is abandoned at this moment. As opposed to transcendence, there is a
going-under; as opposed to measurement, truth and error, there is ambiguity and fragmentation—
the Coatlique state.
In repetition, we tend to focus on the backward moving force of being hauled back to the
scene of trauma. But in order to get to a point in which there is a backward moving, there is a
going-forward. In this case it is a going-under-going-forward-going-backward. The goingforward of overcoming, is going-under without resistance. This is how it is self-overcoming.
The self is that which resists becoming undone. Yet, in le subissement, the individual overcomes
the illusion of a coherent, solid subjectivity as they unravel. Self-overcoming is dynamic in
repetition as one aspect is to overcome the misrecognition of a coherent self. It is selfovercoming in the sense that you have to overcome that sense of security of the self, the
distinction between self and other, and accept the horror of the other living within, to be an
accommodating host for the other to move in and take over, such that the self is annihilated.
This would be the sense of self-overcoming that is most akin to Nietzsche’s presentation
of it. Zarathustra confronts his audience: “But the worst enemy you can encounter will always
be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods… You must wish to consume
yourself in your own flame: how could you wish to become new unless you had first become
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ashes!” (TSZ 176). To digest it, let it nourish you, and not spit it out; to digest the thick, black
tar of darkness, let it enter my blood stream, let it blacken my blood; to allow the eternal return
of the trauma—to wish it!—to wish it outside of the space of the body, into the space of
language, the space of the blank page, the work, literature—this is self-overcoming and the
sudden going-under.
In the case of surviving trauma, and moreover writing-trauma, the notion of selfovercoming goes beyond overcoming self-limiting constructs. Self-overcoming is continuous. It
is self-overcoming in the sense that undergoing trauma-writing, beyond letting go of the concept
of subjectivity, there is an actual abandoning of subjectivity. The individual has to be willing to
annihilate the self, to return to the scene of the trauma, the immediate, abject feeling of being
alive, where subjectivity, identity, agency, and temporality are demolished. It is also selfovercoming in the sense that it is the body of the ‘self’ in the repetitive compulsion, forces a
return to the deepest, darkest, most abject ‘parts.’ It is also self-overcoming in the sense that
revolt of being in the immediate force of the flashback, the nightmare, and the unbearable weight
of being is suspended: “I” carry on. “I” repeat. “I” haul myself along.
Thus, while we are in le subissement, at this point the traumatic fragments, delivered by
chance, throws one off into disaster, annihilates the self to be unrecognizable, and yet, aware of
the utmost, abject feeling of being alive on the border of death and life—the incessant
interruption of trauma is both a going-under and a going-over. But, the residues of the disaster,
for instance disassociation, melancholy, depression, existential paralysis, living-death, are not
disastrous. Blanchot observes, “The fragmentary imperative, linked to the disaster. That there is,
however, practically nothing disastrous in the disaster: this is surely what we must learn to think,
without, perhaps, ever knowing it” (WD 60). The body knows the disaster, the revolt of being.
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With that, though it corrupts and molts the inner core, there is still a plastic power by which the
individual escapes disaster to the point of complete destruction.
We must learn this to write trauma, as disastrous as trauma shows itself to be. Ultimately,
we could say, the body already knows this. There is a point in which the individual absolutely
enfolded into uncontrollable sobbing—an outpouring of a deepest, most painful embodied
knowledge—something happens which cannot be accounted for, other than perhaps the selfovercoming of the body—the body recognizes that it has not been destroyed. The body
annihilates the knowledge of the limitless sobbing, this relentless, resounding cry, and establishes
a limit one again. It overcomes its own knowledge of the horror of the other living within; the
sobbing comes to rest, at some point, and we carry on.
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CONCLUSION

I write the words “a smashed up face”—what happens such that I am able to do so? As I write
these words, they bring to mind no other image than his smashed up face. It is a disturbing
image. If I do not push such images out of my mind quick enough, they choke me. In reading or
writing the words, remnants of images and pain captured within the words, repeat in the open
space of the page, outside and inside of my body, pulling me under. Writing is dangerous as
there is always a risk of the chance, the tuché, for the individual who writes. Though some
inkling of agency is maintained in the process, at any moment, it can be carried off as the words
flood my thoughts as images and sensory fragments, no longer language. Attempting to capture
trauma in language, is to conjure the inevitable chance.
Returning to the initial question, there is some merit in LaCapra’s claim that “There is no
such thing as writing trauma itself,” in that trauma cannot be localized in discrete, dated
experience when thinking of time as linear and writing as a belayed effect. However, writing is
always becoming; it is the text which is the “telling after-effect.” Further, writing-trauma is not
“working through in analyzing and “giving voice” to the past;” rather, it is the disaster speaking
in the ‘language’ of pain, as Blanchot describes: “It is not you who will speak; let the disaster
speak in you, even if it be by your forgetfulness or silence” (WD 4). In the process of writingtrauma, the sudden going under, the aspects that would allow for a cognitive working through are
corrupted along with temporality, agency, and subjectivity. The past is not experienced as past
and thus not voiced as having taken place in the past. Writing-trauma is circular as writing and
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trauma are repetition. Given this, the concept of ‘working through’ (the familiar expression used
to indicate some progress in reaching the other side, moving past the trauma) does not capture
the phenomenon of writing-trauma. There is no other side, only a looping going-underovercoming, but no crossing, traversing, or transcendence. Instead, there is a perpetual,
incessant revolt of being. This is the trauma-being’s ontology and identity. The expression
“coming to terms with” the trauma violates the repetition and betrays the individual, as there is
no “revolt that could be achieved, and verified” (WD 88).
This is why trauma does not fit the scientific model of knowledge, which is sustained on
the possibility of measure and verification. Further, repetition, with the corruption of temporality
and subjectivity, undermines the epistemological framework of the ‘truth-event,’ as well as
narrative discourse. But, this is not to say that trauma is unknowable and ineffable. The disaster
speaks a language of its own; it is situated in a style of writing of its own, which not only is in
contrast to scientific and narrative discourse, but fragments language.
Thus, the value of poetic language and fragmentary writing is found in regard to knowing
and writing-trauma. It is not easy to say that there is value in traumatic experience, especially
for those who undergo such experience. As has been stressed, those who know the horror of
knowing horror do not desire any such knowledge. Yet, this horror is a part of the human
condition and a part of our history. It is not something that we are exempt from—we must
submit to it. And even if we can never know the trauma of others in the way that they have
direct embodied knowledge, for those who endure trauma, one last wish remains: “know what
has happened, do not forget, and at the same time never will you know” (WD 82). The more we
experience trauma, the more valuable such writing becomes, not because it is a testament of what
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has taken place, not because it is a ‘working-through,’ but because it is a crying out of a
fundamental aspect of suffering as human.
Writing-trauma discloses fragments of philosophy. If we can say that literature “gets at”
trauma in a way that ordinary philosophical and, certainly, scientific discourse does not, then the
fragmentary imperative is also a demand on philosophy. That is, the imperative is for
philosophy to allow for a language that, in its functioning, cracks and fissures in meaning.
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